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– Abstract –  
Seneca’s Natural Questions:  
Platonism, Physics, and Stoic Therapy in the First Century AD 
Richard Beniston 
 
The combination of ethics and physics in Seneca’s Natural Questions has frequently puzzled 
scholars. Although a number of studies have attempted to reconcile the work’s ethical and 
physical parts, others maintain that there is no substantial connection between them. Both 
positions are problematic. The former glosses over the quite obvious ways in which these 
vivid accounts of vice are thematically at odds with the physics; the latter results in a 
bifurcation of the aims of the work. This study argues that the incongruous character of these 
passages plays an integral part in the work’s overall goal: to defend the Stoic account of the 
‘the good’. This account was under attack from Platonist rivals. The Stoics argue that the 
good is grounded ultimately in the wellbeing of the cosmos as a whole; Platonists maintain 
that conceptualising the good as such is impossible because, as empiricists, the Stoics can 
only account for a subjective understanding of the good, grounded first and foremost in the 
wellbeing of the body. Seneca’s engagement with this debate is indicated by the frequent 
allusions to Plato in the work, particularly the idea of ‘separating soul from body’. Seneca 
suggests that a carefully structured study of nature can achieve this ‘separation’. This process 
helps agents to overcome the subjective, body-focussed perspective that the Platonists 
associate with empiricism. Seneca thus demonstrates a therapeutic means through which an 
empiricist agent could come to conceive of the good as the Stoics envisage it. This same 
process of separation from one’s body, however, also provides an ideal opportunity to reflect 
critically on the objects that we tend to misidentify as goods. It is here that the moralising 
passages prove useful. These arresting accounts of vice serve to jar us into critical reflection 
on where we ground our understanding of the good.  
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– Introduction – 
 
1. Seneca’s Natural Questions: the rehabilitation of a neglected work 
Seneca’s Natural Questions “has never been widely read or admired”, or so it has frequently 
been said.
1
 In fact, though, the text did not always suffer from such disregard. From the 
Middle Ages through even into the 19
th
 century it enjoyed considerable standing as a 
scientific work, even if consistently outshone by the work of Aristotle and Pliny.
2
 It was 
really only the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries that saw the work fall into serious disrepute. 
Scholarship continued, to be sure, but mainly from the point of view of Quellenforschung,
3
 or 
else focussing on the knotty question of the work’s original book order (an issue which, more 
recently, may finally have been resolved).
4
 Little attempt was made to understand the work in 
its own right. Few, indeed, seem to have thought it worth bothering: the work was widely 
seen to be lacking a coherent sense of structure or purpose, philosophical understanding, and 
even seriousness of intent.
5
 
       In recent decades, though, there has been something of a renaissance of interest in the 
Natural Questions, with scholars returning to the text with a much more sympathetic eye. 
This trend began with a thesis (1960) and subsequent article (1964) by Stahl, followed by a 
monograph by Waiblinger (1977), and then a commentary on book 2 by Hine (1981). At the 
end of the 1980s there arrived another monograph, by Gross (1989), along with a lengthy and 
                                                 
1
 Morford (2002), 9. 
2
 See Waiblinger (1977, 1-3) for a useful history of the early reception of the Natural Questions. 
3
 For a long time it was believed that Seneca drew on just one source for the Natural Questions, frequent 
candidates being Posidonius, Asclepiodotus, or Papirius Fabianus. Today, most scholars accept that Seneca 
drew on a variety of sources. See especially Hall (1977); Setaioli (1988) 375-452; Gross (1989), passim. 
4
 Two main book orderings have come down to us in the manuscripts, with the so-called Quantum order (so 
named because of the first word in the manuscript) running 1 – 2 – 3 – 4a – 4b – 5 – 6 – 7, and the other (the so-
called Grandinem ordering) as 4b – 5 – 6 – 7 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4a. Both orderings, however, result in internal 
inconsistencies (for discussion of which, see Hine (1981), 4-19). Beginning in the early 19
th
 century, therefore, 
numerous attempts have been made to reorder the text coherently – as many as eleven, according to one count 
(Grecke (1895), 110). More recently, however, the work of Codoñer (1979) and Hine (1981) may have settled 
the question once and for all. Working independently, both scholars came to the conclusion that the text is best 
made sense of by arranging the books in what is now known as the Non praeterit ordering: 3 – 4a – 4b – 5 – 6 – 
7 – 1 – 2. While not represented in the manuscript tradition, this ordering makes best sense of Seneca’s inter-
book references, and a plausible explanation can be given about how the manuscripts degraded from this order 
into the two divergent manuscript traditions. There has been a widespread uptake of this ordering – with the two 
most recent translations even printing the books in this order. The arguments of Hine and Codoñer are 
undeniably convincing, and so for the duration of this study I will assume this ordering to be correct. At the 
same time, no element of my argument will depend crucially on this being so. 
5
 Lacking structure: Schultess (1888); Pohlenz (1948), 33. Lacking understanding: Reinhardt (1921). 
Seriousness of intent: Gercke (1895), 312, and especially Münscher (1922), 51ff; 140. For good summaries of 
early scholarship on the Natural Questions see Gross (1989), esp. 2-5; Maurach (1965), 357-9.  
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influential article by Codoñer (1989). Across the same period were a number of shorter 
though nevertheless important articles,
6
 as well as much crucial textual work.
7
  
       The turn of the millennium has seen a spate of further major studies, including 
monographs by Berno (2003), Gauly (2004) and Williams (2012), as well as a detailed thesis 
by Limburg (2007). There have, in addition, been two recent translations – into English by 
Hine (2010a), and Spanish (with substantial notes) by Bravo Diaz (2013). Articles focussing 
on the work have also continued apace.
8
 Altogether, this seems to indicate a level of 
sustained interest in the text – although, as Inwood first pointed out in 1998, Anglophone 
scholarship on the work has generally lagged far behind its European counterpart.
9
 Nearly 
two decades on, this situation remains largely unchanged.
10
  
       In this re-flourishing of interest the chief question that has occupied scholars has been the 
unusual form of the work – namely, the eccentric way in which Seneca articulates the 
physical subject-matter with moralising outbursts.
11
 These passages, which occur variously as 
prefaces, digressions and epilogues, throw up a number of interpretive difficulties, most 
challenging of which is the fact that their content seems to have little to do with the 
aetiological investigations in which they are embedded. It is this very feature, in fact, that has 
so frequently drawn criticism to the work. Accordingly, in studies seeking remedy the work’s 
                                                 
6
 Important dedicated studies from this period include Maurach (1965); Strohm (1977), (1985); Grilli (1987) 
Gigon (1991), with an extended treatment of the Natural Questions in Citroni Marchetti (1991), 116-173. Note 
that in this brief review I have generally excluded works that approach the Natural Questions from the point of 
view of ancient science (Gross (1989) and Maurach (1965) being important exceptions). The reason for this is 
that, strictly speaking, the work is not one of ancient science, but rather a work of philosophical physics (as 
pointed out by Limburg (2007), 72ff.) The primary reason for thinking so is that the work conforms to Seneca’s 
own distinction between science and physics in Ep. 88, in which the latter, unlike the former, is said to 
investigate causes. From the very beginning of the work, Seneca makes clear that he is interested in discovering 
causes: mundum circuire constitui et causas secretaque eius eruere (NQ 3 pref. 1). Furthermore, the authors 
whom Seneca draws on throughout the work are almost exclusively philosophers, and thus it was clearly in the 
tradition of natural philosophy that Seneca intended to locate the work. For extensive bibliography on all aspects 
of the Natural Questions, including ancient science, see Hine’s (2009-2010b) comprehensive bibliography, 
running from 1960-2006. 
7
 Especially important among which have been Codoñer (1979); Vottero (1989); and Hine (1996). 
8
 Including Chaumartin (1996); Leitão (1998); Graver (1999) (a response to Inwood’s (2005a) contribution); 
Scott (1999); Parroni (2000); Kullmann (2005). For comprehensive bibliography in the Natural Questions up to 
2006, see Hine (2009-10b). After this date see Limburg (2008); Williams has, since his monograph (2012), 
published a number of articles, e.g. (2013); (2014); (2016). Berno has also published since her monograph: 
Berno (2015). See also relevant chapter in the recent Brills Companion to Seneca, especially Gauly (2013); 
Setaioli (2013a) (from which also comes Williams (2013)) with extensive bibliography on Seneca in general. 
Another thesis which deals extensively with the Natural Questions is Jones (2013). 
9
 Inwood (2005a), 160 n.12. 
10
 Indeed, omitting Limburg’s thesis, William’s monograph remains the only published English-language 
monograph on the Natural Questions. 
11
 Codoñer (1989) cautions against lumping all of the non-physical portions of the Natural Questions together 
without further qualification. I can agree with this to some extent. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the group of 
passages which deal with ethical themes can (and I think should) be further differentiated.  
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poor reputation, finding a way of justifying the presence of these passages has generally been 
a central concern. 
       In broad terms, the strategies adopted fall into two camps. On the one hand, some 
scholars broadly accept the lack of integration, and assign the moralising passages a purpose 
essentially distinct from that of the aetiology – claiming, for instance, that they serve as light 
relief from the technical portions of the work,
12
 or that they represent a different mode of 
discourse with a separate though perhaps complementary set of goals.
13
 Those in the 
opposing camp, meanwhile, have striven to show that the passages are, despite appearances, 
carefully integrated with the physical themes. This is generally achieved through the 
identification of various lexical, artistic or thematic devices within the aetiology that, it is 
claimed, subsequently recur within the moralising passages.
14
  
       It is to this same debate that the present study hopes to contribute. Thinking in the binary 
terms just employed, my own interpretation sits somewhere between the two camps. On the 
one hand, I am sceptical of what I see as the tendency of the integrating interpretations to 
gloss over the ways in which the moralising passages are not particularly well-integrated.
15
 
The proposed connecting devices, I shall argue, are often highly subjective, open to 
contradictory interpretations, and have, it should be borne in mind, completely eluded the 
notice of generations of scholars. On the other hand, the ‘dis-integrating’ approaches appear 
to me as, essentially, an admission of defeat. To regard these passages as mere entertainment 
seems to trivialise substantial portions of text, while the allocation of a distinct set of ends to 
these sections results in an unacceptable bifurcation of work’s aims. Indeed, this result seems 
little different from the traditional appraisal of the Natural Questions as lacking a sense of 
coherence. I shall argue instead that the best way to resolve the difficulty is, on the one hand, 
to accept at face value that the moralising passages are not particularly well-integrated, while 
also maintaining that this very feature is an essential part of their function – a function, 
moreover, that closely complements that of the aetiology. 
       Reaching this conclusion, however, will not be entirely staightforward. While one might 
hope that something like this were the case, it is certainly not self-evident how the two 
                                                 
12
 A theory championed by Gross (1989), and partly accepted by Limburg (2007) 
13
 E.g. Limburg (2007); Codoñer (1989). Gauly (2004) could also be placed in this camp since, first, he sees 
Seneca as trying to combine Greek (physical) and Roman (moral) modes of discourse (cf. Gigon (1991)), but 
also because he sees moralising passages as, in part, a kind of concession to readers who are not able to benefit 
fully from the physical portions of the work. More on this in Chapter 1. 
14
 This is the approach of Stahl (1960); (1964); Waiblinger (1977); Scott (1999); Berno (2003); Williams (2012) 
– although, on Williams’ interpretation, more below. 
15
A point also made by Limburg (2007). 
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aspects of the work can work together in this way. Instead, it will first require considerable 
reflection on the underlying concerns that, I shall argue, motivate and shape the work as we 
we find it. At the core of this argument is the assumption that the Natural Questions is 
fundamentally a philosophical text, and that it is therefore to these concerns that we must 
look to in order to understand the work, including its unusual form. 
 
2. The Natural Questions: a work of philosophy  
Indeed, despite the revival of interest in the Natural Questions in recent years, it is notable 
that the text has still received relatively little attention as, in the first instance, a work of 
philosophy. Although the work has certainly not escaped philosophical analysis entirely, it 
remains the case that few of the major, ‘holistic’ studies of the text have approached it from 
this perspective.
16
 While none actively deny, or wholly ignore, the work’s philosophical 
character, most have nevertheless approached it as first and foremost a literary construction. 
       The most recent scholar to do so is Williams (2012), on whose study I would like to 
pause briefly for two reasons. On the one hand, this is because Williams’ book has, I believe, 
made an important contribution to our understanding of the Natural Questions, and some of 
my core claims about the work will turn out to be in close harmony with some of his. At the 
same time, Williams’ work (which he himself describes as “stressing to the last the artistic 
impulse that drives and shapes Seneca’s entire project” (his emphasis))17 also provides an 
excellent case study of the literary approach to the text that has dominated scholarship on the 
Natural Questions. 
       Williams’ central contention is that Seneca’s goal in the Natural Questions is to foster 
what he calls “the cosmic viewpoint”. This is achieved, Williams argues, through Seneca’s 
careful choice of physical theories that, individually and cumulatively, through their artistic 
tendencies, serve to draw the reader’s mind upwards into the cosmos, and to present a vision 
of the world as an integrated, unified system. Williams suggests, in fact, that the theories are 
chosen solely on the basis of their artistic qualities: “Whatever the merits or plausibility of 
individual theories, each in its own way projects an integrating vision of nature’s 
                                                 
16
 A notable exception to which is Gauly (2004), to which might be added the work of Stahl (1960); (1964) – 
although it should be said that Stahl’s interpretation has a very prominent literary component, even if framed in 
philosophical terms. Of the major shorter studies – which is to say, those that purport to offer something like a 
holistic interpretation of the text – only Donini (1979), ch. 3, Codoñer (1989) and Scott (1999) put philosophical 
considerations at the forefront. Although Inwood’s important and lengthy (2005a) article on the Natural 
Questions pays close attention to the work’s philosophical concerns, I omit it because Inwood himself purports 
only to give a “selective analysis”  of the work, and thus, for one thing, omits to discuss the moralising passages 
in any detail. 
17
 Williams (2012), 16.  
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workings”.18 On the matter of the moralising passages, Williams argues that, whereas the 
purpose of the aetiology is to extend our minds outwards towards the cosmos, these passages 
illustrate the polar opposite. In the moralising passages we find a “community of deviants” 
who, far from lifting their minds to the heavens, are completely obsessed with parochial, 
“terrestrial” concerns. For Williams, the lurid anecdotes of vice that we find in these passages 
provide an incentive to pursue the cosmic viewpoint, while, at the same time, exerting a 
darkly attractive counterforce of their own, setting the work in a “unifying tension” with 
itself.
19
   
       Williams’ work has, as I say, made enormous progress in elucidating some of the core 
themes of the work. In particular, his contention that the aetiology aims somehow to expand 
the viewpoint of the reader, and that the agents in the moralising passages represent the 
opposite pole of this, are ideas that I too see as central to Seneca’s argument. At the same 
time, Williams’ choice to focus almost exclusively on the literary aspects of the text seems to 
be methodologically problematic when dealing with a philosophical text such as the Natural 
Questions. 
       There is, of course, something of a tradition of reading Seneca’s work as principally a 
literary enterprise. This is in part due to the highly literary-rhetorical character of his work, 
though no doubt also down to the poor reputation as a philosopher that Seneca has often 
endured. There are, however, at least two good reasons why we should place philosophy at 
the forefront of our reading of Seneca’s work, the Natural Questions included. The first is 
that scholarship over the past few decades – spearheaded by Brad Inwood – has led to a 
widespread reappraisal of Seneca’s philosophical credentials. This only makes the relative 
philosophical neglect of the Natural Questions all the more surprising, and by itself warrants 
further philosophical scrutiny of this text. Second, though, and more important from the 
methodological perspective, is the simple fact that Seneca styles himself as a philosopher, 
and frames his prose
20
 works, including the Natural Questions, quite unmistakably as works 
of philosophy. Unless we are to dismiss this as mere posturing, it thus seems essential that we 
start out from the assumption that his work should be read as such. 
       This is not to say, of course, that artistic considerations are not also important. It need 
hardly be said that, in ancient philosophy quite generally, the artistic and philosophical 
aspects of a work are often closely intertwined, and this is undoubtedly true of Seneca’s 
                                                 
18
 Op. cit. 18-19. 
19
 Op. cit. 12; 88.  
20
 The dramas, of course, are a different matter. While some do indeed read the dramas as works of philosophy, 
for the duration of this thesis my focus will be exclusively on his prose works. 
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work.
21
 At the same time, there is something strange about the idea that we should take 
artistic considerations as the primary organising factor in a self-consciously philosophical 
work such as the Natural Questions. While, by way of comparison, no one would deny the 
prominent artistic component of Plato’s dialogues, surely none would argue that we should 
read them as primarily artistic creations. While the artistic elements may serve to convey the 
argument, and may, indeed, have a philosophically-grounded role in their own right, we must 
surely assume that the art is led by the philosophy, and not the other way around.  
       The problems that can arise if we invert this methodological hierarchy are visible in 
various aspects of Williams’ argument. One of Williams’ contentions, if we recall, is that 
‘cosmic consciousness’ is fostered through the artistic tendencies of the theories explored in 
the aetiology. Indeed, as we saw, Williams’ suggests that these theories are chosen solely on 
the basis of artistic merit. While in a more straightforwardly literary work such an idea might 
be unproblematic, when we factor in the philosophical dimension of the Natural Questions 
the claim becomes more difficult to justify. In particular, the reduction of physics to a mere 
artistic instrument in this way seems difficult to reconcile with the idea of Stoic physics as a 
theoretically significant branch of inquiry – something that Seneca seems clearly to have 
believed.
22
  
       Similarly problematic is Williams’ claim that the protagonists of the moralising passages 
exert a darkly attractive counterforce in the text. While, on an artistic level, this suggestion 
may be perfectly reasonable (if highly subjective), it seems doubtful that this is something 
that Seneca would have wanted to emphasise – or even, for that matter, to leave open as a 
possibility. For, on the Stoic understanding, if we as agents do find something attractive 
about vice, it is because we have made a terrible mistake about how to live our lives, and is 
thus something that ought urgently to be addressed. Therefore, unless Seneca was willing to 
risk doing serious harm to his readers, it seems unlikely that any alluring quality that we find 
in the moralising passages was an intentional part of the work’s design.23 
       A further problem concerns Williams’ characterisation of the cosmic viewpoint itself – 
the very end at which he takes the work to be aimed. Williams also describes this end 
                                                 
21
 For one recent exploration of the significance of literary form in Seneca’s philosophical project, see 
Gunderson (2015). See also Bartsch (2009); Armisen-Marchetti (2015), (1989); Inwood (2007c); Setaioli 
(2000); Traina (1995). 
22
 E.g. NQ 1 pref. 1-1; Ep. 89.1-17. More on Seneca’s interest in physics below.  
23
 Of course, as noted above, Williams also argues that the moralising passages are intended to serve as an 
incentive to pursue the ‘cosmic viewpoint’, as fostered by the aetiology. Again, though, while this apparent 
contradiction might be less problematic on an artistic reading, a philosopher might be more concerned about the 
potential of these passages to produce both effects at once – or, perhaps, different effects on different readers.  
13 
 
variously as “cosmic consciousness”, “seeing the all”, or the “totalizing worldview”; though 
despite these various descriptions it is difficult to pin down precisely what Williams takes this 
goal to consist of, if and when it is achieved. This element of fuzziness is perhaps best 
captured in Williams’ introduction, where he describes Seneca’s study of nature as serving to 
“free the mind from restrictions and involvements of this life, liberating it to observe, and 
luxuriate in, the undifferentiated cosmic wholeness that is so distant from the fragmentations 
and disruptions of our everyday existence”.24 While one can perhaps form an impression of 
what Willaims is getting at, it is difficult to deny that there is a degree of imprecision here. 
What, philosophically speaking, does it mean to gain freedom from the restrictions of 
everyday life? Does achieving this mean that we as agents cease to care about everyday 
concerns completely? What, again, does it mean to “luxuriate in...undifferentiated cosmic 
wholeness”? What is the ethical significance of this experience? Where does it sit within 
existing Stoic ethical theory – is it a new ethical τέλος, or is it reconcileable with existing 
Stoic theoretical structures? Considering the centrality of the cosmic viewpoint in Williams’ 
argument, these seem like pressing questions – especially since Williams himself maintains 
that Seneca is broadly working within a Stoic framework.
25
 However, the only way we are 
going to be able to answer them, I think, is by paying far closer attention to the philosophical 
theory that underpins the ideas in the text, including what Williams calls the ‘cosmic 
viewpoint’. 
       What all of this hopefully shows is that we must, at the very least, also pay close 
attention to the philosophical dimension of a work such as the Natural Questions. Doing so 
will not only lead us to an interpretation that is both artistically and philosophically 
consistent, but may in turn actually lead us to a better understanding of what is going on in 
the work in artistic terms as well. Indeed, rather than entirely rejecting the findings of 
Williams and others who have taken the artistic approach to the text, I hope that this thesis 
will, in part, serve to give a firmer philosophical footing to some of these ideas. 
 
3. The Natural Questions and post-Hellenistic Stoicism 
Another central claim of this thesis is that the Natural Questions is best understood by 
locating it within the intellectual context in which it was written. By this I do not primarily 
mean that the work is best seen as a product of Roman intellectual culture – as true as this 
                                                 
24
 Op. cit., 3.  
25
 E.g. op. cit., 2-3. 
14 
 
necessarily is, and it is a facet of the work that has been thoroughly explored already.
26
 
Instead (again considering the philosophical nature of the text) the context that I believe to be 
crucial is that of contemporary, post-Hellenistic philosophy. The philosophical currents of 
this period, I shall argue, turn out to be a crucial backdrop to Seneca’s thought in this work. 
       In order to begin to justify this claim, however, it will first be necessary to address, here 
at the start, what I take to be some long-standing misconceptions about post-Hellenistic 
Stoicism. Although this will involve us briefly looking slightly beyond the scope of the 
present study, it will serve to set the scene for some of the core claims of this thesis. 
 
3.1. Post-Hellenistic Stoicism: not just practical ethics 
By far and away the most enduring myth about post-Hellenistic Stoicism is that it is 
concerned pretty much exclusively with so-called ‘practical ethics’.27 Following the closure 
of the Athenian schools,
28
 on this narrative, philosophical activity was relocated to Rome. 
Finding themselves in this new cultural environment, characterised by an intense sense 
pragmatism, the Stoics were forced to adapt their philosophy to the tastes of their new 
audience. The result was a refocusing of philosophical efforts on the construction of a 
philosophy that better served the needs of practical life.
29
 Another, or perhaps parallel, 
version of the narrative has it that Stoicism became more interested in the “tyro” – the person 
just making moral progress – and that this resulted in a certain softening in the Stoics’ 
theoretical interests.
30
 Whatever the reason, it is maintained that serious interest in the more 
esoteric theoretical questions that had occupied previous generations of philosophers fell, in 
effect, by the wayside.
31
 The tripartite Stoic curriculum of logic, ethics and physics, put 
another way, was reduced to just one part: ethics – though a form of ethics focussed not on 
theory, but practice. In this narrative, Seneca is frequently taken to be one of the key 
protagonists.  
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 Williams (2012), Gauly (2004) and Berno (2003), for instance, all put heavy emphasis on the Roman 
character of the work. 
27
 E.g. Morford (2002, 227): “the obsessive concern...with philosophy as a practical guide to daily life”. 
28
 Athens was sacked by Sulla in 86 BC, leading many philosophers to flee, and to the closure of the Academy 
and the Lyceum. So ended forever the supremacy of Athens as the centre of philosophy – although by no means 
was this the end of serious philosophical  activity in this period. Philosophical schools sprang up around the 
Mediterranean region, of which Rome was just one (perhaps relatively minor) example.  
29
 See, e.g. Morford (2002), 4. Admittedly Morford, like others, does not claim that the study of physics was 
neglected completely; but it is then telling that physics features very little in his narrative of Roman philosophy. 
More on this below. 
30
 Arnold (1911), 102; Thorsteinsson (2010), 15; Bryan (2013), 136. 
31
 Lapidge (1989, 1371) declares that Stoic of this period were “patently uninterested” in cosmology – although 
he maintains that this does not necessarily mean that Stoics of this period did not know about Stoic physics – see 
n. 56, below.  
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       It is true, especially in more recent scholarship, that those who repeat these claims 
frequently add the caveat that, of course, there was some continuing interest in physics – a 
qualification that often seems motivated precisely by the somewhat troubling existence of the 
Natural Questions. But then it is usually added immediately that such interests were in the 
background, or else were subordinated to ethical concerns.
32
 The Natural Questions, indeed, 
is integrated into the narrative in precisely this way – with the claim, for instance, that the it 
has a “patently ethical agenda”, whatever its overt subject-matter.33 
       This, however, looks suspiciously like circular reasoning. It assumes that physics must 
have been of secondary interest to philosophers like Seneca simply because post-Hellenistic 
Stoicism is believed to have been dominated by practical ethics. However, although the 
Natural Questions obviously contains ethical themes, it is, as we have seen, far from clear 
what the relationship between the ethical and physical portions of the text actually is. There is 
certainly no prima facie reason why we should simply reduce the physics to ethics; and yet 
this is precisely what many scholars try to do, seemingly for little better reason than this is 
what best fits the accepted historical narrative. Another way of looking at the Natural 
Questions, however, is as a glaring counterexample to the dominant narrative of this period.     
In fact, though, it turns out to be just one of many.  
       For one thing, the Natural Questions is not even the only work of physics written by 
Seneca. He seems also to have written on the nature of fish, and stone, frequently said to have 
come from works called De piscium natura and De lapidum natura.
34
 Another work, De 
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 Thorsteinsson, op. cit. Morford (2002, 176) refrains from saying this in the case of physics, but does say so 
for logic, at least in Seneca’s case. However, Seneca’s advice to Lucilius not to get bogged down in logic need 
not imply its subordination. He surely means that we should not mistake proficiency in logic for being a good 
person. It seems clear that Seneca accords all three parts of philosophy equal weight from his image of 
philosophy as unified whole in Ep. 89. Moreover Barnes (1996), whom Morford actually cites, argues 
convincingly that logic was all the rage among young intellectuals in this period – again counting against the 
perception of this period as dominated by practical ethics. 
33
 Bryan (2013), 136. Bryan does at least note that the apparent predominance of practical ethics may be 
influenced by the nature of the surviving evidence – although, as I outline below, a great deal of non-ethical 
Stoic evidence from this period has in fact survived. It is more our selective use of this evidence that has skewed 
the picture. 
34
 Although, while it is seldom noted by scholars who reproduce them, the titles themselves are pure conjecture, 
proposed first by Haase (1853) on the basis that Seneca is named as a source by Pliny in the books of the NH 
that deal with these topics. See NH 1.9 and 1.36, on fish and stones respectively. In the former case, we do find 
a corresponding reference to Seneca: his observation of the remarkable longevity of the fish in Caesar’s fish-
pond (NH 9.126). In the latter case, however, no corresponding reference to Seneca is explicitly made. Going on 
the established rule that Pliny uses sources in the order in which he lists them in his index, we would expect 
Seneca’s contribution to come between NH 36.125-174 – though it is impossible to say what in this long 
passage comes from Seneca. Nevertheless, the references at least attest to Seneca writing about these topics; and 
the fact that the observations do not occur in any other of Seneca’s surviving works does seem to attest to lost 
writing (of unknown extent) on these topics. See Lausberg (1989) 1930-2; Vottero (1998a) 87-92; Ferrero 
(2014), 107-112. 
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forma mundi, is named explicitly by Cassiodorus,
35
 while two (apparently) geographical 
works, one on India, the other on Egypt, are referred to by Servius as De situ Indiae and De 
situ et sacris Aegyptiorum.
36
 Seneca himself, meanwhile, refers to a work on earthquakes that  
he wrote in his youth in book 6 of the Natural Questions.
37
 
       Seneca, however, is far from being exceptional.
38
 In the first century BC, at the 
beginning of our period, Antipater of Tyre (a friend of Cato, and possibly also Cicero
39
) 
wrote an On the cosmos. In the same period, Philoxenus (another associate of Cicero) may 
have written a summary of Panaetius’ On providence, and at least had access to one.40  
Posidonius’ pupil Asclepiodotus – sometimes conjectured as Seneca’s sole source in the 
Natural Questions, but certainly one of them
41
 – had something to say about the causes of 
earthquakes, and of lightning, possibly within a larger work itself called the Natural 
Questions.
42
 Geminus, while not definitely a Stoic himself, wrote an (extant) introduction to 
Aratus’ Phaenomena (a poem of intense Stoic interest,43 often seen to be heavily influenced 
by Stoicism itself) as well as a summary of Posidonius’ Meteorologica, of which only a short 
(but important) fragment survives.
44
 Even if not a Stoic himself, though, the considerable 
attention he paid to Stoic physics nevertheless suggests a continued, wider interest in the 
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 Cassiodorus Inst. 2.6.4. See Lausberg (1989) 1928-9; Vottero (1998a) 33-5; Ferrero (2014), 107-112. 
36
 Servius Aen. 9.30, 6.154; Pliny NH 1.6; 6.60. See. Lausberg (1989) 1932-7; Vottero (1998a) 19-22; Ferrero 
(2014). 
37
 NQ 6.4.2. 
38
 The argument for continued interest in physics and cosmology was already made by Todd (1989), though 
seldom heeded. For an excellent summary of the continuing theoretical interest across all schools in the post-
Hellenistic period, see Frede (1999). Trapp (2007, 10-13) also argues against the narrative of a radical restriction 
to ethics in this period. However, it is interesting to note that Trapp pays very little attention to physics in the 
rest of his book. Moreover, he seems unaware that independent physical treatises continued to be written by 
Stoics in this period: he cites only the Natural Questions as an example of Stoic physical writing, and seems to 
suggest that the only other place we find physics is integrated within the work of Stoic ‘ethicists’, who treat 
physics as “a fixed backdrop” against which they “concentrated their imaginative and exegetical resources on 
the ethical payoff” (2007, 12).  
39
 Cicero mentions his recent death at De officiis 2.86. 
40
 Cicero Ep. ad Att. 13.8. It is somewhat uncertain whether this work was actually written by Philoxenus 
himself. It may simply be that Cicero was asking for Philoxenus to send the work, since a slave in charge of 
Quintus Cicero’s library went by the same name – see Goulet DPh (= Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques) 
Va, P167. Even so, the reference to the work by Cicero as “Παναιτíου περì Προνοíας” (rather than, for instance, 
“Panaetii ‘Περì Προνοíας’”) does suggest that it is a derivative version of Panaetius work that is in question 
here, and the existence of such a work around this time is significant regardless of its precise author.  
41
 Mentioned at NQ 5.15.1; 6.17.3; 6.22.2; 2.26.6 
42
 A title conjectured on the basis of NQ 6.17.3, although the reading of this passage has been questioned by 
Hine (1981), 24-9 and Vottero (1989), 506. 
43
 The popularity of this poem among Stoics is attested to by, for example, the commentaries by Boethus of 
Sidon (in four books, 2
nd
 BC) and Achilles Tatius (3
rd
 AD), and a translation by Avienus (4
th
 AD) – on the latter 
two, more below. The Stoic leanings of the poet himself was first noted, as far as I can tell, by Mart in (1956, 3), 
who noted striking correspondences with the prelude of the poem and Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus, and also the 
emphasis on fate and divination throughout. It should be noted, as well, that Aratus came from the same town as 
Chrysippus: Soli. The Stoic influence on the poem is now widely accepted. See, e.g. Kidd’s introduction to his 
translation (1998).   
44
 EK T42. 
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topic in intellectual circles. Much the same can be said for Arius Didymus, who has again 
sometimes been seen as a Stoic in his own right.
45
  Whether or not this is true, he was 
certainly interested enough (and perceived enough popular interest) in Stoic physics to 
preserve its theories in his doxographical work.  
       Moving into the first century AD, there are a number authors for whose work Stoic 
physics is directly relevant. The first of these is Strabo, who repeatedly identifies as a Stoic, 
and whose colossal surviving Geography should perhaps be considered a work of Stoic 
physics in its own right.
46
 Seneca, meanwhile, tells us work that his teacher Attalus wrote a 
work classifying types of lightning for the purposes of divination.
47
 The Egyptian Chaeremon 
(who, as a tutor of Nero, may well have been known to Seneca) wrote a work On comets,
48
 as 
well as several etymological/allegorical works.  
       This latter genre seems to have become quite popular among Stoics at this time, which is 
significant when we consider that these works frequently drew on Stoic physics as a basis for 
allegorical interpretation. We see this in the (extant) Epidrome of Annaeus Cornutus (another 
potential associate of Seneca), as well as in the (also extant) Homeric Questions by the 
commentator Heraclitus – another figure who has not unreasonably been read as a Stoic in his 
own regard.
49
 There is some evidence, in fact, that Chaeremon might have adopted the same 
strategy in his own allegorical works.
50
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 The identification of various figures with the individual believed to be called Arius Didymus remains 
somewhat controversial. Diogenes Laertius lists a Stoic called Arius between Antipater and Cornutus in his list 
of Stoics, which fits chronologically with the Arius who was a court philosopher to Augustus. For a good 
summary of this issue, see Sharples (2010), 21-2. Against the traditional identification of Arius as a Stoic, see 
Hatzimichali (2017). Nevertheless, the very fact that anyone, Stoic or not, was recording Stoic views on physics 
in this period implies some level of continued interest, at the very least. On the remaining fragments of this part 
of the doxography, see Runia (2009).  
46
 Identifies with the Stoic school at e.g. 1.2.3; 1.2.13; 1.2.34; 2.3.8; 16.3.27.  Roseman (2005) regards the 
Geography as a work of science rather than physics, but suggests that Strabo carries out his scientific work 
within a Stoic methodological framework. Interestingly, a similar argument has recently been made for Pliny the 
Elder, by Paparazzo (2011). Pliny has, indeed, sometimes been considered a Stoic in his own right, in part down 
to the extremely Stoic-sounding outline of the cosmos he gives in book 2 of the NH. Unlike Strabo, though, 
Pliny never actually identifies as a Stoic (or, for that matter, as a philosopher of any kind) and there is probably 
too little evidence to be sure about his philosophical sympathies or allegiances (if any). 
47
 NQ 2.48.2; 50.1. 
48
 Fr. 3 Van der Horst. 
49
 Seen as a Stoic in an influential article by De Lacey (1948), a view which was rehabilitated in the doctoral 
dissertation of Thompson (1973). Long (1992), however, rejects this reading. He does so because he does not 
think that type of allegorising that Heraclitus does was that practiced by ‘orthodox’ Stoics. Namely, whereas 
Heraclitus considers Homer to have written in allegory, the Stoics thought the allegorical aspect of myth was not 
by design of the poet. As Boys-Stones (2003) shows, however, both methods of allegorisation were theorised by 
Stoics – especially, moreover, in this later period.  
50
 See, for example, Fr. 17d Van der Horst. 
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       Cornutus, for his part, also wrote a work called On properties,
51
 as well as a polemic 
against Aristotle’s Categories and a Reply to Athenodorus – all of which, and certainly the 
first, were likely concerned with metaphysical matters.
52
 
       In the same period we have the lengthy Astronomica poem, a work awash with Stoic 
cosmology,
53
 and whose author, Manilius, has sometimes been seen as a fully-fledged 
Stoic.
54
 While some have questioned this,
55
 his work nevertheless shows that Stoic physics 
was still seen as a theoretically relevant way of studying the cosmos.
56
 For the same reason it 
is also worth mentioning two other works that can probably be dated to this period. The first 
is the pseudo-Aristotelian On the Cosmos, a work that seems to blend elements of Stoic and 
Peripatetic physics. The second is the anonymous Aetna poem – a work of particular note 
since it seems to have been directly influenced by Seneca’s Natural Questions. It has even 
been suggested, very speculatively, that it was written by Seneca’s own Lucilius.57 
       In the second century we have two extant, though frequently overlooked, works of 
physics written by Stoics. One is Cleomedes’ Lectures on Astronomy. The other, even more 
neglected, is Aelian’s On the Characteristics of Animals.58 Aelian, what is more, wrote at 
least two other physical treatises: On providence and On divine interventions, though these 
have unfortunately not survived. Perhaps equally important from this period is the work of 
the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias. While obviously not a Stoic himself, Alexander felt 
that it was worth writing quite extensively against Stoic physics – in his On mixture, On fate 
                                                 
51
 Corpus die papiri filosofici greci e latini I (1989), 35 1T, on which see Sedley (2005).  
52
 This is clear in the case of On properties because the sole fragment of this work, preserved at Syrianus, in 
met. 106.7, discusses Platonic Forms – more on which below.  
53
 On which see Lowe (2014) – who, however, also detects other non-Stoic sources of influence in Manilius. 
54
 Boechat (2010).  
55
 E.g. Volk (2009), 30-1. 
56
 Indeed, the point about continued theoretical relevance of Stoic physics is important. In a well-known article, 
Lapidge (1989) traces the widespread presence of Stoic cosmological themes in Roman literature, and argues 
that this is merely a literary phenomenon. Lapidge argues that for Romans (whom he sees as “patently 
uninterested” is cosmological speculation), such themes had simply become a literary commonplace, and need 
not suggest continued interest in the theoretical underpinnings of these ideas. Three points can be made against 
this. First, even if some authors were interested in motifs from Stoic physics primarily from a literary point of 
view, this is certainly not true of all authors writing in this period. Second, even if one were to argue that authors 
such as Manilius and the Aetna poet were only interested in these themes for artistic reasons, it remains the case 
that they still saw Stoic physics as the most relevant framework to employ in writing about nature. Third, and 
partially following from this, the very fact that Stoic cosmology remained the model of choice for thinking 
about the cosmos (even if only from an artistic point of view) may in itself be indirect evidence for the 
continued theoretical interest in Stoic physics. For, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that these literary 
trends were themselves informed by contemporary intellectual trends in thought about the cosmos.  
57
 This is based on Seneca’s urging of Lucilius to write about natural philosophy in Ep. 88, coupled with the fact 
that Lucilius himself was based in Sicily. On the Aetna poem, including its Stoic leanings and sometimes 
verbatim correspondence with the Natural Questions, and apparent influence by Manilius’ poem, see Lapidge 
(1989), 1409ff. 
58
 Whose Stoic character is argued by Díaz-Regañón López (1983).  
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and, to a lesser extent, his On the soul. If Stoic physics was not still an active force in this 
period, why bother arguing?  
       In the third century, when Stoicism as a whole was on the decline, we nevertheless have 
an extant work of physics written by a Stoic. This is Achilles Tatius’ Introduction to Aratus, 
which may or may not be the same as his On the celestial sphere.
59
 In addition, Achilles 
wrote a (lost) History (one of several we see across this period, adding to counterparts by 
Aelian and Strabo, again indicating a range of interest beyond practical ethics) as well as, 
more significantly, yet another etymological work.  
       Moving into the fourth century, when Stoicism is generally considered to have ceased to 
exist as an active philosophical force, we nevertheless find several relevant works by an 
author who has sometimes been identified as a Stoic: Rufius Festus Avienus.
60
 Avienus, who 
appears to have been a distant relation of Musonius Rufus, wrote yet another work on Aratus’ 
Phaenomena, this time a (loose) translation, as well as two other poems on physical topics: 
Descriptio orbis terrae and the Ora Maratima – all of which to varying extents survive. 
Avienus’ interest in such topics is significant because, if he was a Stoic, he would attest to an 
interest in Stoic physics right to the very end of our period – and, indeed, to the end of 
Stoicism itself. For, so far as I can tell, Avienus is the very last person in our record who 
might be considered a Stoic.  
       We must also not forget the many works that must, assuredly, have fallen from the 
historical record completely. While it is impossible to guess how many this might be, or to 
speculate about their subject-matter, it should be noted that there is evidence of many – very 
many – Stoics active during the post-Hellenistic period for whom we have no information but 
their names: something in the order of one-hundred-and-fifty.
61
 Had history favoured the 
preservation of even a fraction of the output of these philosophers, who knows how 
differently we would view post-Hellenistic Stoicism? 
       Why, then, has the practical ethics narrative persisted? The sole reason for this seems to 
be the choice of scholars to focus all but exclusively on the work of just four authors: Seneca, 
Musonius Rufus, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. While it is undeniable that these authors 
provide the richest source of evidence for Stoic thought in this period, we must be aware that 
they are rich primarily from just one point of view: precisely that of (practical) ethics. The 
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 A title mentioned in the Suda (Schaefer 1, col. 247). For discussion see Goulet DPh A8. 
60
 See Goulet DPh A515. 
61
 This much is evident if one goes through Goulet (1989-) – though see esp. Goulet’s ‘Epimetrum’ in the 
forthcoming edition of his Dictionnaire, which tabulates philosophers by school, period and region. Many of 
these Stoics were operating in Rome; but many, it should be noted, were not: following the closure of the 
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broader range of evidence available, though, illustrates the relative narrowness of these 
interests, and should, therefore, caution us against basing our impression of this period purely 
on the work of just these four. The danger of doing so becomes even clearer when we 
consider the fact that, of these authors, one wrote a considerable amount on physics in any 
case; one was not a full-time philosopher, but an emperor; the other two left nothing of their 
own writings, and one of these, according to a recent study, may have been as much a Cynic 
(a sect that famously rejected the study of physics and logic) as he was a Stoic.
62
 This is not 
to deny the interest and importance of these authors; but in focussing our attention on them 
exclusively we are stripping away important context for our understanding of this period –
perhaps even for our understanding of these authors themselves.  
       Having said all this, it is not the purpose of this thesis to engage closely with the broader 
range of technical interests of Stoic philosophers in this period  (though a study of this kind is 
crying out to be undertaken). The focus here will remain quite narrowly on the concerns 
relevant to the Natural Questions – a work which does undoubtedly have a strong ethical 
drive. Nevertheless, it will be important for our purposes to be aware of this broader context 
for at least two reasons.  
       To begin with, it will caution us against the common tendency of reading the physical 
content of the Natural Questions as a kind of proxy for, or simply an artistic backdrop to, 
ethics.
63
 Physics, as we have now seen, continued to theoretically relevant to Stoics in this 
period, and thus there seems no reason to think out of hand that Seneca was any different. 
Indeed, considering that the Natural Questions was only one of several physical treatises 
written by Seneca, there is actually good reason to think that he took physics seriously. As we 
shall see, I argue that the physics in the Natural Questions is theoretically significant in its 
own right – meaning that the work’s goals could not have been achieved just as well within a 
more straightforwardly ethical context.
64
  
       Second, an awareness of the fact that many Stoics in this period were still interested in 
more technical, theoretical matters will also caution us against automatically labelling the 
ethical argument of the Natural Questions as merely a form of practical ethics – ethics, that 
is, which is not particularly interested in the underlying theory. Indeed, although I shall argue 
that the ultimate drive of the work is indeed ethical, Seneca’s argument nevertheless involves 
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 Inwood (2017), who suggests that there is “as much or more reason to think of him as a Cynic” as a Stoic, 
though goes on to argue that Musonius should probably be thought of as falling into a category of “generic 
philosopher” or “public intellectual”, without any particularly strong philosophical allegiances.  
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 Including, it should be noted, some of the more philosophical approaches to the text – e.g. Stahl (1960); 
(1964); Inwood (2005a), esp. 200. 
64
 Pace Inwood (2005a), 200. 
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considerable engagement with theory, both ethical and physical. What is more, I shall strive 
to show how Seneca is required to adapt existing Stoic arguments in response to 
contemporary philosophical pressures – a point, however, that brings us to a second major 
misconception regarding Stoicism of this period. 
 
3.2 Seneca, Platonism, ‘eclecticism’ 
Accompanying the narrative of practical ethics, and indeed closely related to it, is the 
longstanding idea that the post-Hellenistic period was an era of philosophical stagnation.
65
 
The idea is well captured in the following from Long: 
 
...they [Roman philosophers] were living at a time when all philosophy, as taught by Greeks, was 
characterized by school allegiance and authority rather than conceptual innovation or purely open-
ended inquiry. The big developments in philosophy, associated with the emergence of Neoplatonism 
and Aristotelian commentary...postdate the figures we primarily think of as Roman philosophers. 
They are creative chiefly in the way they write about their Greek inheritance, in what they select from 
it, and in the educational mantle they assume.
66
  
 
Note, indeed, how Long combines this narrative with that of practical ethics. Although Long 
does not say this explicitly, the former assumption actually follows from the latter. For if the 
Stoics of this period were only interested in practical ethics, it stands to reason that their work 
should be devoid of significant theoretical innovation. 
       In fact, the perception of post-Hellenistic philosophy (and post-Hellenistic Stoicism in 
particular) was for a long time worse even than this. Rather than merely lacking the spirit of 
innovation, Stoicism of this period was seen as positively retrograde, degenerating into a 
kind of fuzzy thinking manifested in what has frequently been dubbed ‘eclecticism’. 
According to some, this trend began as far back as Panaetius, when he, followed by his pupil 
Posidonius, began to experiment by incorporating various aspects of Plato’s philosophy into 
their systems. Thus began, it has been suggested, a trend of Stoics selecting ideas from rival 
schools more or less as they pleased, unaware or uncaring of the philosophical corollaries of 
the theories they adopted.
67
 Another version of this narrative, however, puts this trend down 
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 Somewhat ironically, this narrative of degeneration in post-Hellenistic philosophy was once seen as a 
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 Long (2003), 192.  
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to a later development in this period: the rapid re-emergence of so-called ‘Middle’ 
Platonism.
68
 On this latter reading, Stoics of this period were essentially won over by the 
arguments of this new school and began, as a result, to abandon a pure form of Stoicism in 
favour of one which incorporated elements of Platonism.  
       In this picture Seneca has again featured prominently. The primary reason for this is the 
obvious interest that he undoubtedly displays in Platonist philosophy.
69
 This is most overt in 
the well-known 58
th
 and 65
th
 Letters,
70
 in which he engages directly with a contemporary 
version of Platonic metaphysics. Beyond this, though, scholars have pointed to various 
elements of Seneca’s own thought – about god, for instance, or the soul – which seem to bear 
distinctive hallmarks of Platonism. The Natural Questions itself has formed an important part 
of this narrative due to the distinctly Platonic flavour of, above all, the preface to book 1 (a 
passage to which we shall return frequently).
71
 Whether this was down to the persuasive 
influence of Platonism,
72
 personal religious inclinations,
73
 or simply because of a downright 
lack of philosophical acuity,
74
 it is argued that Seneca was led to abandon ‘orthodox’ 
Stoicism and began to incorporate Platonist elements – often at the expense of philosophical 
consistency.  
       While the narrative of eclecticism has persisted in some quarters, often in more nuanced 
forms,
75
 its popularity has in general waned.
76
 With respect to Seneca, in any case, many 
have now begun to see the presence of Platonic tropes in his work in a completely different 
light.
77
 Several scholars have argued that Seneca’s adoption of Platonising themes can be 
interpreted more or less as a feature of his rhetorical strategy. Seneca, it has been argued, 
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uses Plato’s powerful imagery to convey his ideas in a vivid and persuasive way – ideas 
which are nevertheless easily reconcilable within Stoicism.
78
 
       While this scholarship is welcome, and generally very plausible, it nonetheless raises 
new questions with regard to Seneca’s relationship with Platonism. In particular, if Seneca 
was not seeking some kind of rapprochement between the two schools, then what, precisely, 
is the root of his intense interest in Platonism? While the rhetorical power of Plato’s imagery 
may well be part of it, this by itself does not feel like a complete answer. It is not as though 
Plato had a monopoly on powerful rhetoric; Seneca, of course, was an accomplished 
rhetorician in his own right. Even if, alternatively, we were merely to put it down to a matter 
of personal artistic preference, we would still have to ask why Seneca thought it legitimate to 
so frequently make use of the language of those whom he ought really to see as his 
philosophical adversaries. Indeed, once we do dispense with the conciliatory reading of 
Seneca vis-à-vis Platonism, it actually becomes quite surprising that we do not find Seneca 
adopting a more adversarial stance towards this school. 
       This apparent peculiarity of Seneca’s actually reflects a broader puzzle about the 
philosophical dynamics of this period. For while the Platonists vociferously and aggressively 
attacked the Stoics throughout the post-Hellenistic period, the Stoics, for their part, seem little 
concerned to respond in kind, or even to defend themselves.
79
 This oddity has, in fact, helped 
to feed the narrative of rapprochement and eclecticism, even seeming to explain it; for it 
creates the impression that the Stoics had simply been won over by the arguments of their 
rivals, perhaps becoming aware of inadequacies within their own system.
80
 
       In fact, though, the alleged silence of the Stoics in this period has been overplayed – at 
least to a certain extent. While by no means as vocal as the Platonists, there is at least some 
evidence of Stoic polemic in this period. For instance, in a fragment of Cornutus – perhaps 
from his On properties – we find him describing Plato’s forms as mere genera, apparently an 
attempt to reduce the Forms to mere mental constructs.
81
 If one interpreter is to be believed, 
there may also be a anti-Platonist undertone to another of Cornutus’ works, the Epidrome, 
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 For this reading, see especially Reydams-Schils (2010); Inwood (2005b). 
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 Engberg-Pedersen (2017, 11) notes the common perception that “The Stoics, on their side, were basically 
unconcerned about the rising Platonism”. Cf. Boys-Stones (2013), 128. For possible reasons for this apparent 
silence, see Boys-Stones (2009) – who suggests that their silence is in effect a deliberate attempt not to 
acknowledge the Platonists – and Bonazzi (2014); (2016) – who suggests that such polemical engagements were 
simply more important for the Platonists, who, as new philosophical contenders on the scene, needed to engage 
in noisy polemics as a way of carving out an identity for themselves.   
80
 This idea will be picked up at the start of Chapter 2. 
81
 Syrianus, in met. 106.7. On this being the thrust of Cornutus’ point, see Sedley (2005), 120-1 – although 
Sedley reads this not as polemical, but an attempt at rapprochement, since such a description of the Forms could 
be viewed by some contemporary Platonists as comparable to their own.  
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which may represent a subtle critique of Plato’s Timaeus.82 We should also not forget that 
Cornutus also wrote a work Against the Categories of Aristotle which, while not directed 
against Platonism, nevertheless attests to his polemical mindset, and a keenness to continue to 
fight for the Stoic position.  
       A further example appears in the work of the Homeric commentator Heraclitus. Near the 
end of his allegorical exegesis, Heraclitus turns his sights against Plato, criticising not merely 
his expulsion of Homer from the ideal city (which is perhaps to be expected, given the 
context) but also against Plato’s metaphysics. He calls Plato’s Forms mere “twitterings” 
(τερετίσματα), which serve no practical or moral purpose.83 While not an argument as such, 
the statement nevertheless represents an important example of hostility towards philosophical 
rivals among Stoic (or, at least, Stoically-inclined) writers in this period.
84
 
       However, by far the most significant example – at least for our purposes – comes from 
none other than Seneca, in his 65
th
 Letter.
85
 I shall return to consider this text in more detail 
in later chapters. Here suffice it to say that, although this Letter is frequently taken as prime 
evidence for Seneca’s conciliatory attitude towards Platonism, Seneca actually explicitly 
argues against what he sees as the superfluities of Platonist metaphysics, instead stating a 
clear preference for the simpler Stoic model. 
       While I would hesitate before making sweeping claims about Seneca’s more general use 
of Platonic themes, or that of Stoics in the post-Hellenistic period more widely,
86
 this 
evidence nevertheless demonstrates that Seneca’s attitude towards Platonism, far from being 
conciliatory, could instead be positively adversarial.  
       This evidence counts strongly against both the narrative of eclecticism and that of post-
Hellenistic Stoics as mere inheritors of a Hellenistic legacy, living in a period when nothing 
exciting was happening in philosophical terms. What it shows, in fact, is that at least some 
Stoics in this period were keenly aware of the new challenges arising from the changing 
philosophical landscape. Indeed, what is particularly interesting about the above examples of 
anti-Platonist sentiment is that they are each directed at the very same aspect of Platonist 
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 Boys-Stones (2009). 
83
 Homeric Problems 78-9.  
84
 Indeed, Heraclitus goes on to criticise Epicurus as well – which helps to narrow down Heraclitus’ allegiance 
towards Stoicism, since the Stoics are conspicuously not attacked. 
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 On the polemical character of Letter 65, taken together with 58, see Boys-Stones (2014). For the opposing 
view, see Sedley (2005). 
86
 Some work has been done of the presence of Platonic tropes in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius – see, for 
example, Gill (2007); Bénatouïl (2015). While my focus here will be on Seneca, it is an intriguing possibility 
that the presence of Platonic allusions in their work may also, on occasion, have a dialectical slant. It is certainly 
a question deserving further consideration.  
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philosophy: its metaphysics. This is highly significant, though, since it was precisely the 
Platonists reassertion of Plato’s metaphysics that would define their re-emergence onto the 
philosophical scene. Indeed, it was on this very basis that they began to wage a philosophical 
war against rivals such as the Stoics. ‘Big developments’, in other words, were already taking 
place in this period, and the above evidence clearly attests both to Stoics’ awareness of this, 
and their willingness, at least sometimes, to stand up for the Stoic position. 
 
4. Summary: a dialectical reading of the Natural Questions  
The possibility of dialectical engagement with Platonism is something that I would like to 
explore as part of my interpretation of the Natural Questions. This engagement, I shall argue, 
provides a crucial frame for understanding what is going on philosophically in the text. In 
particular, I shall argue that Seneca is engaging with a particular issue of considerable 
contention with the Platonists in this period: how to account for a well-grounded concept of 
the good. The Platonists, in short, argue that the Stoics cannot account for such a concept. 
This, they argue, is a result of the Stoics’ empiricism, which has the effect of limiting agents 
to an inescapably partial view of the world, which in turn can only result in a partial and 
relative understanding of the good – equivalent ultimately to a narrow form of self-interest. 
This is a problem for the Stoics, however, since they argue that the good is something 
objective, grounded ultimately in the state of wellbeing in the cosmos as a whole. If the 
Platonists are right about the limitations of empiricism, however, grounding one’s concept of 
the good in the wellbeing of the entire cosmos becomes completely untenable.    
       At first, connecting the Natural Questions to such a debate might come as something of a 
surprise. Seneca, it is true, does not explicitly mention this debate in the text. However, there 
are various statements at key points in the work that seem to speak directly to the sort of 
concerns raised by the Platonists on this matter. Moreover, these statements are phrased in 
terms which seem designed specifically to bring Platonism to mind. 
       Seneca’s response to the problem, I suggest, is to argue that the study of physics can 
serve as a therapeutic tool to help agents transcend this restricted perspective on the world. 
Studying physics, he shows, not only leads us to an appreciation of the world’s fundamentally 
rational nature but, in so doing, also serves to foster a sense of affinity with the cosmos – 
something that is vital if we are to develop an understanding of the good as bound up with 
cosmic wellbeing. 
       This model of physics as a kind of therapy has roots, I shall argue in the final chapter, 
that go back to the Hellenistic Stoa. Nevertheless, Seneca develops earlier ideas into 
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something much more systematic. What is particularly crucial for Seneca’s therapeutic model 
is the way in which physical study is approached, which comes out in the carefully conceived 
structure that the aetiology takes in each book. In broad terms, this structure proceeds from 
the visible to the invisible, a ‘methodology of abstraction’ which serves – in Seneca’s own 
terminology – to separate the soul from the body. This separation, I argue, is designed to 
draw attention to one’s essentially rational nature, thus highlighting precisely what one has in 
common with the cosmos, in turn serving to foster a sense of affinity towards it.  
       What is intriguing about Seneca’s adoption of this methodology, though, is that it seems 
closely to mirror an approach that the Platonists themselves advocate. Seneca, then, seems to 
be helping himself to the resources of his rivals. In the Conclusion I shall reflect back on 
what to make of this as a dialectical strategy. Some may wish to see this as simply an 
example of Seneca’s propensity to incorporate elements of Platonism within his own thought. 
Nevertheless, I shall argue that this is not a case of eclecticism, nor an attempt at conciliation 
between the schools. Rather, Seneca’s appropriation of this methodology should be seen as 
an attempt to resist the Platonist attack. Crucial to understanding this is the realisation that, 
despite adopting something from his rivals, Seneca nevertheless decidedly does not adopt any 
of the metaphysical baggage that goes along with it. Rather, Seneca harnesses the Platonist-
inspired methodology to buttress the Stoic position, and does so in the face of a Platonist 
attempt to discredit that very position. While, as a dialectical strategy, this completely lacks 
the ferocity and agression of Platonist polemical writing, this nevertheless represents a 
concerted attempt to defend the Stoic position against a specific line of attack. What is 
particularly ingenious about Seneca’s strategy, I shall argue, is that by partially adopting a 
Platonist methodology, Seneca responds to the Platonists in terms that they ought basically to 
accept.   
       The work’s structural scheme also turns out to be crucial for understanding the role of the 
moralising passages – though these are an innovation over and above both Stoic and Platonist 
models. If the aetiology is supposed to foster an understanding of the good as grounded in the 
cosmos as a whole, then theses passages, I argue, caricature agents who have erroneously 
grounded their understanding of the good in narrowly self-interested terms – precisely the 
terms, in fact, that the Platonists say an empiricist agent must. Their function, I suggest, is to 
complement the goals of the aetiology in reorienting us towards the correct understanding of 
the good, though in this case by turning us away from the objects that we mistakenly 
articulate as goods. Crucial to their effectiveness in this respect, however, is the fact that 
these passages are positioned at very specific points in the text – points that are carefully 
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chosen to create a maximal and jarring contrast between the sense of ‘separation’ brought 
about through the aetiology.  
       The Natural Questions, then, emerges as a text of considerable interest. To begin with, it 
turns out to display a structural, thematic and philosophical unity that has seldom been 
accorded to it, with all parts of the text working together to form a definite and 
philosophically coherent purpose. Second, it shows Seneca to be critically engaged with 
theoretical issues beyond mere practical ethics. Finally – and particularly if I am right about 
the (anti-)Platonist dimension of the work – it also contributes to, and provides a case 
example for, a narrative of post-Hellenistic Stoicism that is much philosophically lively than 
has often been presumed. 
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– Chapter 1 – 
The Unusual Form of the Natural Questions: Interpretive Approaches 
 
1. Introduction: The unusual form of the Natural Questions  
The Natural Questions has often been seen as an unusual text. It is, for one thing, a work of 
physics, written by a ‘moralist’, at a time when Stoics were supposed to be focussed on 
‘practical ethics’. But even if we do away with these assumptions, as I think we should,1 one 
still cannot help but feel that the work is, nevertheless, rather strange. The primary reason for 
this impression is the frankly arresting way in which Seneca regularly interrupts the physical 
investigation with moralising outbursts, dealing with themes that seem to have little to do 
with their surrounding context. Indeed, the nature of these passages seems so incongruous 
that the work has been seen as something of a mess. Scholars have judged the work to be 
without any coherent structure;
2
 they have suggested that the collocation of ethics and 
physics is the result of a dubious attempt to combine two different sorts of discourse;
3
 or even 
that Seneca had no real interest in the physical subject matter, and that the physics merely 
serves as a technically challenging medium for his more typical moralising interests – a 
challenge that he ultimately fails to pull off.
4
 While such negative perceptions are beginning 
to change, the question of how to make sense of the work remains a contentious one. 
       The mere combination of ethics and physics should not, perhaps, strike us as especially 
odd. Seneca is of course a Stoic, and the Stoics famously boasted of the unitary nature of 
their system, with a close relationship between all three branches of the philosophical 
curriculum – logic, ethics and physics.5 The thing that is striking, rather, is the manner in 
which Seneca goes about combining the two.  
       Part of the problem is that the ‘ethics’ is confined to various prefaces, digressions and 
epilogues. This immediately creates a sense of separation between the two parts of the text. 
This impression is reinforced, however, by the awkward ways in which Seneca moves from 
one part of the work to the other. The moralising passages are typically introduced abruptly, 
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 See Introduction.  
2
 Reinhardt (1921), 51ff; 140; Pohlenz (1948), 33. Cf. Sandbach (1975), 158. 
3
 Gigon (1991) – who, however, ultimately leaves the extent of Seneca’s success an open question. 
4
 Gercke (1895), 312; Münscher (1922) – who accuses Seneca of a downright lack of seriousness in the work. 
More recently Inwood (2005a, 200), while not going so far as Gercke in denying Seneca’s interest in physics, 
nevertheless suggests that Seneca’s choice of meteorology in particular (“evidently the driest and least appealing 
genre in the philosophical repertoire”) was motivated by a desire to show his literary brilliance – something at 
which Inwood surmises he ultimately failed, given the works longstanding unpopularity. 
5
 D. L. 7.39-41; S. E. M. 7.19; Seneca Ep. 88.25-8; Cicero De fin. 3.74-5. 
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with jarring formal devices such as the suddenly professed desire to tell a “story” (5.15.1; 
1.16.1) or else in response to a contrived interruption from Lucilius, requesting moral 
instruction instead of the technical investigation (4b.13.1; 2.59.1. Cf. 6.32.1). 
       What is especially puzzling, however, is the content of these passages, which frequently 
appears to have scarcely (if anything) to do with the surrounding physical discussion. In the 
middle of book 3, for example, Seneca has been exploring the causes of rivers. Part of the 
explanation has involved positing the existence of underground caverns that, Seneca goes on 
to suggest, often contain fish-like animals, which explains why fish are periodically dug out 
of the ground. Imagining Lucilius’ incredulity, Seneca remarks that his amazement is 
misplaced, and he should instead be amazed by the inventions of luxury – in particular, the 
practice of watching fish die at the dining table. This gives way to a vivid tirade against this 
custom, and a vicious attack on those who engage in it. Subsequently, Seneca apologies for 
losing his composure, and returns to the investigation (3.16.4-18.7). 
       This is a recurrent pattern. Frequently there is some connection between the physical 
discussion and the subsequent moralising passage; but typically this is so manifestly weak (as 
it is above) that, if anything, it serves simply to underscore the sense of incongruity. In book 
4b, for example, the discussion of the formation of snow and hail gives way – following a 
request for moral benefit from Lucilius – to a diatribe against the practice of using snow to 
cool drinks (4b.13.1-11). In book 5, the central digression tells a fabula detailing how Philip’s 
men were once sent down an abandoned mine in search of gold – the justification for which 
is ostensibly the preceding mention of a theory that winds originate from subterranean caves 
(5.15.1-4). In book 1, the discussion of various reflective phenomena (rainbows and the like) 
gives rise, in the epilogue, to a shocking fabella about one Hostius Quadra – a man who 
delighted in using a panorama of mirrors to view his lavish sexual encounters from every 
possible angle (1.16.1-17.10). Even these superficial connections are not always present, 
however. Following book 4a’s lengthy preface on the dangers of flattery (4b pref. 1-1.1), 
Seneca makes no attempt to connect this theme with the subsequent investigation of the 
Nile’s flooding – except for the idea that the investigation of this topic will serve to draw 
Lucilius away from his present situation.
6
 
        
                                                 
6
 Limburg (2007, 185) finds one parallel where the topic of flattery is associated with the Nile, in a late text by 
John Chrysostom (4
th 
-5
th
 century). However, she herself highlights the tenuousness of the connection and notes 
that, if Seneca did have it in mind, it is remarkable he does not mention it. Codoñer (1989, 1812) sees so little 
connection between the preface and the rest of the book that she suggests that the preface may have originally 
been written as one of the Letters, but was then adapted for this context. Codoñer thus suggests it would be 
futile to look for close thematic connections with the rest of the book.  
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       In some cases, it is true, the connection between the physical and ethical themes can 
seem slightly more reasonable – at least on first inspection. In book 7, for instance, the 
observation that a great deal of further study will be required to discover the orbits of comets 
leads Seneca to bemoan humanity’s lack of interest in philosophy because of its total 
dedication to luxury (7.30.1-32.4). In book 5, the discussion of winds gives way to an 
epilogue inveighing against man’s inclination to go to war in search of wealth – in which the 
winds play a role by propelling armies across the seas (5.18.1-16). Meanwhile, in the 
epilogues to both book 6 and book 2,
7
 the discussion of the fear of death is brought about in 
response to the fearsomeness of the phenomena in question – earthquakes and lightning, 
respectively (6.32.1-12; 2.59.1-13). Even in these cases, however, the connection can seem 
somewhat superficial. In book 6 and 2, the discussion quickly moves away from the fear of 
lightning and earthquakes as causes of death, to a discussion of the fear of death in general. 
Similarly, in book 5, winds quickly disappear from the discussion, which rapidly becomes an 
impassioned indictment against man’s over-willingness to go to war, risking great peril for 
the sake of wealth.
8
 In book 7, although the need for further investigation of comets might 
conceivably justify the comments about mankind’s dedication to luxury (as this is what 
allegedly distracts us from philosophical pursuits), it does not seem to justify, on the other 
hand, the graphic references to lavish sexual practices, transvestism, and genital mutilation 
with which the epilogue begins (7.31.1-3).        
       Indeed, one of the most puzzling things about these moralising passages – and something 
that that unites them all
9
 – is their specific and exclusive focus on the activities of vice – vice, 
moreover, that is described with an avid (and at times almost prurient) attention to detail. It 
is, indeed, this more than anything else that creates a sense of incongruity between the 
different portions of the text. 
       Seneca’s choice to collocate these sorts of ethical themes with his physics also raises 
another question: what the theoretical relationship between the ethics and physics is in the 
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 On the preface to book 6 – which also discusses fear of death – and why I think it should not be considered 
among the ‘moralising passages’, properly speaking, see Chapter 4.  
8
 Berno (2003, 18-19) believes that the connection of navigation and the search for wealth is such a familiar 
literary topos in ancient literature that she chooses barely to discuss this passage in her monograph (cf. Limburg 
(2007), 249ff.) While this might be true, it should be pointed out the move is actually from a discussion of winds 
(not navigation, per se) to the search from wealth. Thus I would question whether the move is as “predicable” as 
Berno claims. In any case, whatever the literary precedent, such an association is nevertheless unusual in the 
current context: a work of philosophical physics. Indeed, to assume that Seneca’s primary influences and 
sources of motivation in this work are literary is slightly question-begging, and certainly up for debate. This 
point will be discussed further below. 
9
 The exceptions being the prefaces to books 3 and 1. More on these below, though I shall also argue in Chapter 
4 that these passages should be distinguished from the other moralising passages, serving instead a more general 
programmatic function. 
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Natural Questions. This question of the relationship between physics and ethics is, it should 
be noted, hotly debated for Stoicism as a whole, and we shall come back to discuss this 
matter in more detail in Chapter 5. However, it is probably safe to say that most scholars 
would not consider this relationship to be exemplified by the particular sort of collocation we 
find in the Natural Questions: vivid accounts of vice only tangentially related to the physical 
discussion. Instead – at the risk of begging the question – the sorts of ethical themes we might 
expect to find in a work of Stoic physics are those concerning the place of man in the cosmos, 
our relationship to the divine, and the need for us to live in accordance with nature. These 
conclusions, moreover, we might expect to be derived organically from the physical 
discussion itself. But while these ideas do come up occasionally
10
, there is, on the face of it, 
no systematic attempt to derive these conclusions from the aetiological sections of the work.  
       Almost the only places where these ideas do come up are during the prefaces to books 3 
and 1. These prefaces, moreover, are widely regarded
11
 as being programmatic for the work 
as a whole – for the very good reason that they are the only places in the work where Seneca 
speaks at any length about the relationship of physics and ethics. As such, we might hope that 
these prefaces could guide us with respect to the broader relationship between ethics and 
physics in the work. In the preface to book 1, Seneca emphasises that the study of nature can 
give us a broader perspective on the ills of mankind, and can ultimately bring us into a kind 
of “partnership” with god. Both prefaces emphasise the morally transformative effect that the 
study of nature can bring about, helping us to become better at dealing with human affairs. 
The trouble (and this is precisely the problem) is that it is difficult to see how these ideas play 
out in the work as a whole. Rather than developing ideas about theology and providential 
nature in the aetiological sections, and then drawing ethical conclusions from these findings 
in the ethical sections – as we might have expected – it is instead, as we have seen, very 
difficult to see how the physical portions of the work are relevant to the ethical portions at all. 
Indeed, even in books 3 and 1, where these programmatic prefaces appear, there is no overt 
attempt to connect the subsequent aetiological investigation with what has been said in the 
respective prefaces.
12
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 Although, notably, the idea of ‘living in accordance with nature’ is never explicitly formulated in the text, as 
Donini (1979, 219) points out (which is a problem for Scott (1999), who places the idea of ‘living in accordance 
with nature’ at the heart of his interpretation of the text).  
11
 E.g. Codoñer (1989), 1811-13; Scott (1999), 59; Williams (2012), 29.                 
12
 A fact that has often been the basis of criticism of the work. Gross (1989, esp. 318-19) tries to resolve the 
issue (at least with respect to book 1) by arguing that the Natural Questions is incomplete, and the preface to 
book 1 was actually intended to be the beginning of a whole new section of the work, dedicated to the celestial 
sphere, which was left unfinished upon Seneca’s death. 
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       More recently, however, a number of scholars have questioned the traditional perception 
of disorder in the Natural Questions. On the contrary, they claim the work is not only 
coherently structured, but also that the moralising passages are actually, despite initial 
appearances, carefully integrated with their aetiological context. This is done, it is claimed, 
through a variety of thematic, artistic or lexical correspondences. Stahl,
13
 Waiblinger
14
 and, 
more recently, Berno
15
 and Williams
16
 have all argued – in various ways – that themes, words 
and concepts used in the aetiological sections subsequently recur in the moralising passages, 
where they are explored under a different, ethically significant aspect. 
       There can be little doubt that these studies have made enormous progress in mapping out 
the artistic themes of the work. However, regarding what can be called their ‘integrating’ 
approach, all of these studies tend, in my opinion, to exhibit a similar set of problems. To 
begin with, several of them effectively reduce the physical portions of the work to the 
function of preparing the reader for the moralising portions.
17
 This seems problematic, first, 
since it suggests that the Natural Questions is ‘about’ the moralising passages – that they are 
the centrepieces around which the work is built.
18
 But this is questionable, not least because 
these passages take up a relatively small portion of the text. Second, though, it also results in 
a rather strange conception of the theoretical relationship between ethics and physics – where 
physics becomes merely an instrument to introduce moral themes. It tends, put another way, 
to turn physics into a kind of proxy for ethical discourse, which in turn seems to strip physics 
of any inherent significance. This, though, seems at odds with the equal weight that the Stoics 
accord to each of the three branches of philosophy.   
       What is also troubling about these integrating approaches, though, is that the complex 
webs of thematic and lexical connections that these scholars detect can seem somewhat 
overwrought and, at times, rather subjective.
19
 A good example of this concerns the 
connection between the investigation of optical phenomena in book 1 and the lurid anecdote 
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 Stahl (1960); (1964). 
14
 Waiblinger (1977). 
15
 Berno (2003). 
16
 Williams (2012). 
17
 This is certainly the case with Stahl, Waiblinger and Berno. Williams might be an exception, since he 
maintains that the physics does serve a function of its own. At times, however, Williams does seem to lapse into 
a similar view – as when, for example, he suggests that Seneca chooses physical theories for the general, artistic 
tendencies they convey, “whatever the merits or plausibility of individual theories” (18). As with the other 
approaches, this seems to reduce physics to a mere artistic instrument, stripping it of any inherent value. Against 
reducing the aetiology in this way, see Strohm (1977). 
18
 Something clearly suggested by Stahl (1964, 428) – who suggests the moralising passages are the “pillars” 
around which the work is written – and implied by Berno (2003), 16-17. 
19
 As Hine (2010b, 14) helpfully summarises, Waiblinger’s work in particular has come in for criticism for its 
subjective use of evidence. 
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of Hostius Quadra that concludes it. Noting the connection provided by the theme of mirrors, 
Williams and a number of others argue that the preceding sequence of optical phenomena is 
structured according to the ever-greater distortion with which they reflect the sun. Coming at 
the end of this sequence, therefore, Quadra (who delights in the distorted reflections of his 
own bodily members) represents a fitting climax – both in terms of literal optical distortion, 
and also in terms of the figurative moral distortion that his behaviour represents.
20
 As 
reasonable as this might appear, the trouble is that several scholars interpret this sequence of 
optical phenomena in different – indeed, completely the opposite – terms. Rather than an 
ever-increasing level of distortion, Stahl
21
 and Waiblinger
22
 detect a progression towards an 
ever-more complete and perfect reflection of the sun. Of course, this does not necessarily 
mean that both interpretations are incorrect; but the fact that these devices are open to such 
opposing readings ought to make us question whether Seneca really intended us to make 
these connections.  
       However, the greatest difficulty with the integrating approaches is the way they tend, I 
think, to gloss over the respects in which the moralising passages are manifestly not 
especially well integrated with the aetiology. Even as a symbolic manifestation of the optical 
distortions found in nature, it is difficult to deny that the abrupt introduction of Quadra at the 
end of the book comes as something as a surprise. Indeed, even if there is some level of 
thematic overlap here, I do not think this is sufficient to smooth over the quite obvious sense 
in which this anecdote is at odds with the level tone of inquiry that has characterised the 
preceding aetiology. 
       Because much the same could be said for each of the moralising passages, I think we 
must face up to the fact that Seneca does not seem to have been overly concerned about 
neatly integrating these passages. However, significantly, this need not mean that we judge 
the work a failure. Rather, having accepted the sense of disconnect between these passages 
and the rest of the text, our job as interpreters ought to be to consider whether there are any 
factors which might explain Seneca’s choice to write the work in this way. The aim of this 
chapter, then, is to do just this – reviewing, as we go, various possible influencing factors that 
may have explained Seneca’s choice to write the work the way that he did. At the end of the 
chapter I shall make the case for a new approach: one which looks to the influence of 
contemporary philosophical debate as a potential motivating factor.  
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 Williams (2012), 58f., following Leitão (1998). 
21
 Stahl (1960), 48. 
22
 Waiblinger (1977), 64. 
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2. The Stoic tradition of physical writing 
Considering that the Natural Questions is, at least on the face of it, a work of Stoic physics,
23
 
one important potential source of influence is the Stoic natural philosophical tradition.  
Indeed, it would be quite surprising if Seneca were not to some extent influenced by this. The 
problem, of course, is that so little remains of Stoic writing on physics that is difficult to 
evaluate the extent of this influence. At the same time, our ignorance in this respect should 
also caution us against making any assumptions out of hand about the unusualness of the 
Natural Questions. While it seems prima facie unlikely that this work is just a run-of-the-mill 
work of Stoic physics, we should nevertheless examine the evidence to see whether such an 
assumption can be substantiated. 
       One way to begin to assess this question is to consider whether the sort of physics Seneca 
writes about in the Natural Questions (which is to say, a technical aetiological investigation, 
seeking to find the causes of specific natural phenomena) is the sort of physics which 
interested earlier Stoics. Indeed, it is sometimes claimed that the early Stoics were not overly 
interested in this sort of technical inquiry, having only a much more restricted interest in 
physics – perhaps limited to broad cosmological phenomena. Part of the reason for thinking 
this stems from the comment made in Cicero’s De finibus 4,24 where the author maintains that 
Stoic physics was a much less complete (and in any case largely plagiarised) version of 
Peripatetic physics. To this can be added a comment from Strabo, who maintains that 
Posidonius – who certainly did write about this sort of technical physics – was engaging in a 
Peripatetic, rather than Stoic, approach to the subject. Indeed, Gigon has argued that the 
Natural Questions – or at least its aetiological portions – should not be located in the Stoic 
tradition at all, but rather that of the Aristotelian genre of προβλήματα. Seneca, Gigon argues, 
attempts to combine this Peripatetic-style inquiry with Socratic-Stoic moralising – which 
accounts for the unusual collocation of the two forms of discourse.
25
 
       However, there are a number of reasons to question this reading. In the case of the 
comment made by Cicero, we need to pay close attention to the context in which it occurs. In 
book 4 of De finibus, Cicero is actually engaging in a polemic against the Stoics, in which his 
strategy is to show that Stoic philosophy as a whole was actually just a plagiarised, and 
inferior, version of Peripatetic philosophy. Just as there is reason to doubt this broader claim, 
so too should we think twice before accepting the point about Stoic physics at face value. 
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One reason why Cicero might have felt justified in making this claim, at least with respect to 
physics, is that the Peripatetics were notoriously prolific in the field of natural philosophy. 
Cicero can thus, in a sense, legitimately claim that Stoic physics is inferior – though of course 
it is going to seem inferior when measured against that bar.  
        The context is also important for the comment made by Strabo. What is important to 
note here is that Strabo’s comment is actually not about physics, per se, but geography – 
which might technically speaking be considered a branch of science. Considering the fact that 
the Stoics (including Posidonius himself) distinguished physics and science precisely on the 
basis that, while physics examines causes, science does not,
26
 Strabo’s point could simply be 
that Posidonius was unusual for examining causes in his scientific writings.  
       Finally, against Gigon’s association of the Natural Questions with the προβλήματα 
tradition, Hine has argued convincingly that, despite the ostensible correspondence between 
‘προβλήματα’ and the ‘quaestiones’ in the title of Seneca’s work, there is actually little in the 
Natural Questions itself to associate it with that genre. As Hine shows, προβλήματα works 
consistently take a short question-and-answer format, something that we generally do not find 
in Seneca’s work.27 
       In any case, there is actually a fair amount of evidence that the early Stoics were, in fact, 
interested in this technical sort of physics, beginning even with Zeno. In addition to more 
general cosmological interests, fragments of Zeno’s On the Whole record a theory of how 
lightning is produced,
28
 and an explanation of how the moon eclipses the sun – apparently 
accompanied by diagrams.
29
 Fragments from unnamed works report theories about comets,
30
 
procreation
31
 and disease,
32
 to name but a few; and all of this is in addition to the more 
fundamental cosmological theories: cosmogony, elements, conflagration, etc.
33
 Some doubt 
has been cast on the Zenonian provenance of fragments not attributed to individual works;
34
 
but even so, the fragments from On the Whole attest to at least some level of interest in such 
matters. We see similar technical interests in Cleanthes,
35
 who is also known to have written 
a commentary on Zeno’s natural philosophical works. Meanwhile, a great deal of evidence 
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for Chrysippus clearly displays his interest in both broad cosmology and the more detailed 
aspects of natural aetiology.
36
 This is not to mention, of course, the wide-ranging interest in 
such matters displayed by Posidonius.  It would seem, then, that Seneca’s attention to this 
technical kind of physics was not particularly unusual in the Stoic tradition, making the 
possibility of influence seem more likely.  
       What, though, of the combination of ethics with this kind of physics? While the Stoics 
certainly posited a close relationship between the branches of philosophy, is there any 
evidence that they combined these in a way approximating what we find in the Natural 
Questions? There is, as happens, at least some evidence that could be taken to suggest this.  In 
his On Stoic Self-Contradictions, Plutarch accuses Chrysippus of having contradicted himself 
regarding the proper order in which the parts of philosophy should be taught. While in some 
works it is physics, and ultimately theology, that Chrysippus says must be taught last, 
elsewhere he seems to say just the opposite
37
: 
 
But this very branch of philosophy that he says must be placed last – that concerning the gods – he 
habitually places first, namely as a preface to all his ethical inquiries. 
(Plutarch, Sto. rep. 1035B, my trans.)  
 
What is interesting here is the suggestion that Chrysippus used to “put first” or even 
“preface” (προεκτίθησι) his ethical works with a theological discourse. The fact that it is 
ethical works prefaced with physical discourse, rather than the other way around (as it is in 
Seneca) does not seem overly important here. What this seems to suggest is that Chrysippus 
regularly combined ethics and physics in the same works and may even have 
‘compartmentalised’ the two sorts of discourse in a way comparable to Seneca – one sort 
restricted to prefaces, the other to the main body.  
       This, however, seems to stretch the evidence too far. Indeed, what Plutarch goes on to 
say about Chrysippus’ work gives reasons to doubt that there was any great similarity 
between the way these authors combined ethics and physics. Having highlighted the alleged 
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contradiction, Plutarch goes on to give examples of the kinds of topics that Chrysippus would 
habitually place at the start of his ethical works: 
 
For whether concerning the end, or the good and bad, or marriage and child-rearing, or law and 
government, it is evident that he does not so much as utter a sound unless, just as those introduce 
decrees to cities first write “Good Fortune”, he, in the same way, writes first “Zeus”, “Fate”, 
Providence”, or that the cosmos, being one and finite, is held together by a single power – nothing of 
which is going to be persuasive unless one is already thoroughly mixed up with their physical 
theories. (Plutarch, Sto. rep. 1035B, my trans.) 
 
What this seems to suggest – sparse though the details are – is that these ‘prefaces’ contained  
only fairly general statements about Stoic physics, aiming, I would guess, to contextualise the 
subsequent discussion – a reminder, perhaps, that the parts of Stoic philosophy are closely 
related, that Zeus or nature provide the ultimate normative framework for Stoic ethics.
38
 
Indeed, this impression is confirmed when Plutarch goes on to quote Chrysippus directly (and 
we should note that Plutarch’s source is now Chrysippus’ physical works,39 which are 
apparently being ‘prefaced’ with ethical considerations):  
 
Listen to what he says about this in the third book of his On the Gods: “For there is no other way to 
discover the principle, nor any other source of justice other than from Zeus and from universal nature; 
for it is necessary that everything of this sort take it principle from there if we are to have a chance of 
saying anything concerning goods and evils.” Again in his Natural Theses: “For there is no other or 
more appropriate way of approaching the account of goods and evils, or the virtues, or happiness, than 
from universal nature and the government of the cosmos”. And again, further on: “For it is necessary 
that the account of goods and evils be connected to this, there being no other principle or better 
standard for these things, nor should physical speculation be undertaken for anything other than the 
differentiation of goods and evils. (Plutarch, Sto. rep. 1035CD, my trans.) 
 
Here, even more clearly, we can see how such statements seem intended to contextualise the 
subsequent discussion – to make the point that physics is relevant to ethics, and relevant 
because it provides the ultimate grounds for our understanding of good and evil. 
       This would seem to suggest that, even though Chrysippus did (sometimes?) preface his 
ethical works with physical passages (and possibly vice versa), it does not seem that the 
content of these passages was anything like what we find in the majority of the moralising 
parts of the Natural Questions – namely, vivid descriptions of vice. Instead, the kinds of 
ethical and physical themes that Chrysippus combines here are far more in line (again at risk 
of over-generalising) with our expectations of what a Stoic might wish to combine – ideas of 
providence, and the cosmic context of ethics. Although, as we have seen, Seneca does 
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sometimes refer to such things in the Natural Questions (most prominently in the prefaces to 
books 3 and 1), on the whole these are not the focus of the moralising portions of the work. 
       Of course, however rich and useful this passage of Plutarch is, it is clearly not a lot to go 
on to establish the character of Stoic works of physics in general. However, although 
frequently overlooked,
40
 there do survive a number of examples of Stoic physical writing. 
Although these date from much later, they might nevertheless help us to get a general idea of 
the character of Stoic works of physics. One especially important example in this respect is 
Cleomedes’ so-called Lectures on Astronomy. What is significant about Cleomedes’ work for 
our present purposes is that he explicitly tells us that he is drawing heavily on a work by 
Posidonius. While there is no reason to think he is reproducing this work verbatim, 
Cleomedes’ work may nevertheless give us a reasonable glimpse into the character of 
physical writing at that earlier stage in the tradition.  
       Interestingly, then, there are ostensibly some similarities between Cleomedes’ work and 
the Natural Questions. For one thing, both are concerned with technical physical subject 
matter. More importantly, though, near the end of 2.1 Cleomedes makes an ad hominem 
attack on Epicurus where, significantly, the ethical views of this philosopher come under fire:  
 
Will you not be off, evil degenerate, to your saffron-robed whores, with whom you will dally on 
couches, whether combing purple wool, or wreathed in crowns, or with your eyes painted, or even 
entertained by the aulos in excessive and unseemly drunkenness, and then coming to the final act like 
a worm wallowing in utterly vile and excremental slime? So will you not be off, “most brazen and 
shameless soul,” routed from Philosophy, to Leontion, Philainis, and the other whores, and to your 
“sacred ululations” with Mindyrides, Sardanapalus and all your boon companions? Do you not see 
that Philosophy summons Hercules and Herculean men, certainly not perverts and their pleasures? 
Indeed, it is evident, I think, to cultivated people that Epicurus has nothing to do with astronomy, let 
alone with philosophy (2.1.511f., trans. Todd and Bowen) 
 
However, while the theme of hedonistic depravity might resonate with certain parts of the 
Natural Questions, this passage, and its relationship with its surrounding context, is actually 
quite different from what we find in Seneca’s work. To begin with, although Epicurus’ 
hedonism is attacked at the end of the chapter, these comments actually form just one part of 
a longer polemic that has been the focus of this entire preceding chapter – namely, against 
Epicurus view that sun is merely a foot across. While the switch to an ethical theme 
represents a change of subject, this is nothing like the thematic discontinuity that we find in 
Seneca’s work. What is more, the switch to Epicurus’ ethical views is easily explainable 
within the polemical context: for any Stoic attacking Epicurus, such low-hanging fruit would 
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have been simply too tempting to ignore. More importantly, though, this solitary excursion 
into ethics represents nothing like the systematic collocation of ethics and physics that we 
find in the Natural Questions. Indeed, aside from this short passage, the rest of Cleomedes 
work remains focussed on the physical topics at hand.  
       Overall, then, it does not seem as though the influence of the Stoic physical tradition can, 
in itself, account for the form of the Natural Questions. Although Seneca’s interest in 
technical physical matters does not seem to have been particularly unusual, and although 
other Stoics seem to have combined ethics and physics to some extent, the small amount of 
evidence that we have of the earlier tradition seems to confirm our initial impression that the 
Natural Questions is an unusual example of Stoic physical writing. 
 
3. Literary convention  
Some might argue that we should not be especially surprised if Seneca is not responding, in 
the first instance, to the philosophical tradition; for many scholars prefer to view Seneca’s 
work primarily through a literary lens.
41
 It is possible, then, that we should be looking for 
literary rather than philosophical influences to explain the unusual form of the Natural 
Questions. While, as I made clear in the Introduction, my own approach to Seneca is very 
much from a philosophical point of view, I would not go so far as to deny that Seneca’s work 
has a prominent literary quality. As such, it cannot be ruled out that literary considerations 
have an important – and perhaps even decisive – role to play. 
       One scholar who has argued that literary considerations are the primary motivation 
behind the form of the work is Limburg.
42
 She, like me, is sceptical of the ‘integrating’ 
approach adopted by some scholars, and bluntly accepts there is a sense of disconnection 
between the ethical and physical passages. Limburg’s main contention, though, is that the 
practice of attaching moralising prefaces and epilogues
43
 to technical works is by no means 
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unique to Seneca, but simply reflects prevailing literary custom. Drawing attention to the 
conventions of didactic poetry and other technical writing, Limburg points out that that many 
of these works contain prefaces, which frequently touch upon moral themes, and which are, 
like those in the Natural Questions, often linked only tangentially to the technical subject 
matter of the work in which they appear. According to custom, the function of these passages 
was to entertain the reader, and make them well-disposed to the author; however they might 
also serve to frame the subsequent technical discussion, indicating how that material should 
be read. In the case of the Natural Questions, therefore, Limburg suggests that the moralising 
character of the prefaces indicates that the physics is supposed to be read in an ethical 
context.
44
 However, Limburg nevertheless denies that the content of these passages has a 
direct bearing on our reading of the physics. For, although she does not deny that Seneca 
holds the orthodox view regarding the unity of the parts of philosophy, she nevertheless 
suggests that the ethics and the physics in the Natural Questions each have their own 
independent ends. Ultimately, then, Limburg’s reading suggests that we should not look for a 
deeper sense of unity in the work. From a literary point of view, Seneca is simply mirroring 
convention; philosophically speaking, the ethical and physical parts of the work have their 
own discrete ends. 
       While I agree with Limburg’s rejection of the integrating approach adopted by some 
scholars, her own approach raises a number of troubling questions. Some of these concern 
Limburg’s methodology. For instance, in her discussion of the literary conventions governing 
prefaces, Limburg draws in part on ancient rhetorical theory, which is used as a basis for her 
suggestion that the traditional ‘framing’ and pleasure-giving functions apply to the Natural 
Questions. However, when it comes to epilogues, Limburg notes that “ancient rhetorical 
theory concerning epilogues is of less interest for the study of the Naturales Quaestiones than 
that concerning prefaces”.45 Limburg points out that epilogues, according to rhetorical theory, 
should contain “a summary of the preceding argumentation and an appeal to the emotions”, 
and she acknowledges that neither of these features are particularly characteristic of the 
epilogues in the Natural Questions. As a result, Limburg argues that we should consider 
“both types of texts [sc. prefaces and epilogues] as one category of moralizing passages”, on 
the basis that both have a similar character.
46
 This, however, seems problematic. On the one 
hand, if ancient rhetorical theory influenced the structure of the Natural Questions, the fact 
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that the epilogues in the work fail to conform to rhetorical norms clearly shows that Seneca, 
at the very least, did not feel bound by these conventions. Moreover, aside from being rather 
question-begging, Limburg’s reduction of prefaces and epilogues to one sort of passages 
seems to suggest, on the contrary, that Seneca was happy to innovate within established 
convention (writing epilogues in a style that would normally be reserved for prefaces being, 
perhaps, just one example).  
       Indeed, Seneca’s propensity to innovate within established convention is also implied by 
Limburg’s comparison of the Natural Questions to the work of authors such as Virgil and 
Lucretius.
47
 Limburg thinks it significant that the work of these authors also have prefaces 
and epilogues that include moral themes; but she also notes that epilogues in these works are 
not nearly so prominent as they are in the Natural Questions. Again, this would seem to 
imply that, even if Seneca makes use of certain conventional devices, he is at least employing 
them in a less in a less-than-conventional manner. 
       Fundamentally, though, even if Seneca’s work were shown to be entirely conventional in 
its use of moralising prefaces and epilogues (though the above gives grounds for doubting 
whether this could be done), this would not, in any case, explain a great deal about the text 
except at a rather superficial level. It is uncharitable to both the Natural Questions and the 
preceding tradition if we assume that these texts are the way they are just, or primarily, 
because that is how texts were conventionally written. Limburg is undeniably correct that 
Seneca makes ample use of what she calls ‘prefatory commonplaces’, and her work does an 
excellent job in mapping these throughout the Natural Questions. However, if we halt our 
interpretation of the text at this level of analysis, we effectively close down the possibility of 
discerning any more interesting possibilities. In particular, this approach shuts down the 
possibility of discovering a unitary purpose behind the form of the work, since it assumes out 
of hand that the moralising passages are basically removable appendages.
48
  
       But such an approach is all the more risky, I believe, when we are dealing with a 
philosophical text such as the Natural Questions. For whatever the work’s relationship with 
literary convention (and it should be noted that the vast majority of the texts that Limburg 
compares the Natural Questions to are not philosophical in nature) the philosophical 
character of the work also means that we must constantly have in mind the underlying 
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philosophical considerations that may be governing what goes on in the work – even where it 
seems to be strictly observing conventional norms.  To me, though, the fact that Seneca does 
not seem overly concerned to stick rigidly to these norms suggests, all the more strongly, that 
more is at play here than a simple desire, or propensity, to adhere to literary custom.
49
  
 
4. Philosophical approaches 
Of course, none of the above necessarily renders Limburg’s thesis false: it could be that 
Seneca really was just following prevailing literary conventions (albeit somewhat 
inconsistently), while philosophical considerations took a back seat. However, we should at 
least be open to the possibility that Seneca, as a philosopher, had reasons for structuring the 
work in this way that went beyond stylistic considerations. As noted in the Introduction, there 
have been relatively few attempts to approach the Natural Questions from a predominantly 
philosophical point of view, and fewer still that specifically address the question of the 
work’s form from this perspective.50 Nevertheless, the issue has not been entirely without 
philosophical attention. 
 
4.1 The Stoic framework    
The approach of several scholars has been to try to explain the combination of ethics and 
physics in the Natural Questions by referring to the close connection between ethics and 
physics in Stoic philosophy. One major study that takes this approach is that of Codoñer. For 
a Stoic, she suggests, there is no radical distinction between ethics and physics. Indeed, both 
are parts of philosophy as a whole, and as such both aim at the same ultimate end: wisdom – 
consisting, Codoñer seems to think, of moral wisdom, and knowledge of god (the latter being 
the ultimate end of physics in particular).
51
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       However, it is dubious whether this can satisfactorily explain what we find in the Natural 
Questions. Indeed, by simply subsuming the ethics and physics in the Natural Questions 
under the broader framework of Stoicism, Codoñer and others who take this approach in 
effect side-step what is most problematic about Seneca’s combination of ethics and physics. 
As we have seen, it is not the mere combination of ethics and physics that is perplexing, but 
rather the particular ethical and physical themes that Seneca combines, and the way he goes 
about combining them. In fact, the surprising content of the moralising passages actually 
poses a serious difficulty for Codoñer’s explanation. For if the purpose of the ethical passages 
is to help us progress towards moral wisdom, then Seneca’s decision to focus so heavily on 
these oddly specific descriptions of vice (rather than, for instance, more general aspects of 
ethical theory) is surely in need of further explanation.
52
 
       Indeed, this is a problem for any approach that tries to solve the issue by appealing to the 
Stoic claim that ethics and physics are closely connected.
53
 Part of the problem, as we shall 
see in greater detail in Chapter 5, is that the nature of this relationship is not altogether clear 
in Stoicism more generally. However, as discussed at the start of this chapter, whatever view 
one takes of this relationship, most people would not consider the sort of ethics and physics 
we get in the Natural Questions to be a particularly representative example of how this 
relationship is supposed to work – precisely because the content of these passages seems so 
unrelated to the topics of the physical investigation. 
 
4.2 The Platonist framework 
This, however, is not the only philosophical approach that has been taken to the problem. 
Others look not to the Stoic framework, but to that provided by the philosophy of another 
school: Platonism. As discussed in the Introduction, a long-standing reading of Seneca 
maintains that he was deeply interested in, and even persuaded by, developments in 
contemporary Platonism. His awareness of this school is most clearly suggested by the two 
famous Letters – the 58th and 65th – that discuss Platonic metaphysics. However, it is also 
evident from the frequent use that Seneca makes of Platonic themes throughout his work – 
not least in the Natural Questions. In this work scholars have drawn particular attention to the 
recurring motif of separating mind and body (3 pref. 18; 4a pref. 20; 1 pref., passim), the 
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suggestion that god is inaccessible to the senses (7.30.3-4) and consists of nothing but reason 
(1. pref. 14). A number of scholars, therefore, have suspected that the influence of Platonism 
might be behind some of the work’s unusual features. 
       One notable reading of this kind comes from Donini.
54
 Donini’s thesis is that, in his later 
writings, Seneca experiments with the combination of two worldviews: Stoic and Platonist. 
At key points in the Natural Questions, Donini contends, Seneca seems to adopt a Platonising 
hierarchy of sciences in which (‘worldly’) ethics is strictly subordinated to a life of pure 
contemplation. At other times, Seneca tries to combine this with the Stoic model, attempting 
to derive moral benefit from this theoretical activity – an endeavour which Donini sees as one 
of the main innovations of the work. The content of the moralising passages, Donini argues, 
is related to the aetiology through antithesis, in that, through their depictions of counter-
natural human behaviour, they represent the opposite pole of ‘nature’ (which is taken as a 
stand-in for the higher metaphysical order).
55
 This contempt for the earthly and the human, 
then, serves to reinforce the new ontological hierarchy that Seneca is trying to introduce.  
       Donini’s interpretation has divided scholars, but it has recently been defended by 
Gauly.
56
 As well as arguing for further indications within the Natural Questions that Seneca 
is adopting metaphysical dualism, Gauly supplements Donini’s interpretation by suggesting 
that the moralising passages depict an earthly realm that is hopelessly corrupt, to which the 
only reasonable response is to escape into a life of pure contemplation.
57
 
       There are, I think, good reasons to think that the Platonising reading of Seneca is 
mistaken. For one thing, as discussed in the Introduction, the view of Seneca as a Platonising 
‘eclectic’58 has come under increasing scrutiny in recent scholarship. At its heart, the problem 
with this reading is that it requires us to impose – as one scholar puts it – a completely 
“unannounced program of eclecticism” on a writer who consistently describes himself as a 
Stoic.
59
 Indeed, Seneca never explicitly commits himself to dualism (either ontological or 
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way that Gauly describes. Rather, contact with the Forms is supposed to give us the ethical grounding to enable 
us to live successful lives in the present world. On this, see esp. Boys-Stones (forthcoming), ch. 17. 
58
 It should be noted, however, Donini explicitly argues against the term ‘eclectic’ (e.g. Donini (1988a). Donini 
believes that Seneca’s defection to Platonism is philosophically well-considered. It must be said, though, that 
this is picture seems somewhat at odds with Donini’s claim that Seneca is “cheating at cards” – maintaining 
both Stoic and Platonist worldviews at the same time (op. cit., 232). 
59
 Graver (2012), 84. 
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psychological); on the contrary, he frequently asserts his Stoic commitments and often argues 
positively for the Stoic conception of the cosmos.
60
  
       In general, scholars have begun to see Seneca use of Platonic themes as broadly a part of 
his rhetorical and/or pedagogical strategy. In a useful study, Reydams-Schils examines many 
of the most commonly-cited instances of ‘Platonising’ in Seneca’s works – the Natural 
Questions among them – and demonstrates the ways in which Seneca carefully exploits 
Platonic language to emphasise certain aspects of Stoic theory. For example, Reydams-Schils 
argues that Seneca’s use of the motif of separating soul from body – one which is prominent 
in the Natural Questions – can be seen to “underscore a genuinely Stoic reorientation in 
values” – a shift from the body to the mind that is just as pertinent in Stoicism as it is in 
Platonism. The Platonic language, Reydams-Schils argues, is merely a “propaedeutic 
device”: a means of conveying Stoic theory in as vivid and compelling way as possible, 
without implying any departure from Stoic orthodoxy.
61
 
       Indeed, on closer inspection there is nothing that Seneca says in the Natural Questions 
that cannot quite easily be reconciled with mainstream Stoic thought. Consider, for instance, 
the suggestion in the preface to book 1 that god consists of nothing but reason (1 pref. 14) – 
one of the most commonly-cited indications of Seneca’s Platonist inclinations in the work. 
While this might well be something a Platonist could agree with, given the appropriate 
context, the same also goes for the Stoics. For although ‘god’ can describe a number of things 
for a Stoic (e.g. the cosmos as a whole; the highest part of the aether; the sun), in his most 
fundamental form – namely, as the so-called ‘active principle’ – they too believed that god is 
nothing but reason. This much is made clear by Diogenes Laertius: “They hold that there are 
two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, 
then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in 
this substance, that is God” (7.134, trans. Hicks, my emphasis). While it might at first seem 
strange that Seneca would refer to god in this particular aspect, once we consider the broader 
context of the preface – in which Seneca has been portraying the disembodied soul flying up 
into the cosmos and realising its relationship with the divine mind – his reason for 
foregrounding this particular aspect of god become clear: it highlights the fact that both we 
and god are both quintessentially rational beings. We shall discuss this passage further in 
later chapters. 
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 E.g. materialism: NQ 2.1-11; Ep. 106; 117. Monism: NQ 2.3.1. Number of causes: Ep. 65.11f. Conflagration 
(stated, not argued for): Ep. 9.16; NQ 3.28.7. 
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       Concerning the other most frequently-cited example of Seneca’s Platonism in the 
Natural Questions – his suggestion that “He who manages all this [sc. the cosmos], who 
created it, who laid the foundations for it all and surrounded himself with it, and who is the 
greater and better part of his creation, he eludes our sight and must be perceived by thought” 
(7.30.3) – we need not even look to the wider context for an explanation. For Seneca clearly 
says here that the god he is talking about is a part (pars) of his creation – something that no 
Platonist could accept, though something that is wholly in line with standard Stoic 
cosmology. As we shall see in Chapter 3, there is also nothing unusual about the suggestion 
that god (qua the reason ruling the cosmos) is inaccessible to vision. Furthermore, as 
Reydams-Schils points out, near the beginning of book 2 Seneca describes air is strikingly 
similar terms, including it among the things that, though they “elude our senses but are 
grasped by reason”, nevertheless possess “bodily unity” (2.2.3).62 
       Altogether, then, it seems unlikely that imposing the Platonist worldview on the Natural 
Questions can be the solution to the puzzling features of the work. At the same time, I do not 
think we can, or should, ignore the prominence this ‘Platonising’ aspect of the work. Even if 
these passages turn out not to betray any genuine shift towards Platonism in Seneca’s 
philosophical outlook, it cannot be denied that some of these passages seem to be alluding to 
Plato. In particular, while the motif of separating body and soul might be perfectly 
reconcilable with Stoic anthropology, one cannot deny the distinctive Platonic character of 
this description. The same goes for the image of the soul flying up into the heavens in the 
preface to book 1. It is of particular note, moreover, that these allusions congregate with the 
greatest concentration at key points in the work – namely, in the programmatic prefaces to 
books 3 and 1. Their presence here strongly suggests that we should pay close attention to 
them. 
       As mentioned in the Introduction, once we do reject the conciliatory reading of Seneca 
vis-à-vis Platonism, the prevalence – and textual prominence – of these allusions to Plato 
raises difficult questions. While Platonic imagery is certainly powerful, it is not as though 
Seneca could not have used other means to express himself. Nor does the suggestion that this 
is merely a matter of personal artistic taste seem fully to justify the extensive use Seneca 
makes of these themes or their location at key points in the work. Indeed, considering the 
prominent position of these allusions, it could be that they were intended to play a role in 
contextualising what is going on in the work. It may be – and this is an idea that I would like 
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to explore – that these allusions are vital clues pointing us towards the dialectical context in 
which the Natural Questions should be read.  
 
4.3. A Stoic-Platonist dialectical framework?  
Why, though, should we think that allusions to Plato should be taken as indicators of a 
dialectical engagement with Platonism? One reason is that this manner of simply alluding to, 
rather than explicitly naming, one’s rivals seems to have been in common usage in the post-
Hellenistic period – at least among Platonists. Scholars had long noted the frequent use that 
Platonists make of Stoic terminology, and for a long time this was seen as an example of the 
same sort of mindless eclecticism that is perceived in the Stoics’ use of Platonising themes. 
More recently, however, a number of scholars have begun to read these allusions and 
borrowings not as ‘eclectic’ or conciliatory, but instead as markers of dialectical engagement.  
       One strategy that seems to have been quite widespread is for Platonists to import selected 
terminology from the Stoics, only to show the rival theory can be made sense of only when it 
is supplemented by Platonic metaphysics. One example of this strategy, pointed out by 
several scholars, concerns the Platonists’ use of the Stoic theory of ‘common conceptions’. 
This theory, in short, holds that all humans are naturally predisposed to form a certain set of 
basic concepts, which serve ultimately as a means of epistemological grounding.
63
 The 
Platonists for their part could claim that – yes indeed – we do have a set of concepts that 
serve as epistemological grounding; but the only way such concepts could be made to serve 
this function reliably is if they were derived from some stable source of knowledge – which is 
to say the Forms. This strategy has sometimes been referred to as one of ‘subordination’: the 
original theory is ‘appropriated’, but then subsequently subordinated within the recipient 
system.
64
 
       Again, what is notable here is that the adversaries are never specifically named; the 
Platonist, Alcinous in this case, merely alludes to the rival theory, and then proceeds to make 
his argument. As to why he should adopt such a strategy, we cannot be sure. However, a 
plausible explanation is simply that these authors expected a philosophically engaged reader 
– one who is familiar with contemporary currents of philosophical debate – to be aware of the 
significance of these allusions. If true, this highlights the importance for us, as modern 
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 Although, against the usefulness of Stoic preconceptions for these purposes, see Chapter 2. 
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 Such a strategy is detected in Alcinous Did. 4 by Boys-Stones (2005); Bonazzi (2014); (2016). For a similar 
strategy employed by the anonymous Platonist commentator on the Theaetetus, see Bonazzi (2008). See also, 
now, various relevant chapters in Engberg-Pedersen (2017). 
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readers, to pay close attention both to the allusions themselves, and to the wider philosophical 
context that such allusions are referring to. 
       But what reason have we to think that Seneca may be confronting his rivals in this way? 
Indirect support comes from the fact, highlighted in the Introduction, that Seneca is one of the 
few Stoics in this period who does unequivocally attack Platonism. In his 65
th
 Letter, Seneca 
asks Lucilius to adjudicate on a conversation between him and unnamed ‘friends’65 
concerning the nature of causes, prompting a discussion of Aristotelian and Platonist 
ontology. Together with its companion Letter – the 58th – Letter 65 has often been taken as 
central evidence for the Platonising reading of Seneca; but this ignores the fact that Seneca 
explicitly expresses his preference for the simpler Stoic model of just one ultimate cause – 
divine reason. In fact, several scholars have argued that that the Letter as a whole should be 
considered a polemic against Platonic metaphysics.
66
 Throughout the Letter, it has been 
suggested, Seneca endeavours to illustrate an almost comic ‘proliferation of causes’ on the 
part of the Aristotelians and Platonists. Having initially introduced just three Aristotelian 
causes – material, ‘craftsman’ (sc. efficient), and formal – Seneca  then claims that Aristotle 
“adds” (accedit) a fourth: the final cause. Plato is subsequently said to add a fifth 
(quintam...adicit) – and maybe even a sixth at 65.14. Seneca suggests that this veritable 
“swarm of causes” (turba causarum) is merely the result of a confusion on Plato’s part 
between ‘cause’ properly speaking, and mere necessary conditions for causation. In Ep. 65, 
then, we appear to have a precedent for Seneca writing polemically against the Platonists.  
       Considering Seneca’s capacity to be hostile to Platonism, and considering the possibility 
that mere allusions to one’s rivals can, in this period, form the basis of a dialectical 
engagement, the interesting possibility arises that the Natural Questions itself has a 
dialectical dimension. Indeed, the fact that the allusions to Plato in the Natural Questions are 
concentrated at important points in the work might indicate that the Platonist context is in fact 
key to understanding what is going on in the work as a whole. If this is true, then it would not 
be unreasonable to think that certain unusual features of the work – features, that is, such as 
the moralising passages – might in turn be the result of the dialectical aims of the work. 
 
* 
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 This reference to live conversation adds support to the idea that Seneca was engaged with contemporary 
Platonism, since these friends may well have been genuine Platonist associates of Seneca (a reading supported, 
e.g., by Sedley (2005), 135f.). Whatever we make of the fictionality of the Letters, there seems no reason not to 
take Seneca’s reference to live conversation with such people at face value, as Inwood (2007a, 151) suggests.   
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 Esp. Boys-Stones (2014) – who also sees the narrative progression from Ep. 58 to Ep. 65 as playing a role in 
this polemic. On the ‘proliferation’ strategy see also Inwood (2007b), esp. 159. Cf., though, Sedley (2005). 
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       If all of this makes a dialectical reading of the Natural Questions a hypothetical 
possibility, it certainly does not yet show the text was, in fact, engaged in debate with 
Platonism. To establish this, we need first to consider whether there are any ongoing debates 
which might conceivably prove relevant to the Natural Questions.  In the following chapter I 
would like to draw attention to one debate in particular, one concerning a key issue in ethical 
epistemology: how to form a well-grounded concept of ‘the good’. Because the immediate 
relevance of this debate to the Natural Questions will be far from clear, the first part of the 
following chapter will be dedicated to outlining the intellectual background of this debate – a 
task which will involve temporarily setting the Natural Questions aside. In the final part of 
the chapter, though, we shall return to the Natural Questions to see how various important 
statements in the work seem, in fact, to be speaking directly to this debate. As subsequent 
chapters will argue, this debate turns out to be crucial for understanding what is going on in 
this text – including the presence of the moralising passages.  
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– Chapter 2 – 
The Dialectical Context: A Debate about Grounding the Good 
 
1. Introduction: Platonism and the ‘crisis’ of materialism  
The re-emergence of Platonism, beginning as early as the first century BC, was a pivotal 
moment in the history of Western philosophy.
1
 Within the space of just a few decades 
Platonism redefined the parameters of philosophical debate. Platonism, furthermore, would 
go on challenge the philosophically dominant Stoics so successfully that, by the end of the 
third century,
2
 Stoicism had ceased to exist as a live philosophical system. Surprisingly little 
is known about the origins of this movement – precisely when it first emerged, for instance, 
or who its founder was.
3
 But what seems relatively clear is that Platonism arose – and arose 
now – as a conscious reaction against the philosophy of the Hellenistic schools. In particular, 
it was a reaction against the materialism that had, in the wake of Plato, become the shared 
theoretical assumption of Hellenistic philosophy. In the opinion of Platonists, this retreat 
from Plato’s theory of transcendent first principles had been a grave mistake. Indeed, it was 
precisely this that had led to the unending disputes that had blighted Hellenistic philosophy. 
By contrast, Plato had represented a beacon of profound unity in the philosophical tradition – 
achieving this consensus, the Platonists believed, precisely by placing transcendent Forms at 
the heart of his system.
4
 The only way forward, then, was to return to Plato, and a reading of 
Plato which took the Forms as the cornerstone of his philosophy.
5
  
                                                 
1
 Whether the appearance of Platonism in this period should be regarded as a re-emergence – i.e. the emergence 
of a philosophy that had lain dormant since the Academy’s Sceptical turn – is debated. Some hold that 
Platonism had never really gone away, but was merely sidelined by the dominant Academic philosophy of the 
day. See Boys-Stones (forthcoming), Introduction.  
2
 Though perhaps this date could be pushed back to the fourth century, depending on what we make of the 
Stoicism of Rufius Festus Avienus – see Introduction.  
3
 Antiochus of Ascalon has sometimes been seen as the first Platonist because of his explicit return to a 
dogmatic reading of Plato. However, many scholars do not think that Antiochus adhered to what we shall see is 
the central commitment of all other Platonists: the existence of transcendent first principles – see Dillon (1977), 
91-6; Barnes (1989); Boys-Stones (2012). Thus even if Antiochus contributed to conditions that made the 
(re)emergence of Platonism more favourable (i.e., by advocating a dogmatic reading of Plato) he perhaps cannot 
himself be considered a Platonist, properly speaking (cf., however, Bonazzi (2009), who seems to regard him as 
such). For good summaries of Middle Platonism, including the question of its founder, see Zambon (2006); 
Bonazzi (2014).  
4
 See esp. Atticus Fr. 1, ap. Eusebius, Praep. ev. 11.2.1-4. On the importance of this perception of Plato as, 
historically, a beacon of unity, and the Platonist use of this historical narrative as a kind of ‘meta-philosophy’, 
see Boys-Stones (forthcoming), ch. 1. 
5
 Indeed, for it is clear that people had been reading Plato throughout the preceding period. However, as 
incredible as it may seem to us, these readers were able to read the dialogues without feeling the need to 
foreground this aspect of Plato’s philosophy. The Sceptical Academy had, of course, done this for centuries. 
However, even as Platonism was re-emerging onto the philosophical scene, such a reading was still viable: the 
remaining fragment of Cicero’s translation of the Timaeus, for instance, seems totally unaware of transcendent 
Forms (on which see Lévy (2003)). 
51 
 
       Platonism thus became marked by an aggressive campaign to show the inadequacies of 
materialism. Their astonishing success in this respect led not only to the demise of Stoicism 
but of materialist philosophy quite generally. Such schools were gradually but ineluctably 
squeezed out by those advocating transcendence – first the Platonists themselves, soon to be 
followed by the emergent Christian movement.  
       The scale of this success has sometimes led scholars to regard the post-Hellenistic period 
as a kind of ‘crisis of materialism’. And, when we consider the broad trend across the period 
as a whole, such an impression does not seem entirely unfounded. At the same time, an 
element of caution is required here. Just because materialism seems to have been, objectively 
speaking, in a ‘crisis’ does not necessarily mean that individual materialist thinkers believed 
their systems to be in bad shape. Indeed, scholars have sometimes taken the broad move 
away from materialism in this period to support the narrative of eclecticism: perceiving 
problems with materialism, philosophers such as Seneca began to incorporate aspects of 
Platonic metaphysics within their own systems.
6
 As I have already argued, this does not seem 
to have been the case; not only does Seneca often argue positively for the materialist 
underpinnings of Stoic philosophy but, in Letter 65, even does so in direct opposition to the 
Platonist alternative. Therefore, even if the advance of Platonism was a cause of concern for 
philosophers such as Seneca (indeed, the very fact that Seneca does respond suggests that it 
might have been perceived as such) we need not assume that he was prepared to make 
concessions. Rather, with Letter 65 in mind, we should be open to ways in which Seneca may 
have attempted to resist the anti-materialism of the Platonists. 
       To detect any such attempts, however, we first need to better understand the nature of the 
debate. What, for instance, were the key issues facing the Stoics in this period? In this chapter 
I would like to concentrate on one debate in particular, one that centres around the Stoic 
account of the highest good. For the Platonists, of course, the Forms were just as significant 
in ethics as they were in all other areas of philosophy – indeed, issues tended to radiate out 
into all areas precisely because the Forms were placed at the heart of their system. One 
significant role that the Forms play in ethics is providing a stable grounding for our 
knowledge of ‘the good’. All philosophical schools agree that our lives must be organised 
around some understanding of the good; but the Platonists argue that, without the sort of 
stable grounding that the Forms provide, ethics as such falls apart. At the heart of the problem 
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for the Stoics, Platonists claim, is their empiricism. Empirical means, they argue, simply 
cannot ground the claims that the Stoics want to make in ethics. 
       In the first part of this chapter the Natural Questions will not be the focus of our 
attention. However, in the final section I shall come back to it to argue that this debate forms 
important context for our reading of that text. As we shall see, several important 
programmatic statements in the Natural Questions seem to speak directly to this debate. What 
is more, Seneca seems to be strategically alluding to Plato at precisely the points in the text at 
which these issues are being aired – intended, I believe, to signpost his engagement with the 
Platonists over this matter. The analysis in this chapter will thus lay the groundwork for the 
two subsequent chapters, in which I shall argue that the work, including its unusual form, can 
be made sense of by reading it within this dialectical context.  
       Throughout this and subsequent chapters I shall regularly be referring to a group called 
‘the Platonists’ – a convenient tag that nevertheless requires a degree of qualification. It has 
been pointed out before that, due to significant variations in the views of Platonist thinkers in 
this period, it might be more accurate to refer to Platonist philosophy as a collection of 
Platonisms.
7
 My references to ‘the’ Platonists, therefore, might give the undue impression of 
a level of doctrinal unity among these thinkers than ever actually existed. Nevertheless, this 
shorthand is permissible, I think, at least given the specific debate with which we shall be 
concerned. For, whether or not all Platonists would have formulated the specific arguments 
against the Stoic position that will be explored in this chapter, it is safe to say that all 
Platonists would have objected to the Stoic’s empirically-based account of the good. 
Whatever else Platonists disagreed upon, one thing on which they would have been unified is 
that a well-grounded concept of the good must be based on a grasp of the intelligible realm 
(i.e. the Form of the Good). As noted above, the belief in transcendent Forms was the starting 
point and cornerstone of the Platonist revival, and thus any epistemological or ethical theories 
that made no reference to these entities would have been judged equally inadequate by all 
Platonists. 
       Another issue to note is chronology. It is my contention that the debate explored in this 
chapter forms crucial context for our understanding of the Natural Questions. However, 
while every effort has been made to chose Platonist evidence from close to Seneca’s time, it 
will be noted that not all of the Platonists referred to were contemporary with him; several, 
indeed, post-date him. Accordingly, it is frequently unlikely or impossible that Seneca 
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actually read any of the writings of the specific Platonists discussed in this chapter. I shall, 
however, be running on the assumption that the ideas expressed by these authors reflect, at 
least, the sorts of debates that were going on throughout this period. This assumption is 
justified by two considerations. First, as we shall see, Platonists at both ends of the 
chronological spectrum – from the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus (perhaps as 
early as 1
st
 century BC)
8
 to Numenius (active mid-late 2
nd
 century AD)
9
 – were making 
arguments pertinent to the debate explored in this chapter. This clearly suggests that the 
relevant issues were longstanding and widely known. Second, as already noted, I shall argue 
that in the Natural Questions (and in other works, such as the 120
th
 Letter) Seneca speaks in 
terms that clearly indicate an awareness of the central issues of the debate. Whether Seneca 
actually read the work of these Platonists, then, is not important. He seems nevertheless to be 
aware of a problem that was apparently being debated widely throughout the post-Hellenistic 
period.    
 
2. Empiricism and ‘the good’ 
Materialists like the Stoics generally adopt forms of empiricism, building their accounts of 
knowledge around the experience that agents gain (in the first instance) through the senses. 
One problem with this, according to the Platonists, is that the material world is a peculiarly 
unsuitable foundation for knowledge. In part this is down to the Platonists’ strong 
metaphysical claim that the physical world is in a kind of ‘flux’ – as most memorably 
described in Plato’s Theaetetus.10 While this special claim is unlikely to worry the Stoics 
much, there are other reasons why empirical experience is a problematic basis for knowledge: 
 
Learning cannot arise in any other way than by remembering what was formerly known. If we had in 
fact to start from particulars in forming our conception of common qualities, how could we ever  
traverse the infinite series of particulars, or alternatively how could we form such a conception on the 
basis of a small number (for we could be deceived, as for instance if we came to the conclusion that 
only that which breathed was an animal); or how could concepts have the dominant role that they do 
have? So we derive our thoughts through recollection, on the basis of small sparks, under the stimulus 
of certain particular impressions remembering what we knew long ago, but suffered forgetfulness of 
at the time of our embodiment. (Alcinous, Didaskalikos 25.3, trans. Dillon) 
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 On the early dating, and the possible identification of Anon. with Eudorus, see Tarrant (1983). The early 
dating was followed by Sedley (in Bastianini and Sedley (1995)). Dillon (1976, 270-1), on the other hand, 
considers an identification with Albinus, or at least with an associate of his. For further discussion, and 
measured criticism of the early dating, see Opsomer (1998), 34-6. 
9
 On Numenius’ dating, see Dillon (1976), 362. 
10
 Tht. 181c ff. 
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Alcinous draws attention to the fact that, in order to be able to navigate the world 
successfully, we need to build up a functional set of universal concepts (those that encode 
“common qualities”).11 A sufficiently large set of these is necessary for us to be able to make 
sense of our experience, allowing us to understand the manifold objects of sense-perception 
in terms of these ‘common qualities’. What Alcinous argues, though, is that the sheer 
diversity of empirical experience represents a serious obstacle to the formation of these 
concepts in the first place. Posing a dilemma, Alcinous argues, on the one hand, that to form 
a reliable concept on the basis of empirical experience we would have to review an infinite 
series of particulars – only thus could we be sure that the concept accurately reflected the 
world. This, however, is clearly not practicable. Accordingly, empiricists are forced onto the 
other horn of the dilemma, into a situation in which these ‘universal’ concepts are formed on 
the basis of only a limited number of experiences. But this renders them manifestly defeasible 
– and us, therefore, vulnerable to error. The Platonists avoid this problem, Alcinous 
maintains, by holding that these concepts stem from our recollection of Forms, our prenatal 
experience of which accounts for a non-partial and well-grounded appreciation of these 
common qualities.
12
  
        In fact, this problem proves especially troublesome for the Stoics, thanks to their 
nominalism. This means that we technically never experience precisely the same quality 
twice: each thing just is what it individually is.
13
 What this also means, of course, is that the 
Stoics technically deny the very existence of ‘common qualities’; but this is no escape, since 
it is clear that the Stoics realised the cognitive necessity for us to be able to categorise the 
diverse objects of our experience. Thus, although they deny that common qualities exist in 
any ultimate sense, the Stoics nevertheless make room for these items among our cognitive 
apparatus, describing them as a kind of mental fiction that we use to make sense of the 
world.
14
 And, because we find ourselves using these fictions regularly (the “dominant role” 
Alcinous alludes to) the Stoics would seem to have a job to do to explain how and why they 
are to be relied upon. 
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 In the following, I adhere to language used by Brittain (2005, 164 n. 1) to distinguish between the various 
items in Stoic epistemology: ‘concept’ is the general term, of which conceptions (ἔννοιαι) and 
preconceptions/common conception (πρόληψεις/κοιναι ἔννοιαι) are species. On the identity of the latter terms, 
along with what are sometimes called ‘natural (ἔμφυτος) conceptions’, see Sandbach (1930); Brittain (2005); 
and, with further distinctions, Dyson (2009), 60ff. 
12
 For discussion of the problems of empiricism and concept formation see Schrenk (1991); Boys-Stones (2005), 
esp. 216-222; (2014). 
13
 Cicero, Acad. 2.84-5. 
14
 For this reason, Long and Sedley (1987, 182) argue that the Stoics might be better described as 
‘conceptualists’, rather than nominalists, since they believe universals do exist, albeit as mind-dependent 
entities. For discussion of the status of universals in Stoicism, see Sedley (1985). 
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       Or do they? While empirical concepts formed through induction might not be absolutely 
reliable, this need not mean that they are not adequate to allow us to navigate the world in a 
reasonably successful way. To take Alcinous’ example of ‘living thing’: while our concept of 
a living thing as something that breathes might lead us astray in some circumstances,
15
 a 
concept articulated along these lines will nevertheless allow us, in the vast majority of cases, 
to identify whether something is a living thing or not; and in any case, if and when we do 
encounter something which, on reflection, ought probably to be considered living despite not 
breathing, there is nothing to stop us from refining the concept to accommodate the 
exception. Indeed, this seems precisely how the Stoics envisaged the articulation of our 
concepts to proceed.
16
 
       What is more, many Platonists seem basically to have thought this themselves, at least so 
far as many of our concepts are concerned. In Platonic scholarship, by way of contrast, there 
is a long-standing debate as to whether all concepts derive from the recollection of Forms 
(even when the agent does not realise it), or if, on the other hand, the recollection of Forms 
only begins if and when the agent receives formal philosophical instruction.
17
 Where 
Platonists are concerned, however, most seem to have opted for the latter model.
18
 The 
primary reason for their doing so is that many of the things we encounter in the course of our 
experience – artefacts of human technology in particular – are not the sorts of things that one 
would expect to correspond to a Form.
19
 But what this means is that the vast majority of 
people – who never even begin the formal process of recollection – go through life relying on 
the same kind of empirical apparatus proposed by the Stoics.  
       What is more, the Platonists would also likely accept that in the majority of cases this is 
all people need to lead a reasonably successful life – or at least, this is the best that many 
people can ever hope for. This is because, in Platonist thought, most people are just not cut 
out to become philosophers. Most are thought simply to lack the natural ability – the 
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 The definition of a living thing as that which breathes is criticised by Aristotle at De an. 404a10 and De 
resp. 470b-471b. 
16
 Cicero, Acad. 2.20, where the empirical process of articulating concepts seems to happen through successive 
stages of refinement and enrichment. There seems no reason why this process could not go on indefinitely. 
17
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 See, for example, Plutarch Fr. 215d. At first glance Alcinous in the quoted passage above may seem to be 
adhering to the other model, though on this see Boys-Stones (forthcoming, ch. 13), who contends that Alcinous 
allows empirical concepts, with the point precisely being that such concepts could not be well-grounded.  
19
 Although Plato notoriously refers to Forms of beds and tables at Republic 596a-c, by this period, at least, most 
Platonists thought that Forms were restricted to so-called ‘natural kinds’ – see e.g. Alcinous Did. 9.2; cf. 
Apuleius De dog. Plat. 1.6 [192-3]. 
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memory, intelligence – as well as the appropriate upbringing.20 Indeed, even among those 
who do start down this path, very few ever get to the stage of actually cognising the Forms. 
Such people might only be fitted for more practical kinds of lives; and for these kinds of 
lives, the empirical framework (defeasible as it is) might serve well enough. 
       But the point is – and this is where it becomes problematic for the Stoics – that this 
framework is not sufficient for the best kind of life, the life of the utmost happiness; but this 
is the kind of life the Stoics are selling in their ethics. Such a life, it was thought, must be 
organised around some stable notion of the good in human life. While in the majority of cases 
a reasonably successful yet ultimately defeasible concept might serve us perfectly well, when 
it comes to the good, there is no room for this kind of uncertainty. And with this, the Stoics 
would have to agree: 
 
...if a man is confident of the goods that he has, what does he lack for living happily? Or how can 
someone who lacks confidence be happy?...no one can be happy without a good which is secure, 
stable and lasting...The man who would fear losing any of these things [i.e. goods] cannot be happy. 
We want the happy man to be safe, impregnable, fenced and fortified, so that he is not just largely 
unafraid, but completely. (Cicero Tusculan Disputations 5.40-1, trans. Long and Sedley)21 
 
Admittedly the discussion here is not concerned with the question of our epistemological 
certainty over the nature of the good, but rather the practical insecurity of so-called external 
goods. However, it is reasonable to assume that the Stoics would be similarly worried if they 
could not be sure that virtue, as they conceive it, is the ultimate and enduring good of a 
human being.  
      In fact, though, the problem is made worse for the Stoics by a number of extremely strong 
claims that they make for both goodness and happiness. For one thing, it is clear that the 
Stoics are no relativists. Far from it, the Stoics clearly believed that the claims they made for 
the good, and for their ethics in general, were completely absolute: 
 
They say that justice, and also law and right reason, exist by nature, and not by convention – as 
Chrysippus says in his On the Fine. (Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.128, my trans.)  
 
And it is not only justice and injustice that are distinguished naturally, but in general all honourable 
and disgraceful acts. For nature has given us shared conceptions and has so established them in our 
minds that honourable things are classed with virtue, disgraceful ones with vice. To think that these 
                                                 
20
 The locus classicus for this being Republic 535a ff. This contrasts strongly with the Stoics, who maintain that 
virtue and happiness is open to everyone – see Seneca Ben. 3.18.2. In fact, though, this merely adds a further 
problem for the Stoics – not merely do they have to explain how some exceptional and lucky people can obtain 
this well-grounded concept of the good, but how it is theoretically available to everyone.  
21
 Cf. Epictetus 2.11.19-21; Seneca, Ep. 120.20-2. 
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things are a matter of opinion, not fixed in nature, is the mark of a madman...Whatever good thing 
deserves praise must necessarily have in itself something that is to be praised; the good itself is not a 
matter of opinion but of nature. If that were not the case, then men would be happy by opinion – and 
nothing dumber than that could possibly be said. Therefore, since good and bad are judged by nature, 
and they are fundamental concepts of nature, then certainly honourable and dishonourable things must 
be judged in a similar way and referred to nature. (Cicero Laws 1.44-6, trans. Zetzel)22  
 
No mere matter of opinion, the character of the good – and justice and all the virtues – is set 
down in nature itself. This means that, according to the Stoics, there is just one way for a 
human to be good. If the Platonists are right, though, how can the Stoics be so sure?  
       But the problem is made worse still by the extremely high standards that the Stoics set 
for happiness and the good life. The good, they claim, is not only absolute in its nature, but 
also in degree.
23
 According to the Stoics, then, any insecurity that one has about the good 
leads not simply to a less-than-happy life (as it might for the Platonists and Peripatetics, for 
instance) but to a life that lacks happiness completely. If empiricism cannot provide a well-
grounded, reliable concept of the good, therefore, the entire eudaimonistic frame of the 
Stoics’ ethical project is placed in serious jeopardy. 
       One consideration that might seem to help the Stoics here is their theory of so-called  
‘preconceptions’ (variously also referred to as ‘common conceptions’ and also ‘natural 
conceptions’).24 Indeed, above, Cicero alludes to this theory as part of his argument for 
regarding the good as absolute. According to this theory, all human beings are naturally 
predisposed to form a certain set of concepts, apparently seen as forming the core of an 
agent’s rationality.25 Significantly, the good, and a number of other central ethical concepts, 
were held to be among these.
26
 This set of concepts is said to be formed in the course of the 
agent’s development before the onset of reason, which is important because it means that 
they form before the corruption of rationality sets in (which happens in most, if not all cases). 
What this means, then, is that all human beings have a quasi-innate concept of ‘good’ that is 
in some sense guaranteed by nature.  
                                                 
22
 The repeated references to nature as the epistemological basis of ethics, as well as the correspondences with 
other Stoic arguments (e.g. the peculiar character of the good, cf. Fin. 3.33-4) suggest to me Cicero is following 
the Stoics here. 
23
 Cicero, Fin. 3.33; D. L. 7.101. 
24
 See n. 11, above. 
25
 For a seminal account of Stoic reason, and the constitutive role of preconceptions therein, see Frede (1994). 
See also Brittain (2001).  
26
 S. E., M. 11.22. Cf. D. L. 7.53, who says that we conceive of the good and the just “naturally” (φυσικῶς), and 
Plutarch Sto. rep. 1041E, who cites Chrysippus as saying that the theory of goods and evils coincides with our 
“inborn preconceptions” (ἐμφύτων...προλήψεων). For a list of all the concepts described as being among our 
common conceptions/preconceptions in the evidence, see Brittain (2005), 171 n. 29. 
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        If all human beings are simply assured to form this preconception of the good, it might 
seem that these issues to do with empirical formation fall by the wayside. Indeed, one 
fragment of Plutarch describes the Stoic theory of ‘natural conceptions’ as their counterpart 
to Platonic Recollection.
27
 However, to push this parallel too far would be a mistake.
28
 
Despite what has sometimes been thought, Stoic preconceptions do not appear to amount to a 
form of innatism, properly speaking.
29
 Indeed, there are good philosophical reasons why the 
Stoics wanted to avoid this position. If all human beings came into adulthood with a fully-
articulated concept of the good, they would then have to explain why the vast majority of 
people in fact end up having the wrong idea about what the good is. Preconceptions therefore 
cannot constitute an understanding of what the term ‘good’ actually means. While the 
possession of the preconception might allow us to refer to things as good, considerable 
cognitive work seems necessary to arrive at an articulated understanding of the good
30
: 
                                                 
27
 Plutarch Fr. 215F Sandbach. 
28
 Indeed, we must pay attention to the dialectical context in which this comment from Plutarch occurs. Plutarch 
is trying to show that the Stoics (and other empiricists) cannot solve ‘Meno’s Paradox’. The Platonists of course 
solve the problem with recollection. Plutarch then tries to show that the nearest Stoic equivalent to this theory 
cannot do the job. This does not mean, though, that the Stoics themselves believed the theories to be parallel to 
each other.  
29
 In a well-known article, Sandbach (1930) argues against Bonhöffer’s (1890) innatist reading of Stoic 
preconceptions – at least when it comes to the early Stoa. More recently, Jackson-McCabe has defended a form 
of innatism, albeit a kind of ‘dispositional innatism’, in which all human have an innate tendency to form certain 
concepts. Hadot (2014, 9) attributes an out-and-out form of innatism to later Stoics such as Epictetus, though her 
analysis of the earlier Stoic theory also places a considerable emphasis on innate tendencies. 
30
 Precisely what these preconceptions are, or consist of, and how they are supposed to function in Stoic 
epistemology, is a difficult problem and a matter of some controversy. Some scholars hold that the 
preconception is an indistinct version of a conception (i.e. an ἔννοια – a fully articulated concept); see. e.g. 
Schofield (1980); Brittain (2005); Vogt (2008a). Thus Vogt (2008a) argues that a preconception has the  
propositional content ‘the good benefits’. However, as Menn (2008) argues in response – rightly in my opinion 
– the concept of the good that Vogt appears to have in mind is not a preconception, as she believes, but the 
“scientific concept” of the good – that is, the good articulated as such and such. As I take it – and this is implicit 
in the passage of Epictetus below, I think – the preconception of the good is basically ‘atomic’, without any 
particular content, allowing us little more than the ability to use the term ‘good’. Our task is then to learn to 
‘apply’ this concept of goodness to the correct instances – as Epictetus suggests (and this is where most people 
go wrong: applying ‘good’ to things like pleasure.) Support for this reading comes first from a well-known 
passage of Aetius (4.10-11), where he gives an account of the formation of the concept of ‘white’. Here the 
concept we end up with is not of white as such and such, but rather simply ‘white’. Further support comes from 
Cicero ND 2.12-13, where he says that, although everyone has an “an innate conviction that gods exist, as if 
engraved on their minds (omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos)”, people 
nevertheless disagree on what precisely the gods are. Dyson (2009, esp. 60-1) seems to be of a similar opinion, 
saying that the ‘content’ of the preconception as such is completely “inchoate” (although I disagree with his 
suggestion that ‘common conceptions’ differ in this respect). One potential problem with my reading relates to 
the criterial role that preconceptions are supposed to play; for if they are without content, how can they serve 
such a role? The first thing to say against such a concern is that, even on the ‘fuzzy conception’ reading, there 
are problems with their criterial role: if my preconception of the good amounts to ‘the good is benefit’, how 
does this help me to determine what truly benefits – i.e. what the good truly is? Indeed, as Menn points out (op. 
cit., 177) benefit is just as problematic a concept as the good itself. I take preconceptions to be criterial in at 
least one of two senses. First, the fact that we all share a concept of the good tells us that  there is some ‘good’ 
out there to be grasped (cf. Dyson (2009, 37). This at once prevents us falling into the Epicurean error of simply 
reducing good to some other quality: pleasure; and the Sceptical error of just giving up the search completely. 
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...who among us enters the world without having an innate conception (ἔμφυτον ἔννοιαν) of what is 
good and bad, honourable and base, appropriate and inappropriate, and of happiness, and of what is 
proper for us and falls to our lot, and of what we ought to do and ought not to do? And so it comes 
about that all of us make use of these terms, and try to apply (ἐφαρμόζειν) our preconceptions to 
individual cases. ‘He acted well, he did as he ought or ought not to have done; he has been 
unfortunate, or was fortunate; he is unjust, or is just’; who among us fails to use such expressions? 
Who defers the use of them until he has been properly instructed, as with those who are ignorant 
about lines or musical notes? The reason is that, in this area, we come into the world ready-instructed, 
as it were, to some degree by nature, and starting from that, we go on to add our personal opinion. 
‘But why is it’, someone says, ‘that I don’t know what is right or wrong? Is it that I have no 
preconception in this regard?’ No, you do have one. ‘Is it that I fail to apply (ἐφαρμόζω) it to 
particular cases?’ No, you do apply it. ‘So I don’t apply (ἐφαρμόζω) it properly?’ The whole question 
turns on that, and it is here that opinion enters in. For people start from these generally acknowledged 
principles, but then get involved in disputes because they fail to apply (ἐφαρμογῆς) them in an 
appropriate way to particular cases. If, in addition to these general principles, they also possessed the 
knowledge that is required to apply them correctly, what could keep them from being perfect?  
(Epictetus Discourses 2.11.3-9, trans. Hard, slightly modified) 
 
Epictetus here acknowledges that we have a natural propensity to use terms such as ‘good’, 
‘honourable’, and the like; it is precisely our ἔμφυτον ἔννοιαν of such things that allows us to 
do so. However, it is also clear that our doing so does not necessarily imply an understanding 
of the true meaning of these terms – what they should be ‘applied’ to (ἐφαρμόζειν, lit. ‘fit 
together with’), as Epictetus puts it. Indeed, as Epictetus says, most people fail in this respect, 
coming to ‘apply’ their preconception to improper instances. As agents, then, our task is to 
learn to ‘apply’ our preconception of the good to the correct instances.  
       But what is significant – and here we see the reason why the theory of preconceptions 
does not help the Stoics a great deal – is that the way we learn to come to ‘apply’ these 
preconceptions correctly is itself an empirical process. We see this in Epictetus’ subsequent 
description of the process by which we learn to refine our application of the term: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Second, I am sympathetic to the idea proposed by Long (1977, 127-8, although cf. Schofield (1980), 295), that 
the preconception works in tandem with the other (much more widely cited) Stoic criterion of truth: the 
‘cognitive impression’. According to this theory, while the preconception allows us to recognise (e.g.) 
‘goodness’ in the world at all, it is the cognitive impression that assures us that the thing we are perceiving is in 
fact good (although, as we shall see, the Stoics have a problem with explaining how we ever get a clear 
perception of the good). Indeed, it is worth noting that when Chrysippus says that preconceptions are criterial, 
he says that they are so along with sense-perception: “And Chrysippus, at variance with himself, says in the first 
of his books On reason that sense-perception and preconception are the criteria” (D. L. 7.54). Overall, I see the 
task of a Stoic agent not as unpacking inchoate concepts (akin to Platonic recollection), but rather articulating 
our set of natural concepts in the correct way: applying or joining them up with the right instances. Indeed, this 
is exactly what we find Epictetus and Seneca trying to do (see below).      
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...we can judge particular cases through the application of an articulated system of preconceptions 
(διηρθρωμέναις ταῖς προλήψει). What is the subject of our present enquiry? ‘Pleasure.’ Submit it to 
the standard, put it on the scales. For something to be good, must it be something that we can properly 
place confidence and trust in? ‘Indeed it must.’ Can we properly place confidence, then, in something 
that is unstable? ‘No.’ Is pleasure stable? ‘No, it isn’t.’ Away with it, then; take it out of the scales, 
and drive it away from the realm of good things. But if your sight is none too keen and one set of 
scales isn’t enough for you, bring another. Is the good something that can properly inspire us with 
pride? ‘It is indeed.’ Is the pleasure of the moment, then, something that can properly inspire us with 
pride?... (Epictetus Discourses 2.11.19-22, trans. Hard, modified) 
 
The process of articulating preconceptions happens in reference to empirical experience. We 
refer our experience of (e.g.) pleasure to a nexus of ideas that we have built up around the 
good:
31
 that it is something to be relied upon; that it should be a source of pride. Because 
pleasure does not cohere with these, we discard it; and presumably we then go on to test out 
other candidates from within our experience until we eventually arrive at something that does 
fit these criteria. It is seemingly through this kind of trial and error process that we eventually 
come to articulate our preconception of the good in the correct way. Taking the fact that we 
do all use the term ‘good’ as a starting point – as proof, for instance, that there is some good 
‘out there’ to be sought – we then use our experience of pleasure and the rest to gradually 
refine our application of the term. 
       But this turns out to be problematic for the Stoics. For, so the Platonists argue, it is 
unlikely that a Stoic agent will ever encounter ‘goodness’ in a clear enough way to facilitate 
this process of articulation. The problem is gestured towards by Numenius: 
 
We can apprehend bodies by induction from similar things and from the distinctive marks shared by 
things that are juxtaposed. But there is no way of apprehending the good from juxtaposition, or from 
some perceptible similarity... if someone, intent on objects of perception, should imagine the good 
flying towards him, and preen himself with the thought that he has come across the good, he is 
completely mistaken. In fact, to get to it requires a divine methodology, one not easy. It is best 
employed by someone who does not care for the things of perception, applies himself with enthusiasm 
to the mathematical sciences, contemplates numbers, and thus learns to master this subject: What is 
being? (Numenius fr. 2, ap. Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11.22.1-2, trans. Boys-Stones) 
 
                                                 
31
 Indeed, these ideas surrounding the preconception, as Epictetus says, have already been articulated 
(διηρθρωμέναις). This, I think, rules out the idea that Epictetus is referring to the bare preconception as a 
standard here (see n. 30, above), as does the fact that he refers to multiple ideas surrounding the preconception: 
that it is stable, that it is a source of pride (for, even on the ‘preconception as fuzzy conception’ reading, it is 
assumed that the content of the preconception must be relatively simple (see Vogt (2008a), 159). As such, I 
think Oldfather is right to cash out διηρθρωμέναις ταῖς προλήψει as something like a “system” of such ideas – 
which I have substituted for Hard’s “systematically examined preconceptions”, above.  
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Prima facie, the Stoics do have an immediate answer to this. For, according to them all 
properties are bodies, the good included.
32
 However, another point of Stoic theory effectively 
commits them to the position that almost no-one will see so much as a single instance of 
goodness in their lifetime. This is their notorious claim that wise people – people, that is, who 
instantiate the good – are superlatively rare, possibly to the point of never existing at all.33 
But, what is more, the problem is once more compounded by the Stoics’ radical distinction 
between the good and the non-good, meaning that we do not even encounter partial or 
imperfect instances of goodness in people, say, who have made some moral progress. 
       However, it so happens that the wise person is not the only ‘good’ thing that the Stoics 
might appeal to here. For they also maintain that the cosmos is good. Indeed, for the Stoics 
the cosmos is the ultimate instantiation of goodness. On most readings of Stoicism, it is 
precisely in reference to the cosmos as a whole that everything derives its goodness – hence 
the human good comes out as ‘to live in accordance with nature’.34 Moreover, we have 
already seen that the Stoics do say that the character of the good “exists by nature”, which 
seems precisely to imply that the character of the good is set down in the cosmos itself.
35
 As a 
preliminary answer to Numenius, then, the Stoics could say: of course we do not just see the 
good ‘flying towards us’. This is because the good is not like this; we cannot just look at a 
piece of the world and call it good. Goodness is something that exists in, and in relation to, 
the cosmos as a whole.  
       The difficulty, however, (and the Stoics seem to have realised this)
36
 is that it is very 
difficult to explain how the cosmos can play this grounding role from the point of view of the 
agent. It is clearly not enough simply to look at the cosmos. So how does an agent go about 
‘fitting’ or ‘applying’ (to use Epictetus’ terminology) one’s concept of the good to the 
cosmos itself? And if one manages such a thing, how does the good, articulated as such, play 
a role within one’s ethical considerations? 
       Traditionally for the Stoics, though, this is where their famous theory of οἰκείωσις seems 
to come in. Indeed, οἰκείωσις is presented as the overriding framework in which our ethical 
                                                 
32
 Seneca Ep. 117.2. 
33
 As pointed out by Inwood (2005c, 274-5), and Boys-Stones, op. cit. On the rarity of the sage: Alexander De 
fat. 196.24-197.3; on potential non-existence: Cicero Fin. 4.65; Div. 2.61; Tusc. 2.51. 
34
 As will be explored in Chapter 5, this claim about the role of ‘cosmic nature’ in Stoic ethics is contentious. 
The evidence, however, seems to be on its side – see esp. D. L. 7.87-8.   
35
 Indeed, it is precisely by doing so that the Stoics can claim the good is absolute; for the cosmos represents 
everything that there is. What is good in relation to the cosmos is thus ipso facto good absolutely. 
36
 The Stoics’ long-standing awareness of this problem is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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development occurs, including the development of our understanding of the ‘good’.37 
According to this theory, as soon as we are born we are driven to preserve our own natural 
constitutions, motivating us to seek out things that will promote this constitution – things 
such as nourishment. Our motivation towards such things is explained by our coming to view 
them as ‘belonging’ (being ‘οἰκείον’) to our natures.38 The process is ethically significant 
because these experiences form an empirical starting point for the agent’s understanding of 
value: we consider things to be of value (i.e., to be a source of motivation) precisely to the 
extent that we consider them to ‘belong’ to our natures.  
       The process of οἰκείωσις, however, does not stop here. Indeed, the reason why οἰκείωσις 
becomes relevant to our problem is because, as we develop, our sense of what ‘belongs’ to us 
is supposed to be able to be extended beyond the requirements of bodily wellbeing, to include 
the concerns of other beings.
39
 The paradigmatic example of this is the relationship of parent 
to child, though with rational effort we are supposed to be able to extend our sense of 
οἰκείωσις to include others as well. In ideal circumstances, this process ought to go on until it 
includes the entire community of rational beings – which is to say, ultimately, the entire 
cosmos.
 
Eventually, then, we come to view the concerns of the cosmos itself as falling within 
our own sphere of self-interest – which is why, I take it, the Stoic τέλος comes out as to live 
in accordance with nature as a whole.
40
 
       One function of οἰκείωσις, then, seems to be precisely to explain how we are supposed to 
be able to get into a state in which we could meaningfully ‘apply’ the term good to the 
cosmos. It is not by seeing the cosmos that we come to understand the proper application of 
                                                 
37
 For the framing of acquisition of the concept of the good within οἰκείωσις: Cicero Fin. 3.21-2. See Jackson 
McCabe, esp. 335ff.; Vogt (2008a), 160ff; Menn (2008), 178; Boys-Stones (2014), 298ff. Cf. Striker (1989, 156 
n. 14), however, who does not think the concept of the good is at stake here. Cicero’s use of the term ἔννοιαν in 
this context seems to count against Striker’s contention, though. 
38
 As Plutarch describes the process at Sto. rep. 1038c: “Οἰκείωσις is a perception and a laying hold of 
something as being οἰκείον (οἰκείωσις αἴσθησις ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι)”. 
39
 This stage of the process is often described as ‘social οἰκείωσις’. A great deal of scholarship has been 
dedicated to trying to show how the initial selfish drive with which all agents begin life becomes an other-
oriented drive in the second stage. See, for instance, Pohlenz (1940); Pembroke (1971); Inwood (1985, 183ff.) – 
all of whom see the two stages of ‘individual’ and then ‘social’ οἰκείωσις as continuous. Variants of this 
interpretation include Reydams-Schils (2002) and Klein (2015) (although Klein essentially rejects the 
distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘social’ οἰκείωσις completely). Others suggest there is a radical break 
between the stages, e.g. White (1979); Frede (1994); (2004); Striker (1996). For an excellent summary of the 
scholarship on οἰκείωσις, see Klein op cit., esp. 153ff. My own opinion falls in the first camp, seeing our adult 
motivations as a development of the juvenile form of self-preservation: in sum, we come to view the wellbeing 
of the cosmos as a part of our own self-interest.  
40
 This, in any case, is how I read Stoicism. To me, in order to get to the stage where the agent genuinely views 
‘living in accordance with nature as a whole’ as their own good, it seems necessary that one comes to view the 
whole cosmos as ‘belonging’ (being οἰκείον) to oneself in this way (for a similar reading see Vogt (2008b), 
213ff). As will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5, some scholars – pre-eminently Julia Annas – deny the 
importance of this cosmic context for a Stoic agents’ ethical deliberations. See Annas (1993), esp. 159-79; 
(1995); (2007). Contra her position, see esp. Cooper (1995); (1996); Inwood (1995). 
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this term. Rather, it is by coming to understand our relationship with the world around us – 
coming to understand that it is the cosmos itself that forms the proper context for our ethical 
deliberations. We come to see, in other words, that it is the wellbeing of the cosmos as a 
whole that should serve as the benchmark for our understanding of the good. 
       If this is how the Stoics traditionally went about explaining how the cosmos comes 
within the agent’s ethical frame of reference, Platonists were evidently not convinced. As we 
shall see in a moment, even if a Platonist were to concede that the cosmos could provide the 
grounding for some abstract notion of ‘the good’, they nevertheless deny that a Stoic agent 
could ever come to meaningfully ‘apply’ or ‘articulate’ the good in this way. They deny, in 
other words, that a Stoic agent could ever get the cosmos within their ethical frame of 
reference in such a way that it could serve as the grounds for an understanding of the good. 
The reason for this, it turns out, is again a direct consequence of the Stoics’ empiricism: 
 
ᾠκειώμε|θα γὰρ τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι· | μᾶλλον μέντοι ὠι|κε  ται το [ῖς ἑ]α  τ ο    ολ ται  [ς· ἐ ιτε ν]ε |ται γὰρ καὶ 
ἀ[ν ετ]α[ι] ἡ | οἰκε  σις· ο  [σοι το]ι   ν  ν | ἀ ὸ τῆς οἰκει  ώσε ς | εἰσάγο σι τὴν δικ αιο |σύνην, εἰ μὲν λέγο |σ ιν ἴσην 
αὑτοῦ τε   ρὸς | αὑτὸν καὶ  ρ ο  ς  τ [ὸν] ε  |[σ]χατον Μ σῶν, τεθέν|τος μὲν τούτο  σώζε|ται ἡ δικαιοσ[ύ]νη, οὐ | 
σ γχ ρει   ται   [δ]ε  [εἶ]|ν αι ἴσην·   αρὰ γὰ[ρ τὴν] ἐνάργειάν ἐστιν κ α[ὶ] | τὴν σ να σθησιν. ἡ | μὲν γὰρ  ρὸς 
ἑα τὸν | οἰκε  σις   σικ  ἐστιν | καὶ ἄλογος, ἡ δὲ  ρὸς | τοὺς  λησ ον   σικὴ | μὲν καὶ αὐτ , οὐ μέν|τοι ἄνε  
λόγο . ἐὰν γοῦν | καταγνῶμεν  ονη|ρ αν τινῶν, οὐ μόνον | ψέγομεν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ | κ αὶ ἀ οτριούμεθα |   ρὸς 
αὐτούς, αὐτοὶ δὲ | α  μαρτάνοντες οὐ|κ ἀ οδέκονται μὲν | τ α  γ ’ ε  χ όμ ε να, οὐ δύναν|ταα [ι] δ ε  μεισῆσαι αὑτούς. | 
ο   κ ἔστιν το ν ν ἴση | ἡ οι   κ ει   σις  ρὸς ἑ|α τ ο  ν κ [αὶ  ]ρὸς ὁντιν|ο   ν , ὅ ο  μηδὲ  ρὸς | τα  ε  α τ   ν μέρη ἐ ’ 
ἴ|ση [ς] ᾠκε ι    μεθα. ο   γὰρ | ο  μ ο  ς  ε  χ ομεν  ρὸς | ὀ θ α λμ [ὸ]ν κα [ὶ] δάκτ |λον, ἵνα μ η  λέγ    ρὸς | ὄν  χας κ α ι    
τρ χας, ἐ εὶ | οὐδὲ  ρο  ς  τὴν ἀ οβο|λὴν αὐτῶν ὁμο  ς | ἠ οτριώμε [θ]α , ἀλλὰ | μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. 
 
For we experience οἰκείωσις towards what is similar to us: he [Socrates] feels more οἰκείωσις towards 
his own citizens. For οἰκείωσις is more and less intense. If those who base justice on οἰκείωσις say 
that one has an equal sense of οἰκείωσις towards oneself and the farthest Mysian, their thesis 
preserves justice – but it is not agreed that οἰκείωσις is equal, because that is something that is 
contrary to what is obvious and to co-perception (συναίσθησις). For οἰκείωσις towards oneself is 
natural and non-rational while that towards one’s neighbours is also natural, but not non-rational. If 
we discover wickedness in people, we do not only censure them, but have a sense of alienation 
towards them; but they themselves, when they are doing wrong, do not accept what goes with it, and 
are unable to hate themselves. In fact, the οἰκείωσις one feels towards oneself is not equal to that felt 
towards anyone else, when we do not even have an equal sense of οἰκείωσις towards all our own 
limbs. We do not feel the same way about an eye and a finger, let alone about finger-nails and hair, 
since we are not equally ‘alienated’ from the loss of them, but froms some more and others less.  
 (Anonymous, Commentary on the Theaetetus col. V.18-VI.16, trans. Boys-Stones, modified)41     
                                                 
41
 For discussion of Anon’s anti-Stoicism in the Commentary, see Bonazzi (2008). For a similar point to that 
made by Anon. here, see Maximus of Tyre, Orations 35, esp. 35.2-3. Here Maximus seems at first to say, rather 
pessimistically, that because human nature falls short of the divine, humans are in general unable to achieve true  
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As Anon. admits, if it were possible to extend one’s realm of self-interest to the point at 
which it coincided with the whole community of rational beings, then the Stoic account of 
justice (and also the good) would stand: the Stoics would both be able to account for an 
objective concept (objective because it is grounded in the whole cosmos), and one that could 
be meaningfully understood (‘articulated’ ‘applied’) by the agent. However, Anon. argues 
that the sort of total impartiality towards other beings that the Stoic position requires is 
simply not feasible. Anon. appears to concede that we can extend our sense of οἰκείωσις to 
some extent – Socrates, for instances, experiences οἰκείωσις towards his fellow citizens. But 
the process certainly cannot extend to the ‘furthest Mysian’ (a fortiori to the cosmos as a 
whole). In fact, though, Anon. seems to have doubts that we could achieve true impartiality 
even towards our nearest and dearest. People generally cannot even get beyond the bias they 
have towards their own bodies – or worse, beyond the most important parts of their own 
bodies. Far from underwriting an objectively grounded concept of the good, then, οἰκείωσις 
can only lead to a relative notion of goodness, one grounded, first and foremost, in the 
wellbeing of one’s own body.42   
       It should be emphasised that while Anon’s critique is framed as an attack on οἰκείωσις in 
particular, it applies equally to empiricist claims about ethics more generally. This much is 
indicated by the fact that Anon. goes on to argue that the Stoics fail to establish justice for the 
very same reasons as the Epicureans – an empiricist school who notably omitted οἰκείωσις 
from their ethical account.
43
 The underlying point therefore seems to be that any empiricist 
model will run into these difficulties.
44
 The problem, I suggest, is that empiricism by its very 
nature can only provide a partial, ‘first-person’, and therefore partisan perspective on the 
world. This very point might be what is indicated by Anon.’s reference to ‘co-perception’ 
(συναίσθησις) – a term that has a particular technical significance in Stoicism. The meaning 
                                                                                                                                                        
οἰκείωσις to our fellow beings. However, the point that emerges seems rather to be that it is only insofar as man 
lapses into his merely human nature – by pursuing pleasure, wealth and the like (i.e. precisely reducing himself 
to the ‘body’) – that he will fall short of divine friendship with other beings. Thus, just as Anon. goes on to say 
that justice is preserved if we adopt Plato’s methodology of ‘becoming like god’, so too Maximus encourages us 
to pursue philosophy if friendship is to be preserved. What is also significant is that Maximus – just like Anon. 
and, as we shall see in a moment, Seneca – all mark out the over-attachment to the body and to external 
possessions as the thing that prevents us from extending our sense of οἰκείωσις to our fellow beings (see esp. 
Or. 35.6).   
42
 As Inwood (1984, 182-3) points out, Anon. thereby shows that the Stoic theory is no better than the Epicurean 
position, in which goodness and justice are explicitly reduced to self-interest. 
43
 Col. VI.35-VII.1. 
44
 Indeed, it is unlikely that the Platonists would be satisfied even if the Stoics or some other school made this 
other-directed impulse a fundamental feature of an agent’s psychology from the very start (as some indeed claim 
is the case with the Stoics – see Reydams-Schils (2002), with an updated version in id. (2005a), ch. 2). For, even 
then one’s limited perspective would result in a stronger sense of attachment to those closest to oneself – those, 
that is, who fall within the one’s direct experience. 
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of this term has been interpreted in a number of ways,
45
 but some have suggested that it is 
meant to describe the way in which an agent constantly perceives the world in relation to 
their own constitutions – a theory that therefore precisely posits oneself as the basic reference 
point for one’s experience and evaluation of the world.46 If correct, this strongly suggests that 
Anon’s point is just as I say: that empiricism leads to an inherently egoistic perspective on the 
world, meaning that the best any empiricist could hope to achieve is an understanding of the 
good grounded in a narrow form of self-interest.  
       Indeed, it is for this reason, Anon. goes on, that Plato founded justice not on οἰκείωσις, 
but on “coming to be like god” – which is to say, on the basis of an apprehension of the 
Forms. The advantage of this approach, presumably, is the fact that contact with the Forms 
offers a way out of the partial perspective offered by empirical experience. Ultimately, 
therefore, the Platonists strive to show that it is only by positing the Forms that one can make 
coherent, objective claims about the good. 
       
3. Seneca and the problem of the good 
One reason for thinking that Seneca was even aware of this debate is the fact that one of his 
Letters – his 120th – tackles this very issue: how we come to form a concept of the good. He 
opens the problem as follows: 
 
Now I return to the point you want me to discuss, how we first acquired a conception of the good and 
the honourable. Nature could not teach us this: what nature has given us is not knowledge but only 
seeds of knowledge. Some people say that we merely happened upon the conception, but it is beyond 
belief that anyone should have stumbled upon a notion of virtue by chance. Our own view is that the 
honourable and the good are inferred through observation and comparison of repeated actions; in the 
judgment of our school, they are understood “by analogy.”  
(Seneca, Letters 120.3-4, trans. Graver and Long) 
 
Here Seneca corroborates what we saw earlier about the role of preconceptions: first, that 
they tell us nothing about what the good actually is; second, that the process of their 
articulation is dependent on empirical experience: in the first place “observation and 
comparison of repeated actions” – though here Seneca also foregrounds the importance of the 
process of analogy. 
                                                 
45
 As, for instance, ‘self-awareness’: Watson (1971), 220; ‘Consciousness’: Pembroke (1971), 119. Long (1993), 
on the other hand, sees συναίσθησις as simply a way of describing the perception of oneself.  
46
 This does seem to be how Hierocles uses it at Eth. el. I.45- II.3. This reading is argued for by Boys-Stones 
(2007a, 83ff.) and more recently by Klein (2015), esp. 173ff.  
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       What is significant about ‘analogy’ as a cognitive process is that, despite relying on an 
empirical starting point, it is nevertheless capable of producing a new concept without the 
need for direct experience of the thing in question. The Stoics theorised a number of these 
second-order operations: analogy, resemblance, transposition, composition and contrariety.
47
 
The standard Stoic example of a concept arrived at analogically are those of Pygmies and the 
Cyclops – which are analogous to humans in basic anatomy, but respectively smaller or 
bigger. Like Seneca, though, other Stoic sources mark out the particular importance of 
analogy in the acquisition of a concept of the good.
48
 What this analogy consists of, Seneca 
describes as follows: 
 
Let me explain what this analogy is. We knew about bodily health; from this we figured out that there 
also exists a health of the mind. We knew about bodily strength; from this we inferred that there also 
exists a strength of the mind. Certain acts of generosity or humanity or courage had amazed us. We 
began to admire them as though they were perfect. There were many flaws in them, hidden by the 
brilliant appearance of some splendid deed; these we overlooked. Nature tells us to magnify 
praiseworthy actions, and everyone always carries glorification beyond the facts. Thus it was from 
these acts that we derived the notion of a mighty good.  
(Seneca, Letters 120.5, trans. Graver and Long) 
 
From the observation of physical health and strength – things which are open to direct 
observation – we come to conceive of psychic analogues. It should be pointed out that what 
the analogy is not is a jump from ‘imperfectly honourable’ acts up to a concept of completely 
good acts. While such an analogy might seem plausible considering the standard example of 
the Cyclops – which ‘enlarges’ from one instance to the other – such an act of increase is not 
possible for the Stoics when it comes to the good because of their strict axiological dualism.
49
 
Rather, the experience of praiseworthy acts – by which we are just naturally amazed50 – 
seems to be what first draws our attention to, and awakens our interest in, psychic 
accomplishments.
51
 What Seneca shows, then, is how our concept of the good can begin to be 
‘nurtured’ – which is to say, how we can begin to refine its field of application – without the 
need for direct empirical experience. The significance of analogy, I suggest, is that it helps us 
                                                 
47
 See D. L. 7.52; cf. S. E. 3.41 ff. 
48
 Cicero Fin. 3.33. Note, however, that Boys-Stones (2014, 305ff.) argues that Seneca foregrounds a different, 
Peripatetic-inspired version of analogy to that found in Cicero. 
49
 On this problem see esp. Inwood (2005c). 
50
 Inwood stresses the importance of the fact that it is providential ‘Nature’ which urges us to ‘amplify’ 
‘honourable’ deeds of this kind. I am not sure what exactly this adds – though it might be significant if it means 
that providence guarantees that the process of analogy gets going in the first place.  
51
 As suggested by Boys-Stones (2014, 307-8 n.18), who argues against Inwood’s (2005c, 285) implication that 
the perception of honourable deeds brings about a second analogical stage.  
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get the process off the ground – allowing us to conceive of objects of value that are not 
directly open to the senses. 
       In fact, although Seneca foregrounds the particular importance of analogy in this process, 
throughout the subsequent paragraphs he can be seen to utilise a number of the second-order 
operations mentioned above.
52
 At 120.8, for instance, Seneca says “Let me add something 
you may find amazing. We sometimes gained a notion of the honourable from things that are 
bad, and excellence has been made clear from its opposite”. This, surely, is an example of 
‘contrariety’. At 120.10, Seneca now describes how from observing people carrying out 
praiseworthy deeds, but only as ‘one-offs’, we come to a conception of someone who acts 
like this with complete consistency. Here the operation of ‘composition’ seems particularly 
relevant.
53
 The archetypal example of this is in our evidence is the concept of a centaur, 
which we arrive at by combining parts of both man and horse. A similar operation could be 
seen to be taking place here – taking various isolated praiseworthy acts and combining them 
into the idea of someone who acts like this all the time. 
      Over this portion of the Letter, then, Seneca draws on a range of cognitive processes 
which allow us to refine our understanding of where we should properly ‘apply’ the term 
good – without, crucially, requiring us to actually perceive a wise person. The use of such 
processes, then, may help to address the sort of concern raised by Numenius: the fact that we 
do not see the good.  
       At 120.12, however, Seneca appears to take a new direction;
54
 and here we begin to see 
signs of him grappling with the kind of issue raised by the anonymous commentator.      
Seneca now seems to begin to consider the happy life,
55
 and starts to outline what precisely 
this would entail on the part of an agent:        
 
The perfect man, the one in possession of virtue, never cursed his luck and never reacted to 
circumstances with a grim face. Believing himself to be a citizen and soldier of the world, he took on 
each labour as though it were a command. He treated no incident as an annoying nuisance and 
misfortune but as a task assigned to himself...he was calm and gentle, equally resigned to human 
affairs and to acts of God (120.12-13)  
 
                                                 
52
 The connection between Seneca’s approach and the second-order operations found in Diogenes Laertius is 
also made by Pohlenz (1940), 86-8. 
53
 Alternatively, this could be seen as an act of ‘privation’ – not mentioned in the standard list of operations but 
mentioned, seemingly as an afterthought, by Diogenes Laertius at 7.53. The example of privation given is that of 
a normal man to a man with no hands. Conceivably, one could similarly strip away the inconsistencies of a 
normal person’s behaviour to arrive at a notion of someone acting with perfect consistency.  
54
 I agree with Inwood (2005c, 290) that Seneca seems to start in a new direction here.  
55
 Or so it seems. See Inwood, op. cit. for discussion of the difficulties in interpreting this section of Letter 120. 
68 
 
Here, then, Seneca introduces the cosmic dimension of the sage’s ethical outlook. The wise 
man’s serenity, his immunity to adverse circumstances, stems from the fact that he views 
himself as a “citizen and solider of the world”. Because of this he regards local circumstances 
not merely as indifferent but actually a part of his duty; and the reason he is able to do so is 
precisely the fact that he sees the worth of his own actions as deriving from, or as existing in 
relation to, the cosmos as a whole. 
       It is what Seneca says next, though, which seems especially relevant to Anon.’s 
concerns. Now Seneca begins to consider the attitudes underlying the sage’s ability to live 
like this, choosing to foreground, in particular, the attitude that the sage has towards his body:  
 
The only mind that could be superior is the divine intellect from which a part has passed down into 
this mortal heart of ours. That heart is at its most divine when it reflects on its own mortality. Then it 
knows that a human being is born in order to complete life’s term with a body that is not a home but a 
sort of short-term guesthouse... Don’t we notice how many inconveniences trouble us and how little 
satisfied we are with our bodies? Now it is our head we are complaining about, now our stomach, and 
now our chest and throat...Yet even though we are allotted such decaying bodies, we nonetheless 
make plans for eternity. In our hopes we seize on the maximum possible extent for a human life, not 
content with any finite sum of money or influence. (120.14-17, trans. Graver and Long) 
 
Inwood detects an almost Platonic level of bodily devaluation here: the sage views the body 
as a mere guesthouse, or, as Seneca says a little later, as something merely on loan (120.18). 
Meanwhile the rest of us fail to see what an unworthy object of our esteem the body is: 
vulnerable, frail, and prone to disease. And yet, despite this, we continue to see it as 
something truly valuable: we complain about it; we rely on it as though it were something 
stable and dependable. Inwood suggests, rightly I think, that Seneca here is suggesting that “a 
ruthlessly clear recognition of the distinction between body and mind is the price one must 
pay for sustaining the consistency that is the mark of virtue”.56 To view oneself as a ‘citizen 
and soldier of the universe’, I think Seneca is suggesting, one needs precisely to stop 
grounding one’s sense of value in the body – it just gets in the way. 
       But Seneca’s emphasis on the attitude we have to our bodies takes on, I think, a special 
significance when we consider the critique of the anonymous commentator. If we recall, 
Anon. buttressed his point about the limited scope for agents to extend their realm of self-
                                                 
56
 Op. cit., 294. I do not agree with Inwood, however, that Seneca is pushing this devaluation of the body 
beyond what other Stoics would accept. For the Stoics, as much as the Platonists, the body is seen as the inferior 
partner in man’s nature, and a potential source of corruption – insofar as it can become a conduit for irrational 
desires. To emphasise this point, Stoics could be quite emphatic in their deprecation of the body (see Brennan 
(2009), who explores the negative attitude of the Stoics towards the body). It therefore seems perfectly 
legitimate for Seneca to minimise the importance of the body in this way – especially, as I shall argue, in the 
context of the issue at hand. 
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interest precisely by pointing out that people tend not even be able to get past the bias they 
have to their own bodies. Of course, the Stoics would claim that this widespread tendency is 
merely the product of the corrupted value-system of most people: they are ‘applying’ the term 
good in the wrong place. Nevertheless, Anon.’s argument here has considerable intuitive 
force for the very reason that, in our experience, pretty much everyone does appear to 
prioritise their own bodies. By foregrounding the problem that the body causes us in realising 
the Stoic ideal, Seneca appears to recognise the problem. He recognises, in other words, that 
the plausibility of the Stoic account of the good rests on the fact of this radical renegotiation 
in our relationship with the body being possible. 
       In Letter 120, however, I do not think that Seneca gets much further than recognising the 
problem. Of course, like a good Stoic, he maintains that a change of attitude towards one’s 
body is possible; and he spends a considerable amount of time exhorting us to see the 
inadequacies of the body as the grounds for our thinking about the good. Nevertheless, the 
fact that he does recognise the problem is significant; for it is a problem, I suggest, that 
Seneca picks up in the Natural Questions. 
 
4. Separating soul from body  
The reason for linking the Natural Questions with this debate is the fact that there are a 
number of statements, occurring at important points in the work, that seem to speak directly 
to the sort of issue we found raised by the anonymous commentator. 
       As we have seen, part of Anon.’s contention is that empiricism limits agents to what 
might be called a ‘first-person’ view of the world. In the Natural Questions, though, Seneca 
seems repeatedly to suggest that the study of nature can help us to transcend this narrow 
perspective. In the first instance this comes out in the recurrent idea that the study of nature 
can bring about a kind of separation of mind and body – indeed, at the end of the preface to 
book 3 (widely considered the opening book) Seneca says that this separation is the very 
reason why we study nature (3. pref. 18). This is significant, of course, because as Seneca 
suggests in Letter 120, and as is also implied by Anon., it is the body in particular to which 
people become overly-attached, which in turn prevents the necessary extension of one’s 
realm of self-interest. Moreover, though, elsewhere in the work Seneca phrases this 
‘separation’ not just as an escape from one’s body, but actually from oneself – which, if 
anything, speaks even more clearly to Anon.’s objection. In the preface to book 4a, for 
instance, Seneca tells Lucilius that in order to avoid being lured into political ambition by 
unscrupulous sycophants, “one must flee and retreat into oneself, or better still, actually 
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retreat from oneself (a se recedendum)” (4a pref. 20), and proposes that his study of nature 
will achieve just this. In the preface to book 1, meanwhile, Seneca praises the moral progress 
that Lucilius has made thus far, but then goes on to remind him “You have not yet achieved 
anything: you have broken free from many things, but not yet from yourself” (1 pref. 6, my 
emphasis). Again, Seneca suggests that physics is the remedy, and goes on to describe how 
the study of nature sends the philosopher’s soul soaring into the heavens, allowing the soul to 
take in the whole earth from above. 
       Another facet of Anon.’s contention, however, is that, even if one could extend one’s 
realm of self-interest to some degree, one certainly could not do so to the extent required by 
the Stoic position – to the extent, that is, where it encompasses the whole cosmos. 
Significantly, then, Seneca at various points seems at pains to emphasise mankind’s close 
relationship with the cosmos itself. In part, Seneca demonstrates this by drawing attention to 
the fact that human beings are just naturally drawn to study nature (e.g. 6.4.2; 7.1.1; 5.15.3). 
Seneca suggests that this desire alone is evidence for an affinity that already exists between 
man and cosmos. Significantly, though, Seneca also implies that the study of nature actually 
helps to foster this sense of affinity. We again see this in the preface to book 1:  
 
...hoc habet argumentum divinitatis suae quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis, sed ut suis 
interest. Nam secure spectat occasus siderum atque ortus et tam diversas concordantium vias; 
observat ubi quaeque stella primum terris lumen ostendat, ubi columen eius [summum cursus]57 sit, 
quousque descendat; curiosus spectator excutit singula et quaerit. Quidni quaerat? Scit illa ad se 
pertinere.  
 
It [the mind] has this proof of its own divinity, that it takes delight in the divine, and enjoys it not as 
someone else’s possession but as its own. For confidently it watches the settings and risings of the 
stars, and their differing but harmonious paths; it observes where each star first reveals its light to 
earth, where its zenith [the highest part of its course] is, to what point it descends. As a fascinated 
spectator, it examines and inquires into each detail. And why should it not inquire? It knows this all 
relates to itself. (1 pref. 12-13)
58 
 
The delight we feel when we penetrate the secrets of nature seems to draw our attention to 
what we and the cosmos have in common: our shared divine, which is to say fundamentally 
rational, nature. Such a realisation, Seneca says, leads us to see the cosmos as our own 
possession, and to see that it all ‘relates’ to us. This seems especially significant, though, 
because this language of ‘owning’ and ‘relating’ strongly recalls the language of οἰκείωσις. 
                                                 
57
 Hine takes this to be an interpolation explaining columen (“zenith”). 
58
 Trans. Hine. All translations of the Natural Questions in this thesis, unless otherwise stated, are from Hine 
(2010a). The Latin text I use is also that of Hine (1996). 
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What Seneca seems to be suggesting, then, is that the study of physics is somehow supposed 
to strengthen the sense of ‘belonging’ we feel towards the cosmos.  
       The benefits that Seneca ascribes to the study of nature, therefore, seem to speak directly 
to the problem raised by the anonymous commentator. While Anon. suggests that a Stoic 
agent could have only a limited perspective on the world, with a correspondingly narrow 
conception of self-interest, Seneca suggests that the study of nature can help one to transcend 
this perspective, and can, furthermore, help to foster one’s sense of οἰκείωσις towards the 
cosmos.  
       But what takes this outside the realm of coincidence, I think, is the fact that Seneca 
phrases all of this in strikingly Platonic terms. The motif of separating body and soul is itself, 
of course, one with strong Platonic connotations. But the language in which Seneca phrases 
this separation is so laden with Platonic allusion that one cannot but suspect its purpose is to 
bring Plato to mind: 
 
Sursum ingentia spatia sunt, in quorum possessionem animus admittitur, ⟨s⟩ed59 ita, si secum 
minimum ex corpore tulit, si sordidum omne detersit et expeditus levisque ac se contentus60 emicuit. 
Cum illa tetigit, alitur, crescit ac velut vinculis liberatus in originem redit. 
 
Up above there are vast spaces, which the mind is allowed to enter and occupy, provided that it takes 
scarcely anything of the body with it, that it wipes away any uncleanness, and that it soars upward 
unencumbered, nimble, and self-reliant. When it has reached those regions, it finds nourishment, it 
grows, and, as though freed from its chains, it returns to its origin (1 pref. 11-12) 
 
Separating the mind from the body, which is viewed as a source of pollution and a form of 
bondage; rising up into the heavens and being nourished by what it finds there; and in doing 
so returning to its origin: all are extremely distinctive ideas lifted from dialogues such as the 
Phaedo, Phaedrus and Timaeus. 
       As mentioned at the start, these allusions have frequently been taken as evidence for the 
conciliatory reading of Seneca vis-à-vis Platonism. However, what our examination of the 
contemporary philosophical context now shows is that there is clearly room for a polemical 
reading of these allusions. For what we can see now is that these Platonic references tend to 
occur at precisely those places where points of dialectical significance are being addressed. 
                                                 
59
 A conjecture by Hine. Most editors read et. 
60
 MSS variations include se contemptus; se contentus modico; contentus modico. The last is adopted by most 
editors, and does not seem to change the meaning significantly from Hine’s choice, above. The first would 
represent the most radical change, though would in fact resonate with 6.32.4: “pusilla res est hominis anima, sed 
ingens res contemptus animae”. The idea of having contempt for one’s soul is one difficult to reconcile with 
Stoic thought. The point must surely be directed against an overly self-centred view about what is valuable, 
where the soul here is taken as a stand-in for the self in a more general sense. If this were right it would again 
speak to the sort of concern raised by Anon.     
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The Platonists argue that an empiricist agent would be locked into a partial, body-centric 
perspective on the world; Seneca argues that the study of nature can help us break free from 
this perspective and employs Platonic motifs to illustrate this. The Platonists contend that an 
empiricist agent could not extend their sense of οἰκείωσις to the whole cosmos; Seneca 
argues that this is possible, and employs Platonic motifs to illustrate this. Rather than 
indicating conciliation, then, it seems plausible that these allusions are instead intended to 
signpost Seneca’s engagement with the issues put forward by Platonists. 
       While these statements suggest the possibility of the work being oriented towards the 
debate explored in this chapter, it remains to be seen how the work as a whole can be taken to 
be addressing the problem. Indeed, it should be noted that most of the statements about these 
benefits that we gain from the study of nature come from the prefaces to book 3 and 1. While 
it is widely agreed that these prefaces are presented as programmatic for the work as a whole, 
it has also often been pointed out that it is very difficult to see how the ideas in them 
subsequently play out – either in the books to which they are attached, or the work as a 
whole. The question now, then, is to consider whether and how these ideas are subsequently 
developed throughout the work as a whole. How does Seneca propose the study of nature 
brings about this separation of mind and body, or promote our sense of οἰκείωσις towards the 
cosmos? As it turns out, it is the Platonist context again which proves crucial to answering 
these questions. 
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– Chapter 3 – 
Separating Mind from Body: The Aetiology of the Natural Questions 
 
1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter we saw the Platonists argue that empiricists like the Stoics cannot 
account for a well-grounded concept of an objective good. The Stoics, as we saw, attempt to 
identify the good with the wellbeing of the cosmos as a whole – which would constitute an 
objective good precisely because it is grounded in everything that there is: the entire cosmos. 
The Stoics then draw on the theory of οἰκείωσις to explain how an agent can get the cosmos 
within their ethical frame of reference, such that they can meaningfully regard the cosmos as 
the grounds for their understanding of what is good for a human being. As we saw, however, 
the Platonists argue that it is impossible for an empiricist agent to achieve this. Empiricism, 
they contend, necessarily limits agents to a partial view of the world, one that can only result 
in an understanding of the good in terms of what will benefit oneself – which is to say, 
principally, the body. 
       As we subsequently saw, though, there seem to be some indications that Seneca was 
aware of, and sought to address this problem. In Letter 120, Seneca appears to realise that in 
order to preserve the Stoic account of the good one would need to show that it is possible for 
people to transcend the bias they have towards their own bodies. Then, in several places in 
the Natural Questions, Seneca seems to suggest that the study of physics provides a means by 
which one can precisely detach oneself from one’s body, “escape from oneself”, and, 
ultimately, foster a stronger sense of affinity with the cosmos. These comments, and 
especially because they are phrased in Platonising terms, may indicate that Seneca thinks 
what he does in the Natural Questions can provide a remedy to the body-oriented relativism 
to which the Platonists confine the Stoics. 
        Three immediate questions present themselves, therefore. First, how precisely does the 
study of physics bring about an ‘escape from oneself’, or a ‘separation of soul and body’? 
Second, how does this ‘separation’ help us to foster a stronger relationship with the cosmos? 
Finally, how and why does Seneca think that all of this will constitute an effective response 
against the Platonists?  
       Sections 2 and 3 will address the first question. In section 2 I offer a detailed examination 
of the structure of the aetiology in book 3 of the Natural Questions. Having reviewed this, in 
section 3 I shall argue that it is the way Seneca structures the aetiology that is supposed to 
bring about the separation of mind and body. It achieves this by gradually leading the 
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reader’s mind away from visible causes to ever more abstract and profound accounts of 
causation. This transition from the use of sense-perception to the use of intellect helps, I 
suggest, to divert the reader’s mind away from the influences of the body – and, in this sense, 
effects a kind of separation of mind and body. What is more, though, I shall argue that this 
methodology is actually one that Seneca borrows from the Platonists. 
       Section 4 will then consider our second and third questions. I shall argue that Seneca 
realises that a strong attachment to the body is precisely what, in most cases, does prevent the 
process of οἰκείωσις from proceeding as it should. Strategies that help to minimise our 
association with our bodies are, therefore, precisely what the Stoics need. As a response to 
the Platonists, though, such a strategy proves especially effective precisely because it draws 
on a methodology that the Platonists themselves advocate.  
       Although our central question remains to explain the unusual form of the Natural 
Questions, in this chapter I shall in general be brushing over the moralising portions of the 
work. However, as I shall argue in the next chapter, once we understand the structure of the 
aetiology, the role that these passages play within the overall scheme of the work becomes 
clear. 
 
2. The structure of the aetiology: the example of book 3 
 Let us, therefore, have a look at how Seneca goes about the aetiology. Considering 
Codoñer’s and Hine’s argument for placing book 3 first in the book-order, this seems like a 
sensible place to start. In addition, as a number of scholars have noted, this book also 
provides an excellent template for understanding Seneca’s methodological approach in 
general.
1
  
       Seneca begins this book’s investigation into terrestrial waters by briefly reviewing some 
remarkable properties of water, followed by some poetic theories on the origin of rivers.
2
 It is 
only at 3.4.1, however, that Seneca formally states the problem: “We are surprised that the 
seas do not register the arrival of water from the rivers; we should be equally surprised that 
the earth does not register the loss as they flow away”. Seneca begins by considering two 
                                                 
1
 E.g. Codoñer (1989), 1801-2; Williams (2012), 17-21. Maurach (1965), on the other hand, takes book 1 as a 
model – but, reassuringly, his description of increasing complexity as the book progresses maps well onto the 
model of increasing profoundness that I argue for here. The following discussion of the first part of the aetiology 
in book 3 owes much to Waiblinger’s (1977, 38ff.) analysis – although I break the argument down into different 
stages from him, and consider each stage in more detail. I disagree, however, with Waiblinger’s analysis of the 
second half of the book, and do not detect his contrast between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aspects of nature in the 
respective halves. 
2
 Ovid, Met. 3.407; Virgil, Aen. 1.245-6; Lucilius Iunior, fr. 4 Buechner. 
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unattributed
3
 theories: either the water flows back from the sea “below the earth in hidden 
channels, and what arrived openly returns secretly” (3.5), and the idea that rivers are simply 
filled by rainfall. Neither theory, however, seems able to account for the sheer volume of 
water flowing in rivers. However, while the rainfall theory is rejected outright ((3.7.1-4), the 
idea of an underground source is partially retained, and is developed further in the subsequent 
sections. 
       Here we observe an example of what Maurach sees as the hallmark of Seneca’s scientific 
methodology.
4
 Maurach points out that Seneca typically begins with simple theories which, 
though wholly or partially rejected, serve to introduce concepts that are then refined and 
developed as the investigation progresses. Here what Seneca retains is the notion of an 
underground source; but to solve the issue with volume Seneca now posits not merely 
underground channels, but vast subterranean caverns, large enough to support “huge marshes 
and great, navigable lakes, and just as seas stretch out across huge areas and flow into fjords, 
so the interior of the earth abounds in fresh water” (3.8). Such is their size, these caverns can 
provide a boundless supply of river-water.
5
 
       It now seems to be realised, however, that this merely pushes the original problem back a 
step: where then does this water come from?
6
 Seneca now introduces what is clearly a more 
technical theory: the Stoic theory of elemental transformation.
7
 Air from the surrounding 
atmosphere, Seneca explains, flows into these caverns and, because of the cold and dark 
down there, becomes “cold...sluggish and immobile”, and thus transforms into water. Here, 
then, is a neat explanation of the water’s origin. Seneca, in any case, seems to regard this as 
some kind of milestone, for he now announces: “Here you have the first explanation of how 
water is produced under the earth” (3.9.1-3). 
       Subsequently, though, Seneca continues to develop the theory. The theory of elemental 
exchange is now revealed to have a much more wide-reaching significance than first it 
seemed. Now Seneca explains that it is not merely that air can turn into water, but all four 
                                                 
3
 In general I shall not be paying too close attention to the sources of Seneca’s theories – except where a 
particular choice of author may have significance in itself – such as I think is the case with the placing of 
Presocratic and especially atomist theories near the beginning of the investigation. The importance of this will 
be noted in due course. For a comprehensive analysis of the sources for Seneca’s theories, see Gross (1989).  
4
 Maurach (1965). Maurach focuses specifically on book 1, though claims – quite rightly – that Seneca employs 
this methodology throughout the work.  
5
 Waiblinger (1977, 40) sees the ‘cavern theory’ as part of the ‘first’ stage in Seneca’s argument, whereas I take 
it be a development of the ‘underground channels’ theory. 
6
 Seneca does not explicitly note this problem, although it does, as Waiblinger (1977, 41) suggests, seem to 
explain the progression from the previous theories. 
7
 Indeed, it does seem to be the Stoic theory he has in mind, since the transformation between elements seems to 
be based around the idea of expansion and contraction. See SVF 2.413; 2.406; 1.102. 
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elements can transform into one another (3.10.1). This, though, turns out to be extremely 
important not just for rivers, but for the stability of the natural system more widely: “Nothing 
is exhausted if it returns to itself. There are reciprocal exchanges between all the elements: 
whatever one loses turns into another, and nature weighs its parts as if they were placed on a 
pair of scales, to make sure that the world does not become unbalanced because the equality 
of its components is disturbed.” (3.10.3). 
         This discovery, however, reveals a yet more profound truth, signalled by Seneca’s 
proposal to “look at this again a bit more deeply, if you agree, and then you will know that 
you have no further questions to ask, since you have arrived at the true origin of rivers” 
(3.12.1). As it turns out, we have been asking the wrong question – or at least thinking about 
it the wrong way. Our initial surprise at the outpouring of rivers is now revealed to be the 
result of our tendency to look at phenomena in isolation, instead of seeing them part of a 
broader, interconnected system: “So you ask me how water is produced? I shall ask in turn 
how air or earth is produced. But if there are four elements in nature, you cannot ask where 
water comes from: for it is one quarter of nature. So why are you surprised that such a large 
portion of nature can constantly pour something out from itself?” (3.12.1-2). When we take 
account of the system more widely, the apparent paradox of rivers disappears. As we shall 
see, this move from local accounts of causation to ones that take account of the wider system 
is a central feature of Seneca’s methodology – one which I shall refer to as the ‘expansive 
move’.8 
       Despite touting that as the “true origin” of rivers, Seneca is not finished yet. After briefly 
noting some similarities and dissimilarities between the Stoic view and that of Thales (3.13.1-
14.2) Seneca now considers an Egyptian theory that holds that each element has a male and a 
female aspect.
9
 Again displaying his methodology of refinement, Seneca does not accept the 
theory as a whole, but retains part of it (“there are some points here I can vote for”); and the 
thing he preserves turns out to be the implied biological connotations of the theory. Seneca 
now explains: “I think that the earth is controlled by nature, and on the model of our own 
bodies, in which there are both veins and arteries; the former are receptacles for blood, the 
latter for breath. In the earth too there are some passages through which water runs, others 
                                                 
8
 This ‘expansive’ tendency of the Natural Questions, it should be noted, forms the central theme of Williams 
(2012) –although  I do not always agree with Williams in how this effect is brought about, or what its precise 
effect is supposed to be. On the relationship between my reading and that of Williams, see later in this chapter. 
9
 Haase, it should be noted, argued that this passage on the Egyptian theory is displaced, and should be 
transposed to 3.12.1 where it would serve as a kind of introduction to theory of four elements. All modern 
editors, however, accept the MSS reading.  
77 
 
through which breath does” (3.15.1).10 More important still, though, is the fact that nature is 
now described as having agency. Seneca says that the earth is controlled by nature (natura 
regi terram). In what follows, moreover, this sense of agency becomes more pronounced.   
After elaborating on the earth-human body analogy a little further, Seneca announces that 
“This is the origin of waters, which are produced according the law and will of nature” (haec 
est causa aquarum secundum legem naturae voluntatemque nascentium, my emphasis).
11
 
       And yet Seneca is still not finished. Before moving into the work’s central digression, he 
first considers a couple of surprising natural phenomena that present specific problems – why 
rivers sometimes dry up; and why some springs run six hours on, six hours off (as we shall 
see in the next chapter, these sorts of ‘surprising’ or ‘paradoxical’ phenomena tend to cluster 
around the work’s moralising episodes).12 Again Seneca solves these mysteries by drawing 
on the human body analogy, and by once again turning our attention to the wider system of 
nature. However, the second problem – intermittent springs – also allows Seneca to make a 
much broader point about the natural system: “Just as quartan fever turns up on the hour, just 
as gout keeps to time, just as menstruation sticks to a set day if nothing intervenes, just as 
childbirth is ready to happen in the right month, in just the same way waters have intervals at 
which they withdraw and return”. (3.16.1-3). Nature, Seneca points out, is littered with 
regular cycles of this kind. Indeed, in yet another ‘expansive’ move, Seneca goes on to show 
how such regularities extend throughout the whole cosmic system, now pointing to the 
regularity we find in various astronomical cycles: “Is it surprising when you see the chain of 
events and nature advancing as preordained? Winter never goes astray; summer heats up at 
the right time; the change to autumn and spring occurs at the usual point; solstices and 
equinoxes alike recur on the right day” (3.16.1-3). Seneca, then, uses such cycles to develop 
his point about the agency in nature – indeed not just agency, but rational agency; for such 
cycles are said to happen according to a plan (per constituta procedere). Indeed, Seneca’s 
language throughout this section serves to emphasise the clockwork regularity with which 
such cycles occur: ad horam; ad tempus; statum diem; certa; suo tempore; suos dies. From 
                                                 
10
 On this analogy with the human body, and a similar one at 6.14.1ff, see Althoff (1997). I disagree that Seneca 
sees these as mere analogies; he seems to be drawing genuine correspondences here.  
11
 Here I follow Corcoran’s translation; Hine translates “This is the explanation for the kinds of water that come 
into being according to the law and will of nature”. However, the ‘kinds of water’ that Seneca has just been 
talking about are the metals and other substances such as bitumen, and this translation gives the impression of 
restricting the explanation to these alone – though it seems unlikely that it was only metals and bitumen which 
Seneca believed to come about according to the law and will of nature. As it happens, the discussion of metals at 
this point in the investigation – at the point, that is, where Seneca is just introducing these biological 
connotations – may be significant in itself. For the Stoics apparently believed that metals were in some sense 
alive, or at least had the power of self-motion: SVF 2.988. 
12
 As was already noted by Stahl (1964), 427; more on Stahl’s theory in the next chapter.  
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here, Seneca begins to move into the work’s central digression, using one more ‘surprising’ 
phenomenon – the fact that fish are dug up from the ground – as a segue.13 
       When the aetiology resumes, Seneca returns to considering ‘paradoxical’ phenomena 
(3.19.1-26.8) – again ‘framing’ the moralising passage. Seneca first elaborates on the nature 
of underground creatures and the environment down there (3.19.1-4), before considering the 
remarkable properties of certain kinds of waters: their different tastes, medicinal properties, 
petrifying abilities; their  capacity to intoxicate, poison and even kill. Some emerge boiling 
hot from the ground; others have the ability to change the colouring of livestock. Others still 
allow rocks to float on their surface – and yet more remarkable effects besides.14 
       This deluge of paradoxical phenomena reaches a fitting climax when we arrive at this 
book’s finale: an aetiological account of the flood which is apparently destined to destroy 
mankind.
15
 Indeed, more than any other, this worldwide disaster seems utterly without 
reason, totally at odds with the picture of complete rational regularity with which Seneca 
broke off the investigation before the digression.
 
 
       In response, then, Seneca strives to show us that even this phenomenon can be made 
sense of when considered within the wider system of nature.
16
 He begins by considering 
whether just one isolated phenomenon will bring about the flood – the sea rising? constant 
rain? rising rivers? No, Seneca concludes; all causes will function together to bring it about.
17
 
                                                 
13
 Even here, though, Seneca takes one last opportunity to reaffirm the all-pervasiveness of nature’s regularity, 
taking the underground fish as evidence that the iura natura applies just as much below ground as it does above 
(3.16.4).   
14
 Again, the function of these ‘natural paradoxa’ passages will be discussed in the next chapter. However, this 
unusually extended string of such phenomena may also be serving an additional function. For, it is worth noting 
that Seneca seems at pains to assign these phenomena to specific locations – locations, more importantly, that 
literally span the known world: Seneca mentions Caria in Asia (19.2), Albulae in Africa (20.4), Lyncestae in 
Macedonia (20.6); the Nile and the Danube (22); Nonacris in Arcadia (25.1); Galatia and Syria in the Near East 
(25.4-5) – not to mention multiple locations in Italy and Sicily. This globetrotting tour of amazing phenomena 
may in part serve, I suggest, to continue the ‘expansive’ thrust we saw throughout the previous section: whereby 
Seneca strives continually to direct our minds away from the local and towards the global (more on the 
significance of this below). If correct, then the culmination of these phenomena in the final account of the 
apocalyptic flood would be apt: here we arrive at a truly global phenomenon. On the ‘globalising’ significance 
of the flood see Williams (2012), 113.  
15
 Berno (2003, 96) also associates the flood with the paradoxical (or as she calls them “adynata”) phenomena. 
On the relationship of Seneca’s flood to Stoic theories of cosmic cycles and conflagration, Mader (1983) argues 
that Seneca is proposing an alternative to the conflagration. Long (1985, 33 n. 35) on the other hand thinks that 
Seneca is referring to a catastrophe that happens within cosmic cycles, as does Armisen-Marchetti (2006). 
Armisen-Marchetti op. cit. also usefully shows potential parallels for Stoic belief in such a flood. 
16
 This is perhaps supposed to have the force of an a fortiori argument: if you believe the flood can be explained 
rationally, then you will have no problem believing that the same can be said of the previous set of paradoxical 
phenomena. 
17
 Scholars sometimes link Seneca’s reference to multiple causes here, and in the discussion of earthquakes in 
book 6, with the Epicurean doctrine of ‘multiple causation’ (e.g. Hine (2010a), 196-7 n. 51). Here in book 3, at 
least, there seems no reason to do so. Epicurus’ point is that any of a number of causes may be in operation, 
even if, in actual fact, only one turns out to be the true cause. But to Epicurus it does not especially matter which 
cause is actually in operation: “If we think that [a phenomenon] might also occur in some particular way and 
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Here, then, we see an interesting echo of where we began in the first half of the book, where 
it was likewise considered whether rainfall alone was sufficient to fill rivers. Indeed, there are 
actually a number of striking parallels between Seneca’s methodology here and what we saw 
earlier.
18
  
       After indulging in an extended and rather dramatic description of the flood (3.27.4-15), 
Seneca returns to consider its causes, reiterating his point that many will operate. But now 
Seneca introduces yet more causes. First, he suggests that the sea will be able to rise 
extremely high because of its vast reserves of water in the depths of the sea (3.28.3) (which is 
not unlike the ‘underground cavern’ theory we saw in the first half). To help us understand 
the scale of these reserves, Seneca now points out the spherical shape of the globe – thus, as 
we have seen before, encouraging us to take account of the wider system of nature. Indeed, 
this ‘expansive’ move is then extended when Seneca now begins to factor in astronomical 
causes for the flood (3.28.6; 3.29.1-2) – a move we also saw at 3.16.1-3. 
       Subsequently Seneca makes another move we have seen before – now introducing a 
biological analogy:
19
 
 
...whether the world is an animal,
20
 or a body, such as trees and plants, governed by nature, from its 
beginning to its end all that it must do, all that it must undergo, is contained within it. The entire 
rationality of a future human being is incorporated within its seed, and, while still unborn, the baby 
contains the law governing the beard and grey hair (for the features of the entire body and of its 
subsequent growth are there, in miniature, and invisible); and in just the same way the origin of the 
world encapsulated not just the sun, and the moon, and the motions of the heavenly bodies, and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
recognise the very fact that it [might] happen in many different ways, we shall be as free of disturbance if we 
knew that it occurred in some particular way” (Ep. Pyth., ap. D. L. 10.80, trans. Inwood and Gerson). Seneca, on 
the other hand, simply says that all such causes will be in operation. In book 6, meanwhile, Seneca clearly states 
his preference for the (Stoic) view that ‘breath’ (spiritus) is the cause of earthquakes (6.18.1ff.). Pace Inwood 
(2005a, 183), Seneca does generally express his preference for a particular explanation – although I take his 
point that it is strange that Seneca does not express more disdain for the Epicurean theory when it is apparently 
mentioned (6.20.5). However, Seneca does go on to say that Epicurus thought that breath was the most 
important cause (6.20.7), so perhaps Seneca is just drawing Epicurus on side to support his own position – 
regardless of his other theoretical baggage (cf. Williams (2012, 246-7), who makes a similar point). See, 
however, n.73, below. 
18
 One difference from the first half, though, is that the co-ordinating role of divine reason is present from the 
very beginning of the flood account, rather than being revealed in stages: “fate sets in motion many causes” 
(3.27.3, my emphasis). Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the role that divine reason plays in the flood becomes 
increasingly prominent as the account progresses. 
19
 Althoff op. cit. does not discuss this analogy – though it adds support to the idea that Seneca sees the 
analogues as genuine, rather than ‘mere’, analogies.  
20
 Some MSS here read anima, not animal. This reading is followed by Oltramare, though not by editors since. 
The latter is certainly to be preferred. Seneca surely cannot have wondered whether the world is nothing but a 
soul, as opposed to nothing but a body. Rather, the distinction being drawn is not between body and soul, per se, 
but between beings which have a soul – e.g. animals – and those which do not – e.g. “trees and plants” (which 
on the Stoic understanding have only φύσις, falling short of a ψυχή, properly speaking; see e.g. SVF 2.458). 
Seneca is therefore asking rhetorically whether the world is an animal-like being (i.e. with a soul) or a plant-like 
organism (i.e. without one). 
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birth of animals, but equally the forces that would transform the earth. These include the flood, which 
occurs, just like winter or summer, according to the laws of the world. (3.29.2-3) 
 
Already here, with the mention of the lege mundi, we can see Seneca beginning to overlay the 
biological model with the notion of agency. This, then, becomes even more apparent as 
Seneca proceeds, saying first: “Everything will assist nature so that nature’s decrees may be 
implemented” (Omnia adiuvabunt naturam, ut naturae constituta peragantur (3.29.4)); and 
then even more clearly, a little later:  
 
Everything is easy for nature, as I have said, especially what she has determined to do from the start 
and tackles not unexpectedly but with due warning. Already from the first day of the world, when it 
separated out from formless unity into its present structure, the date when the earth would be drowned 
was decreed. (3.30.1) 
 
Here, then – just as immediately before the digression – Seneca emphasises the rational 
character of nature’s agency by pointing to its operation according to a fixed plan. 
       In the remaining few paragraphs of the book (3.30.2-7), Seneca thunders ominously 
about the immanence of the disaster (with characteristic drama: “Do you not see how the 
waves attack the shore as though they were going to break out?”), before concluding with the 
promise of a newly created world after the disaster – although, always the pessimist, Seneca 
warns that vice will inevitably creep back in. Even in this, though, we should note the 
emphasis on the cyclical aspect of the destruction and subsequent palingenesis – again 
drawing attention to the regularity of this rationally organised system. 
 
3. From seen to unseen: Seneca’s ‘Platonising’ methodology  
A number of important methodological features arise from this analysis of book 3. Some of 
these have been observed before. It was Waiblinger who initially pointed out that the 
aetiology in book 3 (or at least its first half) is developed in stages, with each stage 
representing a successively more profound account of causation.
21
 Seneca begins from 
superficial ‘mechanical’ causes – e.g. that rain fills rivers (although there may even be a yet 
more superficial stage before this: the ‘mythological’ explanations of poets). After 
developing the ‘underground channel’ theory into the ‘underground cavern’ theory, Seneca 
then introduces the more theoretically technical theory of elemental transformation. This, 
then, is used as a means of introducing the importance of taking account of the wider system 
of nature (since each elemental region feeds into and balances out the other). Nevertheless, 
                                                 
21
 Waiblinger (1977), 40ff. 
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this account remains a merely mechanical notion of causation: elements changing into other 
elements on the basis of contraction and expansion. From here, though, Seneca deepens the 
level of causal analysis by introducing the idea of nature as a biological system, which is then 
overlain with a yet more profound notion of causation when nature is described as an agent. 
Finally, Seneca emphasises the rational component of this agency by pointing to the 
regularity with which nature operates, evidenced by ubiquitous regular cycles. 
       As I have also tried to illustrate, Seneca’s approach to the aetiology of the flood displays 
a number of striking parallels to the methodology employed in the first half of the book. 
Seneca begins by considering a number of isolated theories (among which is, again, the idea 
that mere rainfall causes the flood). After developing (i.e. combining) these theories, Seneca 
refers to submarine reserves of water (cf. underground reservoir theory in the first half), 
before then looking to the wider system of nature to help explain the phenomenon: first, the 
overall shape of the earth; then, the influence of astronomical bodies. In what follows, Seneca 
introduces first a biological model, and then overlays this with the notion of rational agency. 
       Of course, the correspondence is not absolute or rigid; Seneca is always happy to take an 
excursion, to make additional side-points as he goes along if something takes his interest or 
(more often) to lambast a theory with which he has a particular gripe. Nevertheless, across 
the two parts of this book I think we see a fairly consistent methodology emerge: Seneca 
moves from naive accounts of causation (i.e. involving only material or mechanical causes, 
operating in relative isolation within the broader system of nature) to ever more complex, 
integrated and philosophically sophisticated ones, culminating in the action of divine reason. 
It seems significant, moreover, that we see this methodology unfold not once but twice in 
book 3 – very likely the opening book– almost as though Seneca wants to begin the work 
with a clear statement of his methodological approach.  
       In fact, though, the methodology we find in book 3 plays out, with relatively little 
significant variation, across all eight books of the Natural Questions. For the sake of 
maintaining focus, I remove the analysis of the individual books to an appendix to this 
chapter. For the time being, one significant point is worth noting: each book of the work 
concludes with some sort of reflection on the role of the divine in nature. This in itself, I 
suggest, is a powerful indicator of the general trajectory Seneca’s methodology. 
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       Codoñer has also noted some of these structural features.
22
 Codoñer suggests that we 
should understand the progression of the aetiology as a movement from the concrete to the 
abstract. Indeed, she suggests that Stoic physics as a whole should be conceived as a training 
of the ratio to think in abstractions, which serves to expand the critical faculty and prepare it 
for the attainment of Stoic wisdom.
23
 While I disagree with Codoñer about the purpose of this 
exercise in abstraction, the suggestion is nevertheless enlightening.
24
 However, the specific 
way in which we should interpret this process of abstraction is, I think, as an abstraction from 
sense-perception.
 25
 Throughout the work, Seneca repeatedly emphasises that he aims to 
investigate the ‘hidden’ aspects of nature. Right at the start of the work, for instance, Seneca 
announces his intention to seek out not only nature’s causes, but also its “secrets” (secreta), 
and comments on how “inaccessible” (occulta) these problems are (3 pref. 1). In the preface 
to book 1 (the other of the work’s important ‘programmatic’ prefaces) Seneca seems to 
suggests that the distinctive feature of physics is the fact that it “is not satisfied with the eyes; 
it suspects that there is something greater and more beautiful that nature has placed beyond 
its sight” (1 pref.1; cf. 6.5.2), and he subsequently claims to “give thanks to nature whenever 
I see her not in her public aspect, but when I have entered her more remote regions” (1 pref. 
3). Elsewhere Seneca blames our misunderstanding of natural phenomena on the fact that 
“we grasp nature with our eyes, not our reason” (6.3.2) – a criticism that recurs several times 
(6.7.5; 7.30.4; 1.3.9). 
       Interestingly, then, as well as a steady increase in the profundity of causal analysis, the 
progression through causal explanations in book 3 can be read as a gradual abstraction away 
                                                 
22
 Codoñer (1989), 1799ff.  While I agree with many of Codoñer’s suggestions, I do not entirely agree with her 
structural analysis, which restricts the process of abstraction to the first half of the book. I maintain that the 
process continues across the whole of each book, not just the first part. 
       Codoñer, in fact, sees the tendency to move from concrete to abstract not only as the structural principle in 
each book, but of the work as a whole. She notes, plausibly in my opinion, that there is an overall ‘upward’ 
tendency across the books: beginning with terrestrial phenomena, finishing with those in the heavens and 
atmosphere (in this she is followed by Gauly 2004; cf. Williams (2012) 27, et passim). Book 2, she argues, 
represents a fitting conclusion to this progression because of the Jovian connotations of lightning. This, as 
Codoñer notes, nicely complements another commonly suggested structural principle of the work: elements (e.g. 
Waiblinger (1977); Hine (1981)). Thus (assuming the Non praeterit ordering) the work begins with terrestrial 
water, moving to water in the atmosphere, then air, culminating with fire. This structuring is not entirely 
unproblematic: why, for instance, does Seneca not finish with book 7, and his theory that comets are celestial 
phenomena – surely a more fitting conclusion to the upward trajectory. Nevertheless, I tend to agree with 
Codoñer here.  
23
 Codoñer (1989), 1813. 
24
 Codoñer suggests that its purpose is to arrive at knowledge of god – which she suggests is the ultimate 
purpose of physical study. While I agree that god is where the investigation ends up, I do not think that 
knowledge of god is per se the reason why we should study physics. As I argue in Chapter 5, the Stoic study of 
physics should be conceptualised as a therapeutic, rather than a knowledge-gathering exercise.  
25
 Toulze-Morisset (2004) also calls attention to Seneca’s emphasis on discovering the ‘unseen’. I disagree 
strongly, though, with Toulze-Morisset’s contention that the work has only a loose structure. Williams (2012, 
e.g. 27, et passim) also emphasises the importance of the idea of changing modes of seeing. 
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from what is open to sense perception. The first such departure is what I shall call the ‘move 
underground’ – first seen with the underground channels/caverns theory (and then again, in 
the flood account, with the idea of submarine reserves of water). Significantly, we find this 
move underground in almost every book of the work (cf. 4a.2.26; 5.4.1; 6.7.5) – or, where we 
do not find it (presumably because the phenomenon in question occurs in the atmosphere) we 
generally find a corresponding move upwards (4b.3.1; 7.9.4ff; 1.2.10ff.; 2.13.1f).
26
 In either 
case, what is significant about this move is that it takes us, in a very literal sense, beyond 
what can be directly perceived by the senses.  
       Of course, while one may not actually be able to perceive such causes, such things 
remain in principle perceptible (indeed, the digression in book 5 describes Philip’s men 
encountering precisely these sorts of underground caverns (5.15.1ff)). Subsequently, though, 
Seneca begins to take us beyond the range of what actually can be perceived. This is initially 
brought about through what I have called the ‘expansive move’. In book 3 we first saw this 
through Seneca’s introduction of the theory of elemental exchange, which introduced the idea 
of nature being a vast interconnected system: elemental regions of earth, air and water all 
feeding into and balancing each other. Indeed, it was our failure to take account of the 
interconnected nature of the wider system that led to our initial surprise at the constant flow 
of river water. A little later we see yet another expansive move, when Seneca draws our 
attention to regularity not just in terrestrial, but also astronomical cycles (cf. the reference to 
the overall shape of the earth, and then the influence of celestial bodies in the flood account). 
What these ‘expansive moves’ represent, I suggest, is a second and more significant 
departure from what is perceptible. For, while each part of this complex web of causes is in 
principle open to perception, the fact is that to take account of the whole system in the way 
that Seneca urges us does in a very real way require us to shift from a sensory to an 
intellectual mode of perception: one really cannot see the entire world at once. 
        This process of abstraction culminates, however, with the introduction of divine reason. 
In fact, it is a culmination of this process in two senses. First, it can be seen as the ultimate 
end-point of the ‘expansive’ process, since Seneca shows us that divine reason coordinates 
the entire cosmic system. In addition, though, the introduction of reason represents the 
conclusion of the process of abstraction; for reason itself is not perceptible via the senses. Of 
course, as a Stoic, Seneca believes that reason has a corporeal basis.
27
 Nevertheless, it 
                                                 
26
 For full discussion of these upward/underground moves in their respective contexts, see the appendix to this 
chapter.  
27
 Ep. 106.5. 
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remains the case that, in Stoic thought, reason is at the very least invisible (thus eluding what 
was widely thought to be our keenest sense
28
) and may well have been thought of as 
undetectable to all the senses.
29
 Seneca, in fact, suggests just this near the end of book 7:  
 
Ipse qui ista tractat, qui condidit, qui totum hoc fundavit deditque circa se, maiorque est pars sui 
operis ac melior, effugit oculos: cogitatione visendus est. Multa praeterea cognata numini summo et 
vicinam sortita potentiam obscura sunt, aut fortasse, quod magis mireris, oculos nostros et implent et 
effugiunt, sive tanta illis subtilitas est quantam consequi acies humana non possit, sive in sanctiore 
secessu maiestas tanta delituit, et regnum suum, id est se, tegit, nec ulli adytum dat nisi animo. Quid 
sit hoc sine quo nihil est, scire non possumus; et miramur, si quos igniculos parum novimus, cum 
maxima pars mundi, deus, lateat! 
 
He who manages all this, who created it, who laid the foundations for it all and surrounded himself 
with it, and who is the greater and better part of his creation, he eludes our sight and must be 
perceived by thought. Also, many things that are related to the supreme deity and have been assigned 
power akin to his are obscure; or perhaps, what may surprise you more, they both swamp our vision 
and elude it, whether they are so insubstantial that human sight cannot perceive them, or such 
greatness hides itself in holier seclusion, concealing its kingdom, that is, itself, and granting access to 
nothing except the mind. We cannot discover what this thing is without which nothing exists; and yet 
we are surprised that we know too little about some mere fires, when the greatest part of the world, 
god, is hidden! (7.30.3-4).
30
 
 
       Again, this process of abstraction is something we see with remarkable regularity across 
all eight books of the work. Indeed, it is worth re-emphasising that each and every extant 
book of the work ends with some reflection on the role of divine reason in some form (see, 
again, the appendix to this chapter). Without fail, therefore, each book culminates with both 
the most profound, and the most abstract, account of causation. 
 
       While this regularity in Seneca’s methodology is already significant considering 
traditional accusations of disorder in the Natural Questions, the particulars of this 
methodology turn out to be doubly significant when we consider the work’s relationship with 
the Platonist debate outlined in the previous chapter.  
       To begin with, Seneca explicitly associates the investigation of ‘hidden’ causes with the 
goal of separating mind and body. He does so, moreover, at a crucial point in the text – at the 
                                                 
28
 E.g. Ep. 124.5 
29
 See SVF 2.794, where Alexander of Aphrodisias argues against the soul being a body (presumably targeted 
against the Stoics), since if it were a body it should be perceptible by at least one sense – but is not. If the Stoics 
did not think this, though, the argument would simply not stick. 
30
 This follows shortly after a passage in which Seneca also comments on the imperceptibility of (or at least the 
difficulty of perceiving) the human mind (7.25.2). Cf. again SVF 2.794, which seems to suggest that Seneca was 
not alone in thinking that reason eludes the senses completely.  
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end of the preface to book 3 – a passage which is arguably the clearest statement of purpose 
that we find anywhere in the work:  
 
Ad hoc proderit nobis rerum inspicere naturam: Primum discedemus a sordidis; deinde animum 
ipsum, quo summo31 magnoque opus est, seducemus a corpore. Deinde in occultis exercitata subtilitas 
non erit in aperta deterior. 
 
For these reasons it will be useful for us to investigate nature: first, we shall leave behind what is 
sordid; next, we shall keep our mind, which needs to be elevated and great, separated from the body; 
next, when our critical faculty has been exercised on hidden matters, it will be no worse at dealing 
with visible ones. (3 pref.18)  
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the goal of separating mind and body seems to address the 
sort of concern raised by the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus. Now, though, we 
can see with greater clarity how precisely Seneca hopes to bring this about: through a 
carefully structured study of nature, one that, in particular, directs the mind towards ‘hidden’ 
causes.  
       Even more significant, though, is the fact that the methodology Seneca employs (and the 
‘separation’ it is supposed to achieve) bears a striking resemblance to one which is advocated 
by Platonists.
32
 Broadly following the educational programme set out in Plato’s Republic, 
Platonists were committed to a carefully structured curriculum that was, over its course, 
designed to lead the mind of the budding philosopher away from the sensible world towards 
the intelligible.
33
 For this purpose, as Plato had suggested, the mathematical sciences were 
seen as especially useful, in large part because of the way mathematics encourages us to think 
                                                 
31
 While most MSS read summo (followed by Hine here), some have sano, which is adopted by Vottero, and by 
Oltramare, which Corcoran (who follows Oltramare’s text) thus renders “Second, we will free the mind – and 
we need one that is sound and great – from the body” (my emphasis). In support of sano, Vottero (149) points 
out that Seneca elsewhere associates sanitas animi with sapientia. However, it is not immediately obvious that 
sapientia, properly speaking, is what Seneca is concerned with here. Rather, he seems to be describing a quite 
specific process related to the study of nature – namely, the separation of body and soul. Accordingly, summo 
seems much better to reflect what is being described in this passage, especially when the process being 
described here is linked (as I think it should) with the image of the soul flying up in to the heavens in the preface 
to book 1.  
32
 Codoñer, on the other hand, suggests that the methodology of abstraction originates from within Stoicism. She 
highlights Seneca’s 88th Letter, which discusses the division of Stoic philosophy, and notes that Seneca divides 
physics into the corporeal and the incorporeal (88.16). Codoñer takes this to imply that the aim of physics is to 
proceed from one to the other. Even according to her suggestion that the ultimate end of physics is knowledge of 
god, however, it is difficult to see what such a progression would achieve. Even god is not, according to the 
Stoics, incorporeal. Nor would such a reading make sense in the scheme of Seneca proceeding to ever more 
profound accounts of causation.  The Stoics, of course, thought that only bodies could act. Thus, a transition 
from corporeal to incorporeal – far from representing a move towards a more profound account of causation – 
would represent a move into things that cannot cause anything at all.  
33
 Esp. Rep. 521c ff. For evidence and discussion of this educational programme among Platonists, see Boys-
Stones (forthcoming), ch. 16.  
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in abstract terms.
34
 By pursuing these studies in abstractions, Platonists believed that the 
agent’s soul could gradually be purified of sense-perception (a goal, indeed, that is sometimes 
described as a separation of soul and body – e.g. Phaedo 79a ff.) This purificatory role is 
made clear in the following from Alcinous and Plutarch:  
 
The introductory ceremonies, so to speak, and preliminary purifications of our innate spirit, if one is 
to be initiated into the greater sciences, will be constituted by music, arithmetic, astronomy, and 
geometry... (Alcinous, Didaskalikos 28.4, trans. Dillon)   
 
In all of the so-called mathematical sciences there appear traces and images of the truth of 
intelligibles, as if in smooth and undistorted mirrors. According to Philolaus, geometry especially, 
being the principle and mother-city of the rest, turns and leads the intellectual capacity upwards – 
cleansed, so to speak, and gradually set free from perception. 
 (Plutarch, Table-Talk 8.2, 718E, my trans.) 
 
An important thing to note here is that this process of purification happens before the 
philosopher directly apprehends the Forms. As Alcinous says, the purification via the 
mathematical sciences is “introductory” and “preliminary”, preceding initiation into the 
greater sciences (i.e. dialectic, the final stage of the philosopher’s education through which, 
and only through which, one can ultimately get a glimpse of the Forms). Similarly, Plutarch 
says it is geometry (again, not dialectic) that purifies, and ultimately releases us from 
perception. 
       However, while it was the mathematical sciences par excellence that the Platonists saw 
as useful in this way, it also seems that the study of nature was thought able to play an 
analogous role – provided it was pursued in a specific way:35  
 
In this way most of all the philosopher seems to be different from the doctor, the farmer, or the flute 
player. For them it is enough to consider the very end of the causal sequence. For the last cause can be 
seen along with its effect: swelling or embolism in the case of fever; blazing sun after a storm in the 
case of corn-rust; the inclination and bringing together of pipes for a low tone; and this is sufficient 
for the craftsman to do his proper job. But for the natural philosopher, who pursues truth by means of 
contemplation, the cognition of last causes in not the end but the start of a journey to the first and 
                                                 
34
 As we see in Plato’s Line (esp. Rep. 510d), thinking about mathematics engages διάνοια – a cognitive faculty 
whose objects are precisely abstract versions of (for example) sensible geometrical figures (rather than νόησις, 
which is used in dialectic to grasp the Forms themselves). It should be added that mathematics is also seen as 
useful because of the way it takes the Forms as first principles in an especially direct way, compared to other 
‘sciences’.  
35
 Indeed, later in the passage of Table-Talk referred to above, Plutarch goes on to tell an anecdote about Plato 
scolding his pupils for applying geometry within the practical sphere, building certain mechanical devices. Plato 
is said to have remarked that “the advantage of geometry was dissipated and destroyed, since it slipped back into 
the realm of sense-perception instead of soaring upward”. It is especially important for the Platonists, then, that 
when studying such things (and presumably the same can be said for physics) it is vitally important that one 
pursues them only in a carefully prescribed way – indeed, precisely via the methodology of abstraction. 
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highest causes. For this reason Plato and Democritus, when they were seeking the cause of heat and 
heaviness, rightly did not stop their account with fire and earth, but went on carrying back sensible 
things to intelligible principles until they arrived at, as it were, the minimal seeds. 
 (Plutarch On the principle of Cold, 948BC, my trans.)36 
 
As we can see here, the study of nature can, on the Platonist view, provide a useful starting 
point for the process of abstraction. This process, as we can also see, proceeds along carefully 
circumscribed lines: starting from sensible phenomena, we then ‘journey’37 back up the 
causal sequence, arriving eventually at intelligible causes. Provided we pursue the study of 
nature in this way – moving from naive to profound, from sensible to abstract causes – it 
seems that we can achieve a similar sort of purification as is usually achieved through to the 
mathematical sciences.  
       In fact, Plutarch clearly means what he says here; for, as has sometimes been noted, he 
often works along precisely these methodological lines. One good example of this is his 
dialogue On the E at Delphi. Attempting to discover the meaning of the ‘E’ dedicated in 
Delphi, one of the first
38
 suggestions (attributed to a ‘Chaldaean stranger’) is that the E 
represents the sun (since εἰ is supposedly the second of seven vowels, and the sun is the 
second planet). Initially, then, a ‘physical’ explanation of the E is proposed. From here, the 
interlocutors then try out a number of semantic explanations (a move, then, to words rather 
than physical things)
39
 before, significantly, coming to a mathematical hypothesis.
40
 Finally, 
the investigation culminates with a theological/metaphysical explanation: E, it is suggested, 
means “thou art”, which we address to Apollo as ‘being’ – in the full, Platonic sense. Here, 
then, we see Plutarch putting his methodology into practice, proceeding from naive to 
profound, sensible to intelligible explanations.
41
  
                                                 
36
 On the methodological importance of this passage see Sierksma-Agteres (2015), esp. 66ff. For the 
propaedeutic role of the study of nature in Platonism, see Meeusen (2015) and also Van der Stockt (1992). 
37
 On the significance of the concept of a ‘journey’ (πορεία) here, see again Sierksma-Agteres (2015).  
38
 The first in time, if not in narrative sequence (since the encounter with the Chaldaean stranger precedes the 
dramatic meeting). The first suggestion sequentially comes from Lamprias, who suggests that the E, as the fifth 
letter of the alphabet, is supposed to represent the original five sages. Ammonius, though, subsequently rejects 
this as mere pseudo-history. Taking the narrative order as methodologically primary, it could be that this 
‘historical’ theory represents a kind of pre- or non-philosophical account. Cf. Seneca’s recurring critique of 
historians (3 pref. 5-7; 4a pref. 21; 4b.3.1; 7.16.1-3) as well as his general tendency to begin the investigation 
with ‘early’ views – see appendix to this chapter.  
39
 The semantic theories revolve around different interpretations of ‘εἰ’ qua the Greek ‘if’. Namely, that εἰ either 
represents: the ‘if’ that we use when we ask the oracle if we should do something; the ‘if’ that we supposedly 
use in prayers to the god; or, finally, the ‘if’ that is indispensable in logic.  
40
 Namely, E = the fifth letter of the alphabet, and five represents an important number in mathematics, 
philosophy and music, along with physiology. 
41
 For more detailed analysis of the structure in De E, see Ferrari (2010) – who argues that the progression is 
from historical, to Stoic, to Pythagorean, to Platonic interpretations – and Lernould (2006) – who sees the 
progression as: history, (scientific) astronomy, (traditional) religion, mathematics-physics (with further 
subdivisions) and finally theology. For structural similarities in Plutarch’s De facie, see Dillon (1988). See also 
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       It would seem, then, that there are some striking parallels between Seneca’s approach to 
the study of nature and the methodology advocated by the Platonists. Seneca’s approach 
mirrors the Platonists’ both structurally (an aetiological investigation structured around 
increasingly abstract and powerful accounts of causation) and in the supposed outcome that 
such an approach is supposed to bring about (a kind of psychic purification). 
       Now, I am by no means suggesting that Seneca believes that a study of nature structured 
in this way will lead to the cognition of Forms. Of course, some scholars have read the 
Natural Questions with Plato’s metaphysics in mind, precisely drawing attention to motifs 
such as the separation of soul and body, and the Phaedrus-like account of the soul flying up 
into the heavens in the preface to book 1, as evidence for Seneca’s sympathy for the Platonic 
worldview. While I have already argued against such an interpretation,
42
 a further point that 
can be added here is that, even in the preface to book 1, it is unquestionably the physical 
cosmos into which the soul is depicted as flying:
43
 it is “the settings and risings of the stars, 
and their differing but harmonious paths”, not the Forms, at which the disembodied soul 
gazes. Clearly, then, Seneca locates this activity and its outcome squarely within the physical 
cosmos. 
       What I suggest Seneca is doing, however, is acknowledging that the Platonists are on to 
something when they suggest that certain types of intellectual activity can achieve a 
therapeutic effect – namely, a certain distancing of mind and body. In particular, he seems to 
agree that intellectual activity that abstracts away from the immediate objects of sense-
perception can help to bring this about. However – and this is part of his dialectical point – 
you do not need to go beyond the physical cosmos in order to achieve this. Indeed, as we 
have seen, the Platonists themselves seem to suggest that the ‘purification’ of the soul 
happens before the agent gets to the Forms. Accordingly, Seneca’s point will be that, for a 
Stoic as much as a Platonist, a carefully structured study of nature should be able to achieve a 
certain distancing of mind from body. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Boys-Stones (1997) on Plutarch’s progression towards ever truer (or at least more likely) causes in De prin. 
frig. – albeit, in this work, stopping short of the ultimate metaphysical step. 
42
 See Introduction and Chapter 1. 
43
 As is also noted by Setaioli (2007), 355; Bonazzi and Bénatouïl (2012), 8, 11. Cf. Reydams-Schils (2010, 
202) for the same point elsewhere in Seneca’s work, and Bénatouïl (2013, 157) regarding Epictetus’ and Marcus 
Aurelius’ comparable use of Platonic themes in their work.   
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       In fact, there is evidence elsewhere in Seneca’s corpus that he may already44 have been 
thinking along these lines – in terms, that is, of the potential benefits of what might be called 
a Platonist ‘mode’ of intellectual activity. At the end of Letter 58’s discussion of Platonist 
ontology, Lucilius asks what benefit is to be gained from thinking about Plato’s Forms. 
Seneca initially says that they merely provide a kind of intellectual amusement; but he goes 
on to argue that it is a useful exercise nonetheless. Meditating on Plato’s ontology, Seneca 
suggests, helps to highlight the insignificance of material possessions.
45
 While clearly not 
accepting the existence of Forms, he nevertheless seems to suggest that Plato’s particular 
mode of thinking – thinking, that is, in entirely abstract terms – can in itself bring about a 
therapeutic effect. In a similar move, and one that parallels the Natural Questions even more 
closely, Letter 65’s discussion of causes is brought to a halt by an objection from Lucilius, 
who again asks what the point is of these abstract technicalities. Thinking about these 
matters, Seneca maintains, can “elevate and relieve the mind, which, being burdened by its 
great load [sc. the body], desires to be set free” (65.26).46 Again, Seneca by no means accepts 
Plato’s ontology – in fact, in what follows he clearly redirects our thinking away from Forms 
and towards the physical cosmos, clearly seeing this as the proper object of this kind of 
contemplation (65.16-19). Again, though, Seneca seems to recognise that there is something 
to this abstract mode of thinking that can, indeed, bring about a certain distancing of the mind 
from the body. 
       Why, though, should a Stoic such as Seneca think that he can exploit this Platonist 
methodology? In the Platonist system, of course, the methodology has a clearly defined 
function: to lead the mind away from the objects of sense-perception so that it might grasp 
the Forms. This so-called ‘purification’, according to the Platonists, is necessary because the 
Forms are not only inaccessible to the senses, but the use of sense-perception actually 
prevents one from grasping them. As an empiricist and material monist, Seneca obviously 
cannot have precisely the same motivations in mind.  
       However, the Stoics have their own reasons for wanting to distance us from the senses 
and the body. Although epistemically reliant on them, the senses are also the primary means 
                                                 
44
 I do not mean here to make any judgement about the relative dates of the Letters and the Natural Questions, 
but merely that Seneca was apparently toying with this line of thought elsewhere as well. For the question of 
dating, see Griffin (1976), esp. 395-411; Marshall (2013); Williams (2014). 
45
 Ep. 58.25-7. 
46
 Trans. Inwood. Interestingly, in this very Letter Seneca may be employing something not unlike the 
methodology of abstraction, since he starts from Aristotle’s material cause and gradually works up to Platonic 
first principles. In this case, however, this may simply reflect the way in which Aristotle sets our his ‘four 
causes’ (i.e. material, then formal, then efficient, then final), and then Seneca’s strategy of presenting Plato’s 
causes as a kind of addition on top of this scheme. 
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by which human rationality becomes corrupted;
47
 the body, meanwhile, can become a mere 
conduit for irrational desires. In this situation, means which help to bring about a certain 
‘distance’ between mind and body might have seemed like an appealing idea – all the more 
so considering the nature of the Platonist critique (which we shall return to in a moment). 
Seneca, I suggest, seems to have realised this. While, it is true, the process of separating mind 
from body might mean something slightly different for the Stoics (they cannot, for instance, 
think that the process results in a literal loosening of the soul from the body) there seems no 
reason why this methodology could not achieve something analogous for the Stoics. Namely, 
by gradually abstracting away from what is open to sense-perception, the mind’s focus can 
diverted away bodily distraction, resulting in a kind of separation of mind and body. While 
maintaining some technical disagreement over its effect, Seneca can legitimately, and 
usefully, adopt the Platonists’ ‘methodology of abstraction’.  
 
4. Seneca’s response to the Platonists 
How precisely, though, does this ‘separation’ help Seneca with the problem posed by the 
Platonists? To understand this, we need again to think about the nature of the problem and its 
relationship to the Stoic argument from οἰκείωσις. If we recall, Anon. argued that οἰκείωσις is 
unable to do the job that the Stoics assign to it. Namely, it is incapable of producing the 
attitude of complete impartiality to all rational beings, and ultimately the cosmos, that is 
required to maintain the Stoic identification of the ethical good with the wellbeing of the 
cosmos as a whole. In particular, Anon. drew attention to the fact that most people cannot 
even get beyond the bias they have towards their own bodies – a bias that Seneca also seems 
to recognise as an obstacle in Letter 120.  
       The Stoics for their part would claim that this attachment to our bodies is not a necessary 
state of affairs, but merely the result of the rational corruption that occurs in the process of 
our development. From the moment of birth, all agents act to preserve their bodily wellbeing 
– and at this stage in their development such actions are entirely appropriate since, as a child, 
one’s ‘nature’ simply is one’s bodily constitution.48 Subsequently, though, the development 
of rationality is supposed to transform our source of motivation, whereby the agent ought to 
come to see themselves as a rational being integrated within a wider community of rational 
                                                 
47
 D. L. 7.89: “When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external things or 
sometimes to the influence of associates” – where “external things” presumably denotes precisely that which 
comes in via the senses. Corruption from our associates, it should be noted, also comes in through the senses. 
Cf. SVF 3.229a. 
48
 Seneca Ep. 121.15-16 
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beings. The trouble is, the Stoics would say, most agents precisely fail to make this transition 
– getting stuck, as it were, in their juvenile value system, and thus continuing to regard mere 
bodily wellbeing as the proper basis for value-judgements.
49
  
       Nevertheless, Anon.’s criticism has considerable force for the simple reason that pretty 
much everyone does prioritise their body in this way. However, in this situation, a good 
strategy for the Stoics would be to show how one might go about minimising this sense of 
bias we have towards our bodies, thereby making the Stoic claims more plausible. And this, I 
suggest, is precisely what we find Seneca doing in the Natural Questions. 
       But, as we have seen, there was also another prong to Anon’s attack: not merely that 
everyone is helplessly over-attached to their bodies, but also that even if οἰκείωσις could be 
extended beyond the body, it could certainly not be extended indefinitely in the way the 
Stoics require. As we have seen, though, Seneca does not merely say that the study of nature 
will help to separate our minds from our bodies; he also seems to say that the study of nature 
can, in addition, actually promote our sense of affinity with the cosmos. We saw this 
especially in the preface to book 1, in which, I argued, Seneca’s description of coming to 
view the cosmos as one’s ‘possession’ and as ‘relating’ to oneself strongly recalled the 
conceptual vocabulary of οἰκείωσις.  
       But how is this supposed to be brought about by the aetiological scheme I have 
described? As it happens, I think the answer is pointed to by an important detail in this very 
same preface. In particular, what I think is significant here is the fact that the agent who is 
described as experiencing this heightened sense of οἰκείωσις towards the cosmos is, in 
Seneca’s artistic description, nothing other than a disembodied soul. A large portion of this 
preface, if we recall, is taken up with Seneca’s description of the soul of one who studies 
nature soaring up into the heavens, gazing at the stars and consorting with the divine. What is 
especially significant, though, is that immediately before the part of the preface referred to 
above – that is, just before he says that such a soul will experience a heightened sense of 
οἰκείωσις towards the cosmos – Seneca makes an important qualification of these statements, 
saying: “Up above there are vast spaces, which the mind is allowed to enter and occupy, 
provided that it takes scarcely anything of the body with it” (si secum minimum ex corpore 
tulit (1. pref. 11, my emphasis)). Seneca’s point, then, seems to be that it is precisely by 
minimising our sense of attachment to the body that we can boost our sense of οἰκείωσις 
towards the cosmos. 
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 For the problem of becoming over-attached to juvenile sources of motivation, see esp. Aulus Gellius, Noct. 
Att. 12.5.7 (= SVF 3.181); cf. SVF 3.229.  
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       How precisely, though, is this supposed to work? What I think Seneca realises is just 
what was said above: that is precisely our over-attachment to our bodies that causes οἰκείωσις 
to, as it were, stall. Due to the persuasiveness of things like pleasure, most agents make the 
mistake of identifying the body as the locus of value, thus viewing the wellbeing of the body 
alone as the standard for what should be considered good. What Seneca hopes, I suggest, is 
that by bringing about this sense of ‘separation’ from the body, he can provide the agent with 
some perspective – a certain degree of ‘critical distance’ from their body – giving them the 
opportunity to consider the world around them in a way that is not, for once, refracted 
through the prism of the body.  
       But the exercise becomes especially powerful in the context of Seneca’s physical 
investigation. For, as we have seen, over the course of the methodology of abstraction Seneca 
gradually reveals the most profound cause in nature: divine reason. But, considering the 
process of ‘separation’ that accompanies this methodology, what this means is that our 
discovery of divine reason in nature coincides with the point when we are, in a sense, most 
detached from our bodies – when our minds are most isolated. What this serves to do, I 
suggest, is to confront us with the rational character of nature at just the point when our 
attention has been drawn to our own quintessentially rational nature. In other words, what the 
exercise achieves is to highlight vividly what we and the cosmos have in common.
50
 Seneca, 
indeed, seems to suggest that this is precisely what is going on:  
 
Cum illa tetigit...hoc habet argumentum divinitatis suae quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis, 
sed ut suis interest.  
 
When it has reached those regions...It has this proof of its own divinity, that it takes delight in the 
divine and enjoys it not as someone else’s possession but as its own. (1 pref. 12, my emphasis). 
        
This point is subsequently reiterated when, at the climax of his account of the soul’s celestial 
sojourn, Seneca says that “[t]here the mind at last learns what it has long been inquiring into; 
there it begins to know god...what is the difference between god’s nature and our own? The 
mind is the superior part of us; in him there is nothing apart from mind” (1. pref. 13-14). The 
soul realises, in other words, that there is no fundamental difference between man and god: 
they are both quintessentially rational beings.
51
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 A similar point – that the study of physics leads to an appreciation of our relationship to the divine principle – 
is made by Reydams-Schils (2005a), 41-2. Cf. Reydams-Schils (2005b), 582. 
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 I do not agree with Inwood (2005a, 192) that this amounts to a negative evaluation of man’s status – namely, 
because while god is nothing but reason, we are a mixture of mind and body. On the contrary, I suggest 
Seneca’s point is this: if the only difference between us and god is our bodies, how much less important does 
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       In sum, by  first ‘separating’ our minds from our bodies – which allows us to transcend 
our ordinary body-oriented view of the world, and draws our attention to our own 
fundamentally rational natures – and then confronting us with the rational character of nature 
itself, Seneca strives, I suggest, to create the psychological circumstances where one’s sense 
of οἰκείωσις towards the cosmos might, indeed, be fostered. 
 
* 
       At this point it is worth pausing to reflect back on what was said in the Introduction 
regarding some broad similarities between my own account and that put forward by Williams 
in his recent monograph. If we recall, one of Williams’ central contentions is that the physics 
in the Natural Questions fosters what he calls ‘the cosmic viewpoint’. Although, as noted in 
the Introduction, it is not entirely clear what Williams takes this goal to consist of, what I 
have suggested above – that the physical investigation serves ultimately to bring us into 
closer union with the cosmos – nevertheless seems to bear some resemblance to Williams’ 
idea. I hope, however, that what I have argued actually serves to develop some of Williams’ 
suggestions. 
       One area in which I hope it has done so is with respect to Seneca’s methodology. 
Williams rightly suggests, I think, that the physical theories that Seneca explores serve to 
draw the reader’s mind out into the cosmos, though I believe the means by which this is 
achieved is actually much more sophisticated that Williams realises. Williams contends, if we 
recall, that the cosmic viewpoint is fostered through the artistic tendencies of the theories 
Seneca explores, since “whatever the merits or plausibility of individual theories, each in its 
own way projects an integrated vision of nature’s workings”.52 However, if the foregoing is 
correct, then Seneca’s choice of theories is much less ad hoc than this would indicate. It is not 
the case that Seneca simply assembles theories that individually serve to portray the cosmos 
as an integrated system. Indeed, as I have suggested (and shall demonstrate further in the 
appendix to this chapter) theories near the beginning of the investigation actually portray 
(from a Stoic point of view) a decidedly partial and naive view of the cosmos and its 
workings. The ideas that rivers are replenished by rainwater or by water flowing back from 
the sea, for instance, simply fail to take account of the wider causal system in which natural 
                                                                                                                                                        
this make our bodies seem (and, correspondingly, how much more important our minds)? Indeed, in general, I 
do not perceive the pessimistic tone that Inwood does in this work. If Seneca does show ‘epistemic humility’ at 
times, this does not take away from the positive, and indeed transformative, benefit that Seneca says we can get 
from studying nature. On the allegedly Platonising description of the Stoic god here, see Chapter 1.      
52
 Williams (2012), 18-19. 
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phenomena occur. Instead, building on the ideas of Waiblinger and Codoñer, I have 
suggested that theories are actually arranged in a carefully contrived sequence, which serves 
to take us from a partial view of the world to an ever more expansive, integrated and 
sophisticated one. This being the case, though, the merits and plausibilities of individual 
theories turn out to be highly significant. Theories are chosen and arranged by Seneca not just 
because of the ‘integrating’ tendency that they individually convey (and, as I say, many 
theories do not convey this) but rather because of the role they play at a specific stage in the 
overall trajectory of the investigation – a trajectory which is ultimately structured, I have 
argued, according to the Platonist-inspired ‘methodology of abstraction’. While I do, 
therefore, to some extent agree with Williams about the overall goal of Seneca’s physical 
investigation – fostering something which might be called ‘the cosmic viewpoint’ – I 
nevertheless think that Seneca’s methodology is both more organised, and much more 
philosophically-driven, than Williams supposes.  
       What is more, the foregoing may also help to clarify just what this ‘cosmic viewpoint’ 
means in the context Natural Questions. The idea of taking the view of the cosmos – 
sometimes referred to as the ‘view from above’53 – is in fact one which has been explored 
before in the context of post-Hellenistic Stoicism. Sellers, for example, considers instances of 
this motif in the work of Marcus Aurelius, though sees it only as a kind of therapeutic (or 
‘spiritual’) exercise, practised in order to “devalue human anxieties and concerns”.54 
However, while the physical investigation in the Natural Questions undoubtedly serves a 
therapeutic function,
55
 the goal of achieving what Williams calls the cosmic viewpoint 
(though which Seneca himself phrases as an escape from oneself) seems to be much more 
substantive: a goal in its own right, not merely an instrument to some other end (e.g. to 
alleviate anxiety). Williams, I think, recognises this – though as I noted in the Introduction, 
his description of the cosmic viewpoint leaves questions unanswered about the precise 
significance of achieving this perspective, and how this goal sits within the broader 
framework of Stoic ethical theory.  
       What has been said in this chapter, however, presents one way of cashing this idea out in 
philosophical terms – terms, moreover, that can be made perfect sense of within existing 
Stoic ethical theory. What achieving the ‘cosmic viewpoint’ means, I suggest, is not merely 
viewing events in one’s life from a detached perspective, as Sellers suggests is the case in 
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 More on this in Chapter 5. 
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Marcus. Rather, to achieve the cosmic viewpoint, if we call it that, is to come to see oneself 
and one’s ethical wellbeing within the context of, as being intimately bound up with, the 
cosmos as a whole. As we have seen, this idea is in turn grounded in the Stoics’ theory of 
οἰκείωσις, whose end-point is precisely when we come to see the entire community of 
rational beings, the cosmos included, as the context in which we locate our moral decisions. 
Insofar as what Seneca tries to foster can be described as a ‘cosmic viewpoint’, then, it is 
because, having achieved this perspective, one takes the cosmos as a whole as the ultimate 
reference point for determining moral value. 
 
* 
 
If I am right about what Seneca is doing in the Natural Questions – trying to foster a greater 
sense of affinity with the wider community of rational beings – it is interesting to note that he 
was not the only Stoic in this period to attempt something of this sort. Indeed, Seneca’s 
approach finds a number of striking parallels in a famous passage of the Stoic Hierocles. Here 
Hierocles describes an exercise which, like Seneca’s, seems designed precisely to help us to 
expand our realm of self-interest. To do so, he asks us to imagine ourselves surrounded by a 
series of concentric circles, with each successive circle representing increasingly distant 
relationships – family, deme, citizen, with the largest circle encompassing the whole of 
humanity. He then bids us concentrate on ‘drawing the circles together’, encouraging us to 
regard more distant classes of people as more closely related to us – non-family members as 
part of our family, non-citizens as fellow citizens, and so on.  
       An interesting feature of the exercise, though, and one that creates an even stronger 
parallel with Seneca, is where Hierocles places the body in this scheme. Near the start of the 
passage he says:  
 
 ρῶτος μὲν γάρ ἐστι κύκλος καὶ  ροσεχέστατος, ὃν αὐτός τις καθά ερ  ερὶ κέντρον τὴν ἑα τοῦ γέγρα ται 
διάνοιαν· ἐν ᾧ κύκλῳ τό τε σῶμα  εριέχεται καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἕνεκα  αρειλημμένα. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ βραχύτατος 
καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν αὐτοῦ  ροσα τόμενος τοῦ κέντρο  κύκλος οὗτος.  
 
The first and closest circle is that which each person draws around his own mind, as the centre: in this 
circle is enclosed the body and whatever is employed for the sake of the body. For this circle is the 
shortest and all but touches its own centre.  
(Hierocles, ap. Stobaeus, Anthology 4.84.23, trans. Konstan, my emphases)  
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Although Hierocles says that the body comes very close to the centre, it is actually the mind 
alone that occupies this position. What makes this distinction especially clear is the fact that 
the first circle contains not only the body, but things taken for the body. In effect, Hierocles is 
asking us to regard the body as being of the same status as the external objects we pursue for 
its preservation. Elsewhere in Hierocles’ work we find him clearly advocating the standard 
Stoic position that man is a combination of body and soul,
56
 so there is no reason to think that 
he is advocating an unorthodox anthropology here. Rather, in the context of this passage, 
what Hierocles seems to realise is precisely what I believe Seneca is getting at: namely, that it 
is our over-attachment to the body and the things taken for the body that causes the process of 
οἰκείωσις to stall. Accordingly, in order to get ourselves back on track, we must strive to 
create a certain level of critical distance between mind and body. 
       It is unclear whether Hierocles here was reacting to the same dialectical pressures as I 
take Seneca to be – although it is certainly possible, given his dates (probably second century 
AD), and Hierocles’ argument has actually sometimes been read in the very context of the 
criticism we find in the anonymous commentator.
57
 If they are reacting to the same pressures, 
though, it is worth pointing out a number of advantages that Seneca’s approach has over the 
exercise proposed by Hierocles.  
       To begin with, rather than simply imagining a distinction between mind and body, which 
is basically what Hierocles proposes, Seneca outlines a much more carefully worked out and 
theoretically grounded means to achieve this. Drawing on the Platonist ‘methodology of 
abstraction’, Seneca shows precisely how this can be brought about.  
       However, and specifically with regard to its success as a polemical argument, Seneca’s 
approach is particularly effective because it is phrased in terms that the Platonists themselves 
ought to accept. It is the Platonists who propose the methodology of abstraction as a means 
of distancing the mind from the body, and they themselves admit that this can (and indeed 
must) take place before any cognition of the Forms occurs – thus leaving this technique open 
to be utilised by those who do not see cognition of the Forms as the end-point of the process. 
As it turns out, then, it is the Platonists themselves who provide the means to overcome the 
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 E.g. col. IV.38-9. 
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 Inwood (1984), 182-3. Inwood, however, argues that Hierocles here contributes nothing towards solving the 
problem of the conflict between self-interest and altruism in Stoicism. While it is true that Hierocles does not 
forward any novel argument about, for instance, the underlying mechanism that facilitates the extension of self-
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people behaving. Hierocles starts from a similar appeal to general experience: people do regard those close to 
them as included within their realm of self-interest. This serves as a proof of concept that some sort of 
‘extension’ is possible. He then strives to illustrate how an extension of this tendency might be brought about. 
97 
 
problem raised by Anon. By turning the Platonists’ own theory against them, then, Seneca 
constructs a highly effective dialectical response. What is more, though, he does so without 
having to make any serious theoretical concessions. He does not need to propose any serious 
alterations to the fundamentals of Stoic theory – this, he can say, is already fit for purpose. 
Rather, all he does is elaborate on the therapeutic means by which we – as corrupt, body-
loving agents – might go about getting our natural course of development back on track.58  
 
Appendix: The structure of the aetiology in the individual books of the Natural Questions  
What follows is a detailed run-through of the structure of the aetiology of each remaining 
book of the Natural Questions. I have consigned this to an appendix to avoid holding up the 
argument with such an extended (and fairly repetitive) account of each book, though its 
inclusion seems necessary to corroborate my point. This repetitiveness, however, should 
probably be viewed as welcome; for it serves to highlight the considerable consistency with 
which Seneca applies his methodology.  
 
Book 4a 
Book 4a on the Nile has, unfortunately, not survived in full; but even in what remains some 
clear methodological parallels with book 3 are visible. For instance, following the preface on 
the dangers of flattery that Lucilius faces in his office as procurator of Sicily, Seneca 
precedes the investigation proper with a review of some remarkable features associated with 
the river, just as in the previous book (4a.2.1-16). Also analogous is Seneca’s choice to 
“begin with the earliest writers” (i.e ‘naive’ theories59), and again this includes poets 
(4a.2.17). The cause that these writers propose (that melt-water causes the Nile to flood) is, 
moreover, a distinctly ‘material’/‘mechanical’ cause – much like the view that rainfall fills 
rivers at the beginning of book 3 – as is the subsequent view of Thales that wind holds up the 
flow of the river (4a.2.22-5) 
        The parallels continue when the next theory takes us underground, with Oenopides of 
Chius’ theory that cold underground venae supply the Nile’s flood (4a.2.26; cf. 3.9.1ff.)  
       In what follows, Seneca’s methodology of refinement is apparent when, in the next 
theory (from Diogenes of Apollonia), he retains the idea of underground veins but develops it 
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 For more on the therapeutic frame of the study of physics in Stoicism, and indeed of Stoic philosophy in 
general, see Chapter 5. 
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 For the idea that the theories of early writers are ‘naive’, see 6.5.2: “I shall now examine these theories 
individually, but first of all I need to say that early views were rather imprecise and crude: people were still 
roaming in search of the truth; everything was new to the first investigators. Later those same views were 
refined...”   
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into a more far-reaching theory: “It is impossible for part of the earth to be dry and part full 
of water: for everything is pierced by passages and interconnected”. In this ‘expansive’ move, 
comparable to 3.10.1ff., the earlier theory of venae is located within the larger natural system: 
the whole earth is penetrated by channels of this sort, and, moreover, this plays a crucial role 
in the distribution of water around the earth as a whole. Indeed, as Seneca says a little later, 
because of these channels, Egypt can draw water from as far away as “the regions where it is 
always winter” (4a.2.28). The causal frame of reference is then expanded even further when 
Diogenes of Apollonia brings the sun into play, which serves as the driving force in the 
process of redistributing water through these channels, by drawing moisture towards itself. 
       Unfortunately, the text breaks off at this stage; but already there are some encouraging 
parallels: Seneca begins from naive, ‘material’ or ‘mechanical’ causes; he proceeds to 
consider causes that are not directly open to perception, before integrating these within a 
wider system of causes.  
 
Book 4b 
The beginning of Book 4b (a book that deals with snow, hail, and analogous atmospheric 
phenomena) has also been lost;
60
 but again some methodological parallels are clearly visible. 
Where the text picks up, with the formation of hail, we are again dealing with hidden causes 
– though this time because they are located high above. Seneca himself draws attention to the 
imperceptibility of these causes by referring to himself as a “second rank witness” 
(testibus...secondae notae) on the matter – that is, in legal jargon, someone who has not 
observed the event directly (4b.3.1). This, as I argued earlier, seems to correspond with the 
‘move underground’ that we find in books dealing with ‘terrestrial’ phenomena.  
       Seneca’s subsequent move is again familiar, as he integrates his account of hail-
formation into a larger system of phenomena: just as ice and frost form at our level, Seneca 
explains, so hail and snow form in the clouds (4b.3.6). This is similar to his assertion in book 
3 (3.16.4) that the same laws apply below as above-ground.
61
 
       After a side-argument against members of his own school who apparently believed they 
could predict the onset of hail (4b.6.1-7.3),
62
 Seneca moves to explain why snow is supposed 
to be formed nearer the ground than hail (4b.8-10). Having explained why (because air nearer 
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the ground is warmer than higher up, where the denser hailstones are formed) Seneca 
proceeds to lambast those who would dispute this by claiming that “mountain tops ought to 
be warmer, the closer they are to the sun” (4b.11.1). In the response that follows, we see 
another expansive move.
63
 To think this, Seneca argues, is to take an exceptionally narrow-
minded, ego-centric view of the cosmos. “They are high so long as they are being compared 
with us; but when you look at the universe, the modest height of all of them is evident” 
(4b.11.2). Once more, then, Seneca encourages us to divert our thinking to the system of 
nature more widely in order to understand local phenomena. As Seneca says: “measure the 
world on its own scale” (4b.11.4).  
       Following this, Seneca moves abruptly into the book’s epilogue, which considers the 
misuse of snow to cool drinks. Again, I shall delay detailed discussion of this to the next 
chapter. For now, what is significant here is that, as in all other books, Seneca concludes with 
some reflection of the role of the divine in nature. Seneca explains the moral error of this 
practice by referring to nature’s intention in providing a ready supply of water. 
 
Book 5  
       After a brief introduction on the definition of wind, book 5’s investigation gets swiftly 
underway with a theory from Democritus (5.1.2) – an early thinker again, but also an atomist, 
whose views are therefore quintessentially ‘mechanical’. We next encounter the familiar 
move underground, with the view that winds are emitted from caves (4.1). As in book 3, 
Seneca then introduces an analogy with the human body off the back of this move. There it 
was on the model of veins, here bowels. In this instance, though, while he accepts that winds 
can be emitted from such underground caves, Seneca cannot bring himself to accept that 
wind is essentially flatulence (5.4.2). He prefers, for the time being, to view such emissions in 
mechanical terms, drawing on the Aristotelian theory of ‘exhalations’: “Is it perhaps truer to 
say that many particles are constantly being given off from every part of the earth? When 
they have been packed together and then begin to be thinned out by the sunshine...” (5.4.3) – 
a theory which serves to expand our causal frame of reference: such exhalations are emitted 
from every part of the earth, and are set in motion (cf. 4a.28-30) by the sun.  
       Shortly after, though, the rejected analogy with a human being is replaced by another. 
Moreover, here Seneca explicitly ‘deepens’ the level of causal analysis, saying that “the 
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following [cause] is a much more powerful and truer one” (ceterum illa est longe valentior 
veriorque – much like Seneca’s call to “look at this...more deeply” at 3.12.1; cf. also 6.16.2): 
        
...air has a natural ability to move; it does not acquire it from any external source, but has an innate 
capacity for movement, among other things. Do you think that we have been given strength to move 
ourselves, but the air has been left inert and immobile, even though water possesses its own motion 
even when the winds are still? Otherwise it would not produce living creatures; and we also see moss 
growing in water and grass-like plants floating on the surface. Therefore water has some vital power. 
Am I talking just about water? Fire, which consumes everything, creates certain things, and—this 
seems incredible, but it is true—living creatures are generated by fire. So air possesses some vital 
power
64
... (5.5.1-5.6.1) 
  
Air – and indeed nature as a whole – is permeated by a vital force. In addition to introducing 
these biological connotations, and a notion of agency, Seneca also uses the elemental theory 
(as in book 3 (3.9.1ff)), to further expand our causal frame of reference: it is not merely one 
element (and thus elemental region) that has these properties, but all of them.  
       Following this, Seneca moves from speaking about the causes of wind “in general” to 
consider a number of winds individually (5.7.1ff.). Ostensibly, this switch from general to 
specific goes against the expansive tendency we have seen so far (although it should be noted 
that in all of the following the sun remains as the primary motivating force). However, the 
order in which these winds are introduced points towards their role within the standard 
scheme. As Seneca successively introduces first predawn breezes, then the so-called 
ἐγκολπίας, then Etesians, it becomes apparent that what is significant about these winds is 
that they blow at different times of day.
65
 The first, obviously, occur before dawn; the 
ἐγκολπίας blows just after dawn (5.8.2), while the Etesians are apparently notorious among 
sailors because they “can’t get up in the morning” (5.11.1). Here, moreover, Seneca points 
out the various seasonal effects on the relative strength and duration of these winds. Much 
like the discussion at 3.16.1-3 of intermittent springs and the other regular cycles we find in 
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 Habet ergo aliquam vim ⟨vi⟩talem aer. The insertion is adopted by most editors, though not by Oltramare, 
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ἐγκολπίας, for instance, can be weak as well as strong (5.8.3-9.2). 
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nature, then, this section serves to introduce the idea of nature as a system that operates 
according to a regular pattern.
66
  
       Leading into this book’s central discussion, Seneca considers a number of much more 
powerful and destructive winds: ἐκνεφίαι, whirlwinds and the so-called πρηστήρ, a kind of 
fiery whirlwind (5.12.1-14.4). Here, then, we again see these surprising or ‘paradoxical’ 
phenomena clustering around the moralising passages. 
       Following the digression, the last part of the book is dedicated primarily to mapping and 
naming the winds. This can overall be seen as a continuation of the expansive tendency. 
Indeed, at the outset of the passage Seneca draws attention, via a quote from Ovid,
67
 to the 
fact that the winds traverse the whole globe: they blow in Nabatea and Persia in the east, 
Scythia in the north, Africa in the south.
68
 Next Seneca introduces Varro’s twelvefold 
division of the compass, which, Seneca explains, corresponds to where the sun rises at 
different times in the year (5.16.3). Moreover, as he explains a little later, these divisions 
represent sections in the very sky, corresponding to astronomical regions: 
 
Those who have said there are twelve winds have taken the view that the number of winds 
corresponds to the number of the sectors of the sky (caelum). The sky is divided into five circles that 
pass through the key divisions of the world: there is the arctic circle, the tropic of Cancer, the 
equatorial circle, the tropic of Capricorn, and the antarctic circle. In addition there is a sixth that 
divides the upper part of the world from the lower; for as you know, half of the world is always above 
us, half below. This line between the visible and the hidden the Greeks call the horizon, our 
countrymen have called it the delimiter, or others the delimiting circle. One must also add the 
meridian circle, which intersects the horizon at right angles. Some of these circles run at an angle and 
intersect the others as they encounter them. There must be partitions in the air corresponding to each 
of these sections. (5.17.2-4) 
 
       It is again only as we come into the epilogue that the ultimate cause of winds is revealed. 
Here we at last
69
 learn the significance of this worldwide distribution of winds (as well as, 
perhaps, the temporal distribution that was discussed before the digression): 
 
...providence did not devise winds or distribute them in different locations for one reason alone, but, 
first, so that they would not allow the air to grow stagnant...so that they might supply the land with 
rain and at the same time prevent an excess of it...so that rain can be shared out across the entire earth. 
The south wind drives them to Italy, the north wind forces them back to Africa. The Etesians do not 
allow clouds to settle in our region...And just think: grain could not be harvested if the redundant 
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material mixed in with what needs to be kept were not winnowed out by an air current...Just think 
how wind has given all nations communications with each other and brought together peoples 
separated by geography! (5.18.1-4). 
 
Such constant and ubiquitous flowing of the wind provides balance to the whole natural 
system. Again, at this deepest level of causal analysis, Seneca draws attention to nature’s 
intention behind providing winds. Providence, Seneca shows us, has precisely the benefit of 
the whole system in mind. 
 
Book 6 
In the books we have seen so far, Seneca introduces the concept of the lex naturae gradually. 
In book 6, however, the concept features prominently at the start. On the one hand, this might 
be a function of the notable increase in the presence of the divine from this point onwards.
70
 
More likely, though, is that it is down to the devastating effect of this particular phenomenon 
– which Seneca heralds as the most terrifying of all natural disasters, and which might 
therefore have been seen as requiring a certain amount of extra theodical justification. 
Seneca, indeed, stresses that earthquakes are not the work of malevolent divinities. Rather, he 
encourages us to see them as the result of material weaknesses (just like the frailties of our 
own bodies) (6.3.1), and to locate them, like the death they often result in, within the context 
of broader natural cycles (6.1.13: “Fate goes round in circles”). The reason we fail to see this, 
Seneca says, is precisely because “we grasp nature with our eyes, not our reason” (6.3.1).  
       Seneca then begins the investigation proper, proposing to review theories grouped 
according to the element responsible. Here, then, we see familiar patterns emerging. Having 
rejected an early ‘material’ view of Thales (6.6.1), we again encounter the ‘move 
underground’. Here Seneca explicitly connects this to a transition from ‘seen’ to ‘unseen’ by 
remarking that “if people do not believe that the gulfs of a huge sea are hidden within the 
earth, they are relying too much on their eyesight, and do not know how to let their minds 
advance beyond it” (6.7.5). Underground caves are a constant in the subsequent investigation; 
what varies is the element that is proposed to cause the earthquake. What emerges, though, is 
the significance of the order in which the elements are introduced: from water (6.1-8.5) and 
earth (10) Seneca moves through explanations based on fire (6.9.16; 6.11) before culminating 
with ‘breath’ (spiritus – equivalent, of course, to Stoic πνεῦμα (6.12.1ff)).71 Although breath 
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is said to be the cause endorsed by “many very distinguished writers”, Seneca soon begins to 
exploit its specifically Stoic connotations, using these to construe, once again, an analogy 
between the earth and the human body: 
 
Our bodies are irrigated both by blood and by breath, which passes along channels of its own. We 
have some narrower receptacles for the soul, through which it does no more than move, and some 
broader ones, in which it collects and from which it is distributed to the various parts of the body. In 
the same way the entire body of the whole earth is permeated both by water, which functions like 
blood, and by wind, which one could simply call soul (6.14.1) 
 
As well as introducing the biological model, the analogy also serves to expand the causal 
network (cf. 5.5.1ff) since, just like the veins in our body, the underground channels 
permeate, emphatically, “the entire body of the whole earth” (totus terrarium omnium corpus, 
my emphasis). Shortly after this, Seneca returns to the human body analogy to affirm that this 
is no mere analogy,
72
 but a genuine correspondence: 
 
It is plain that the earth contains breath: I do not mean just the breath that makes it cohere and keep its 
parts united, which is found even in rocks and dead bodies, but I mean the life-giving breath that is 
vigorous and sustains everything. (6.16.1) 
 
In doing so, Seneca introduces further emphasis on the vital aspect of nature. Indeed, just as 
in book 5 (5.4.2ff.) Seneca moves from a merely biological analogy (there digestive faculties, 
here veins and arteries) to one that characterises nature as a genuinely living thing (in both 
cases, we should note, this is done on the basis of the vital characteristics of aer/spiritus).  
       Subsequently, in a move we have seen repeatedly, Seneca expands the causal network 
yet further, now revealing how this terrestrial system also interacts with the heavens. 
Characteristically marking the transition into a deeper level of analysis (“So far I have been 
using lightweight arguments”), Seneca explains: 
 
The entire heaven, surrounded by the fiery aether, the highest part of the world, all these stars, whose 
number cannot be reckoned, all this host of heavenly bodies, and, to omit the others, the sun, which 
orbits so close to us, several times larger than the entire circumference of the earth – all these draw 
their nourishment from the earth and share it among themselves, and are obviously sustained by 
nothing other than the earth’s exhalation (6.16.2)  
 
       After further explaining the proposed role of breath, and again affirming the human body 
analogy (6.18.6), Seneca subsequently considers one last causal possibility: that a 
combination of the four elements is responsible for earthquakes – the view of Democritus and 
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Epicurus (6.20.1 ff.). Even in Epicurus’ case, however, Seneca says that breath is assigned 
the most important role.
73
  
       Finally committing himself to the breath theory at 6.24.1, and reviewing some final 
theories (24.1-26.4), Seneca transitions into the book’s epilogue – via, as he often does, a 
survey of some marvellous effect associated with the phenomenon (6.27.1-6.31.3).  
       In the epilogue, Seneca returns to the theme at the start: fear of death. Here again the 
message is the same: Seneca stresses the need to see death, like earthquakes themselves, as 
parts of the lex naturae: “Death”, he says, “is a law of nature” (mors naturae lex est) 
(6.31.12). 
 
Book 7 
After a short introduction lamenting people’s lack of interest in nature, except when 
something unusual such as a comet appears (7.1.1-7.2.3), as well as the superstitious beliefs 
built up around comets (perhaps occupying a comparable place to the ‘pre-philosophical’, 
poetic explanations at the start of books 3 and 4a), Seneca begins book 7’s investigation by 
distinguishing two opposing camps in cometary theory. These are exemplified by Epigenes, 
who thinks comets are atmospheric phenomena caused by winds or whirlwinds, and 
Apollonius, who believes they are types of planet.  
       Seneca starts with the former. He clearly views this theory as naive, and begins with a 
few simple criticisms based on empirical observation: comets do not match the intensity or 
direction of winds; nor can they account for their regular movement and long duration (7.1.1-
7.9.3). At 7.9.4, however, Seneca introduces a new consideration: “if it (sc. a whirlwind) did 
reach the highest level, where the stars have their courses, it would certainly be broken up by 
the motion that turns the universe.” The orbits up there, he goes on, are “unalterable”, so the 
erratic motions of winds could not persist there. Not only does this objection introduce a 
much more technical conception of the cosmos (cf. the introduction the theory of elemental 
exchange at 3.9.1) but also serves to expand the causal frame of reference, now factoring in 
not just the motion of air, but of the heavens as well. The introduction of the heavens into the 
picture, however, also marks a transition, corresponding to the ‘move underground’ in other 
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books (cf. the move ‘upwards’ at 4b.3.1). Indeed, from this point on, Seneca leaves 
atmospheric explanations behind and now focuses on astronomical causes.
74
 
       The first of these proposes that comets are the result of planets moving into conjunction 
and combining their rays (7.12.1). The main problem with this theory, though, is that it 
erroneously restricts comets to a small part of the sky (another expansive move, requiring yet 
more of the cosmos to be taken into account).  
       Across the subsequent theories we see a showcase of Seneca’s ‘methodology of 
refinement’. Developing the previous theory, then, Seneca introduces one from Artemidorus, 
who suggests that there are actually many more than five planets, including outside the 
Zodiac. It is these, he suggests, that amalgamate rays to form the appearance of comets 
(7.13.1) – a theory that Seneca rejects in surprisingly strong terms, considering that he 
himself accepts a similar one later on. 
       Despite criticising Artemidorus, then, Seneca retains the idea of extra-zodiacal planets. 
He develops the idea, though, by introducing the theory of Apollonius of Myndus: that 
comets are not merely illusions created by the conjunction of planets, but planetary bodies in 
their own right (7.17.1). This, then, is the theory Seneca accepts – at odds, he is keen to point 
out, with his own school. Why depart from orthodoxy? Why does this theory offer a ‘deeper 
level of analysis’? Seneca’s reasons become apparent a few paragraphs later. Explaining why 
these new ‘planets’ do not fall within the Zodiac, he argues:  
 
Who is imposing a single path on the planets? Who is forcing the divine within narrow limits?... Just 
think: is it not more appropriate to the world’s greatness for it to be divided into many paths as it 
rotates, and not to wear away one track while the rest of it lies idle? Do you believe that, in this huge, 
immensely beautiful body, out of the countless stars that adorn the night with their varied beauty and 
will not let it be empty and inactive, there are only five that are permitted to take any exercise, while 
the rest stand still, a static, motionless population? (7.24.1-3) 
 
A little later, Seneca elaborates further on this idea: 
 
Nature does not produce her creation according to a single pattern, but rejoices in variety: she has 
made some things bigger than others, some faster, some stronger...Anyone who thinks that nature is 
not entitled to do something occasionally unless she does it often does not know nature’s power. 
Nature displays comets infrequently and assigns them a different place, different timetables, and 
motions unlike the rest: she wanted to enhance the grandeur of her creation with them too. (7.27.4-5) 
 
It is not merely that this theory explains the phenomenon best (although Seneca maintains 
this as well); it is also that this is the view that makes most sense when considered within the 
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system of nature in its broadest terms, and, in particular, when considered in relation to the 
guiding intentions behind the system.
75
  
       As we have come to expect, the close of the book sees the explicit introduction of the 
divine – though here spoken about in more detail and with greater religious reverence than 
we have seen in previous books. We have seen part of this passage before: 
 
If we enter temples with composure, if when we are going to a sacrifice we have a humble 
demeanour, we straighten our toga, and we assume every mark of modesty, how much more ought we 
to do this when we are arguing about the stars, about the planets, about the nature of the gods...He 
who manages all this, who created it, who laid the foundations for it all and surrounded himself with 
it, and who is the greater and better part of his creation, he eludes our sight and must be perceived by 
thought. Also, many things that are related to the supreme deity and have been assigned power akin to 
his are obscure; or perhaps, what may surprise you more, they both swamp our vision and elude it.  
(7.30.1-4) 
 
Here, at the culmination of the aetiology, Seneca explicitly draws attention to the fact that at 
the ultimate level of causal analysis we must, indeed, engage our minds rather than our 
senses.  
 
Book 1 
In book 1 the themes of visible and invisible, seen and unseen, cluster with much greater 
concentration than in previous books. Already in the preface the theme dominates. As we saw 
earlier, Seneca describes physics as the branch of philosophy that “is not satisfied with the 
eyes” (1 pref. 1), and speaks of his own love of investigating nature “not in her public aspect, 
but...[in] her more remote regions” (1. pref. 3). When god is described a little later, Seneca 
does so in terms similar to the end of book 7, saying that god is “all that you see and all that 
you do not see”.76 In addition to everything else that is important about this preface, then, it 
also aptly sets up a book that will be dominated by the theme of the weakness of vision.
77
  
       The marked emphasis on this theme in book 1 may be down in part to the fact that the 
nature of the phenomena in question – many of which essentially turn out to be little more 
than optical illusions.
78
 However, this unusual emphasis may also, I suspect, be to do with the 
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fact that the (unusually diverse) group of phenomena discussed in this book present 
something of a challenge to certain features of the methodology employed in previous books. 
For instance, all of the phenomena described in this book already occur high up in the 
atmosphere, meaning there is limited scope for the typical upward/downward movements that 
we have seen elsewhere. Furthermore, once Seneca reaches rainbows – quite early on – all 
subsequent phenomena have essentially the same cause, and a relatively simple one at that: 
the sun reflecting from cloud. This limits Seneca’s ability to draw on an ever increasing 
network of causes, on biological models etc. At the same time, this is not to say that we do 
not see any of the features of the usual methodology. Indeed, Seneca finds some quite 
ingenious ways of incorporating many of them anyhow. However, the ubiquity of the 
‘weakness of vision’ theme may in part represent Seneca trying to compensate for where he 
cannot include certain features found in other books – doing so by constantly reminding us of 
the need to go beyond the visible in our engagement with the world. 
       The investigation begins with an account of the various fires we see in the night sky – 
which are said, interestingly, to “hide” (latent) during the daytime (1.1.11). As at the 
beginning of book 7, Seneca begins by reviewing various superstitious beliefs that have built 
up around these supposed ‘portents’, again possibly representing naive, ‘pre-philosophical’ 
views – although here, it should be said, Seneca defends the concept of divination, albeit 
reserving a proper explanation to the  next book (1.1-3). Subsequently, when he offers a more 
‘scientific’ account, the cause he proposes is of a decidedly mechanical nature: “fires of this 
kind occur because the air is subject to violent friction when there is a movement of air 
toward another region, and it does not yield, but battles against itself” (1.1.5). These 
atmospheric conflicts, Seneca now explains, come about as a result of the terrestrial 
exhalations proposed by Aristotle – thereby expanding the network of causes to include the 
region of the earth as well as the air. Interestingly, Seneca also explicitly denies that the stars 
play a role in  causing these phenomena – thereby allowing himself scope to expand the 
causal frame of reference with the next phenomenon. 
       Seneca now discusses so-called ‘haloes’ – rings that form around celestial bodies. He is 
keen to remind us not to rely too heavily on our senses to understand these phenomena: 
“These shapes are formed not far from the earth, and our sight, deceived by its habitual 
weakness, thinks they are located around the star itself” (1.2.3). This phenomenon, too, is 
given a conspicuously mechanical explanation: “When a stone is dropped into a pool, we see 
the water spread out in many circles... Let us think of something similar happening in the air 
too: when it becomes denser, it can experience a blow; when the light of the sun or the moon 
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or any star encounters it, it forces it to recede in expanding circles”.  Here Seneca says that 
these haloes can form around sun, moon or stars; though it seems important that, a little later, 
he seems keen to emphasise that such phenomena only occur rarely around the sun or stars, 
and are mainly caused by moonlight (1.2.10-11). 
       This is important, I think, because when Seneca then moves to the next phenomenon – 
rainbows – it is the sun that is said to be the primary cause. This is significant since while the 
moon is the closest celestial body to the earth, the sun, on the ancient understanding, is the 
second closest. In effect, then, this represents one of Seneca’s expansive moves.  
       As indicated above, though, it is from here that Seneca’s usual strategies hit a barrier. As 
Maurach has shown,
79
 across this section we see another showcase of Seneca’s methodology 
of refinement: he gradually builds the complexity of the theory of how clouds and sun 
interact; but there is little in the way of other causes that he can draw into this system. It is 
interesting, then, that it is precisely in this section that we see an unusually strong emphasis 
on the weakness of vision (although, even now, Seneca manages to integrate aspects of the 
usual methodology). The theme occurs several times in the discussion of rainbows. Having 
suggested (on Aristotle’s authority80) that reflective raindrops are a cause of rainbows, 
Seneca explains how the water-droplets send back our vision,
81
 and notes that in some cases 
eyesight is too weak even to penetrate the air in front of us (1.3.7). Very shortly after this, 
facing an objection that questions why a multitude of raindrop-reflections look like just one 
rainbow, Seneca explains: “I ought to say this: nothing is more deceptive than our eyesight, 
not just with things that distance prevents it from examining minutely, but also with things it 
sees within easy reach” (1.3.9). Significantly, in what follows, Seneca draws attention to the 
especial inability of eyesight to provide insight into the nature of the cosmos:  
 
Go back to the sun itself: this object, which reasoning proves to be larger than the whole earth, our 
eyesight makes so small that wise men maintained that it was a foot across. None of us sees the 
motion of the object that we know is fastest of all [sc. Saturn], nor would we believe it was moving if 
it were not evident that it had moved. The world itself glides with feverish speed and brings risings 
and settings round again in a moment, but none of us is aware of its motion (1.3.10).    
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Indeed, the Epicureans (who famously posited this theory about the sun’s size82), Seneca 
might be implying, fall into all sorts of errors about the cosmos (and in ethics) precisely 
because of their uncritical reliance on sense-perception. We should also note that, although 
the risings and settings of planets such as Saturn (N.B. the most distant planet from the earth) 
that Seneca mentions here do not play a role in the aetiology per se, these could perhaps be 
seen an a attempt to, nevertheless, focus our attention on the cosmos at the broadest scale – a 
scale at which, indeed, our eyes become less useful.  
       Concerns with eyesight and its ability to be deceived are never far away in the following 
sections. 1.4.1-1.8.6 is largely dedicated to the defence of the reflective explanation of 
rainbows, in the first instance against those who would maintain that the colour we see really 
exists in the cloud, rather than being an illusion. As Williams plausibly suggests, this could 
be seen as directed against those who do, indeed, rely too uncritically on their eyes – all too 
ready to regard what they see in the clouds as having substantial reality.
83
 In the same section, 
furthermore, there are numerous references to optical illusions or the ability of reflective 
substances to distort what we see (1.4.3; 1.5.10; 1.5.14; 1.6.2; 1.6.5-6; 1.7.1-3).  
       At the end of the long section on rainbows it is interesting that, drawing again on 
Aristotle, Seneca brings in the effects of the different seasons on the shape of rainbows: 
“Aristotle says that after the autumnal equinox a rainbow can form at any time of day, but in 
summer it can form only when the day is either beginning or drawing to a close”. This is not 
unlike what we saw in book 3 with the introduction of intermittent springs and other 
(including seasonal) natural cycles (cf. also 5.7.1ff, with explanation above). Here, too, this 
may be intended to draw our attention both to the broader range of factors that influence 
rainbows, and, more importantly, to the regularity with which nature operates.          
       There follows a relatively brief discussion of two phenomena that are closely related to 
rainbows: so-called rods, and parhelia. They have essentially the same causes, but differ only 
in shape.
84
 Here again Seneca does not miss an opportunity to draw our attention to the 
propensity of our eyes to be deceived – saying, in reference to a theory about the causes of 
parhelia: “For in our experience also, when several mirrors are arranged so that one has sight 
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of another, they are all filled with images, and one image comes from the real thing, but the 
rest are copies of images” (1.13.1).     
       At 1.14.1, Seneca returns to considering fires that occur in the night sky,
85
 running 
through a dizzying variety of astonishing spectacles that were (in a less light-polluted world) 
sometimes visible in the hours of darkness. Seneca mentions so-called ‘wells’, ‘jars’, 
‘chasms’; ‘quasi-stars’, which shoot across the sky; phenomena the Greeks called sela, which 
can manifest in a variety of ways. I tend to view these phenomena as examples of what I have 
been referring to as ‘paradoxical’ phenomena – particularly because, as has frequently been 
the case, these occur just before the book’s moralising epilogue. In the sheer variety of 
phenomena that Seneca mentions here, however, one cannot help but be reminded of the 
point made in the previous book: that nature “rejoices in variety” (7.27.5). By drawing our 
attention to this level of variety, then, Seneca may again be gesturing towards the ultimate 
explanation of these phenomena. 
       However, it is only once we reach the epilogue (via a final reminder of the weakness of 
vision: 1.15.6) that the divine is explicitly reintroduced into the picture. After the bizarre 
account of Hostius Quadra’s sexual escapades, the book concludes, as we have come to 
expect, with a reflection the providential intention behind the phenomenon of reflection: 
“what nature was thinking of when, after producing real bodies, she also wanted likenesses of 
them to be seen...” (1.17.1-2). The answer? The mirror provides a starting point for coming to 
know oneself, and the cosmos (1.17.2-4). This double function of the mirror, therefore, 
artistically reflects the double function of physical study itself, as, precisely, a means of 
knowing oneself within the context of the cosmos.  
 
Book 2 
The final book of the work, on thunder and lightning, opens with an extended preface 
containing a technical discussion of the nature of aer/spiritus.
86
 The main thrust of this 
passage is to illustrate the unitary nature of air, as well as the unifying role that it plays by 
serving as an intermediary between the earth and the heavens. Already in the preface, then, 
Seneca draws attention to the wider, interconnected, system of nature. What is worth noting, 
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though, is that at this stage in the book he does so in purely material terms – outlining, in 
effect, the material conditions that make phenomena of the air possible.
87
  
       Material causes persist as the investigation proper gets underway. As we have seen 
before, Seneca begins with early (and therefore also ‘naive’88) explanations. Anaxagoras, in 
this case, believed lightning was caused by fire descending from the aether (12.3). As an 
alternative, Seneca then introduces Aristotle’s theory of terrestrial ‘exhalations’. Both of 
these theories, then, serve to bring elemental regions into interaction with each other.         
       As it happens, though, Seneca disagrees strongly with the former theory. The aether, he 
explains, is different from fire at our level: “Everything [in the aether] is ordered, and the 
purified fire, which has been assigned the highest place in the protection of the world, 
encircles the outer edge of this quite beautiful structure. It cannot descend from there...in the 
aether there is no room for any unstable body” (2.13.4). This response is similar to the one we 
saw at 7.9.4; in both cases Seneca dismisses the theory by drawing on a wider appreciation of 
the system of nature, and the interaction between its parts.  
       Nevertheless, despite ruling out descending aether as the cause for lightning, Seneca does 
not entirely rule out interaction between the heavens and the region below: “heat jumps 
across from that powerful fire to the regions below...the lowest level of the aether contains 
something like air, and that the highest level of the air is not unlike the lowest level of the 
aether...At the boundary they gradually blend their properties...” (2.14.1). This, then, serves 
as a convenient way of introducing the Stoic elemental theory (2.15.1), whose introduction 
we have seen in various books at a similar stage in the argument (cf. 3.10.1; 5.5.1), and 
whose purpose here, likewise, seems to be to draw greater attention to the interconnectedness 
of the wider system. 
       After briefly reviewing a number of competing material explanations, Seneca marks a 
shift in tone by announcing: “Now we dismiss our teachers and start to proceed 
independently, and from agreed points we pass on to uncertain ones” (3.21.1). Seneca’s 
cautiousness here clearly stems from the fact that such causes are so far removed from what 
is observable. It is also worth noting, however, that this statement is not unlike a parallel 
piece of rhetoric at 3.12.1, where Seneca asks “Let us look at this again a bit more deeply”. In 
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book 3, just as here, this move came just after the introduction of the theory of elemental 
transformation; and, just as there, his focus now turns to the complex interactions between 
elements that, he speculates, must be involved in the production of thunder and lightning.   
       Seneca’s first task is to explain how fire is produced from air. To do so he draws an 
analogy with how fires are produced at our level (comparable to his claim at 3.16.4 (cf. 
4b.3.6) that nature’s laws apply just as much below, as above ground – perhaps again, 
therefore, drawing attention to the regularity with which nature operates). At both levels, in 
any case, Seneca draws on the theory of elemental transformation, explaining how force can 
bring about a change in elemental state. At 2.25.1, he now also introduces water into the 
equation, facing down the problem of how fire is produced if water is present. Contrary to 
expectations, Seneca says, even water can play a role in the production of fire. Bit by bit, then 
Seneca finds a contributing role for all four ‘quarters’ of nature: earth (through the 
Aristotelian exhalation theory), air and water all coordinate together to produce the fire in 
lightning. 
       From 2.27.1 we see a short excursus into the phenomenon that accompanies lightning: 
thunder. The explanation that Seneca gives is similar to that for lightning, again explained in 
terms of elements interacting: violently moving air interacting with water-laden clouds. 
Already, though we seem to be into the paradoxical phenomena that frame this book’s central 
digression. Seneca mentions the fact that sometimes thunder’s “occurrence makes people 
collapse and die; some live in a daze and completely lose their senses—we call them 
thunderstruck, when that noise from the heavens has deranged their minds” (2.27.3). A little 
later, Seneca records how thunder and lightning are sometimes produced from dry clouds of 
volcanic ash, clouds that “fill the air with burning fires or with winds that scour the earth” 
(2.30.4). In any case, paradoxical phenomena are explicitly introduced at 2.31.1 – though 
here Seneca uses them to finally bring the divine into the picture: “The effects of a lightning-
bolt, should you wish to examine them, are amazing and leave no doubt that its power is 
divine and subtle”. Seneca then describes some truly remarkable effects: coins or swords 
melted inside undamaged containers; wine casks destroyed with the wine left standing frozen 
solid; venomous animals robbed of their poison. 
       The gesture towards the divine, though, also serves as a convenient transition to the 
discussion of Etruscan divination that dominates much of the rest of the book. More 
importantly, though, it heralds a transition to the deepest level of causal analysis. Indeed, in 
what follows we get the longest discussion anywhere in the work of the divine and its role in 
causation. Seneca begins by distinguishing the Stoic view from the Etruscans, who think the 
113 
 
thunderbolt occurs in order to indicate the future. The Stoics, conversely, think that it 
indicates the future because it occurs. The former view, Seneca explains, makes god someone 
with “too much time on his hands”, makes him involved in too much menial detail in his 
organisation of the world (2.32.1-4). The point is an important one; not only does it insert a 
degree of intentional distance between god and destructive phenomena such as thunderbolts, 
but it also emphasises that god’s focus is on the whole rather than part (precisely where, we 
might infer, our attention should be). The importance of focussing on the whole continues as 
a concern when, shortly after, Seneca criticises the Chaldaeans for only taking account of the 
five planets in their predications. Seneca objects: “What else leads the experts on horoscopes 
into most serious error but the fact that they assign control over us to just a few stars, 
although all the stars overhead claim a share of us for themselves?” (2.32.7). The point, 
again, is that we cannot consider individual events in isolation, but must strive to view them 
within the cosmic system as widely as possible.  
       From 2.33 Seneca begins a lengthy and technical discussion of the Etruscan methods of 
divination. While extremely esoteric, the discussion nevertheless allows him to make some 
important points about fate more generally. While he denies that one sign can overrule 
another (“fate cannot be altered” (2.34.4)), he ultimately defends the efficacy of expiations, 
drawing on the Stoic notion of confatalia (2.35.1-2.38.4) – the idea that if one is fated to do x, 
one might also be required (and fated) to do y to bring x about.
89
 As well as disapproving of 
their over-technical categorisations of lightning (2.39.1-2.40.6; 2.47-2.51), Seneca spends 
some time discussing their mythicising descriptions of the gods, such as their equipping of 
Zeus with different types of manubiae (41.1-43.2). Subsequently, though, Seneca explains 
these beliefs in allegorical terms, and insists that the Etruscans essentially share the Stoic 
beliefs about god: 
 
They recognize the same Jupiter as we do, the ruler and guardian of the universe, the mind and breath 
of the world, the master and the craftsman of this creation, for whom every name will be appropriate.  
Do you want to call him fate? You will not be mistaken: he it is on whom everything depends, the 
cause of causes. Do you want to call him providence? You will be right: he it is by whose deliberation 
provision is made for this world, so that it can advance unhindered and unfold its actions. Do you 
want to call him nature? You will not be wrong: he it is from whom everything is born, by whose 
breath we live. Do you want to call him the world? You are not mistaken: for he himself is all this that 
you see, contained in his own parts, sustaining both himself and his creation. The Etruscans too 
believed the same, and they said that lightning-bolts are thrown by Jupiter because nothing happens 
without him. (2.45.1-3)  
                                                 
89
 On which see Long and Sedley (1987), 343; Bobzein (1998), 221ff., esp. 231-3 on this passage of Seneca. 
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With this list of Stoic identifications we encounter some of the strongest evidence for 
Seneca’s theological and ontological orthodoxy. More than this, though, here he spells out in 
the plainest terms the causal primacy of the cosmic rationality of Zeus, “on whom everything 
depends...cause of causes...from whom everything is born...nothing happens without him”.  
       After finishing off his critique of the Etruscan categorisations of lightning, Seneca 
returns to discussing paradoxical phenomena (52.1-53.3), which again frame the central 
digression (albeit here, exceptionally, not a moralising one). In the final, relatively short, 
section of the book Seneca considers a few additional theories on the causes of lightning, as 
well as confirming his own, which is in broad agreement with those of his school. At a 
request from Lucilius for moral benefit (2.59.1), Seneca moves into the final epilogue, 
placating him with another discussion of the fear of death. As always, the divine makes a 
reappearance here. Death, like lightning, is the product of a wider organised system and 
ought to be seen as part of the lex naturae. 
 
* 
 
So ends the Natural Questions. I hope to have illustrated the surprising consistency in which 
Seneca structures the aetiology of each book. Of course, I do not wish to claim that he sticks 
rigidly to an overly formulaic plan. Indeed, as will have been apparent, there is a certain 
amount of variation between the books: the presence or not of a central moralising digression; 
the appeal, or not, to human body analogies; the ways in which the upwards/downwards 
moves are brought about. Some of these variations, as we have seen, are down to the 
phenomenon in question; though no doubt others are simply due to Seneca’s wish to avoid 
monotony. Nevertheless, there are striking consistencies between the books. In particular, the 
start from naive, mechanical and/or material causes, the gradual expansion of the causal 
system under consideration and, most importantly, the culmination of the investigation with 
some consideration of the divine seem to be the core features of the aetiology. Were there no 
other correspondences – though of course there are – I think this would already be significant.  
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– Chapter 4 – 
Re-evaluating False Goods: The Moralising Passages of the Natural Questions 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we focussed our attention on the aetiology of the Natural Questions. 
Rather than mere ‘doxography’, as it has sometimes been described,1 what we instead found 
was an ordered and theoretically grounded arrangement of theories according to a consistent 
plan. This arrangement, it was argued, is guided by the central idea of ‘separating mind from 
body’ – an outcome that, by focussing the mind away from the objects of sense-perception, 
provides the opportunity for the agent to reflect on the world in a way that is not, for once, 
refracted through the prism of the body. 
       This account, however, is clearly incomplete; for as yet we have not explained what are 
in fact the most contentious and perplexing features of the work: the moralising passages.  
As we have seen, these typically address issues that seem frankly irrelevant to the aetiology, 
and might be thought to belong more appropriately within one of Seneca’s more 
straightforwardly ethical works. Indeed, it is this facet of the work that has traditionally led 
scholars to see the Natural Questions as an incoherent mess. 
       In Chapter 1 we saw that a number of more recent studies have striven to demonstrate 
that these passages are, despite appearances, artfully woven into the aetiology through 
complex networks of thematic and lexical devices.
2
 As I argued, though, such approaches 
tend to paper over the really quite overt ways in which these passages are not especially well-
integrated.  I suggested there, though, that we need not necessarily take this lack of 
integration as a failure on Seneca’s part (nor as indicative of a fundamental bifurcation of the 
goals of the work).
3
 Rather, we should be open to ways in which this apparent sense of 
disconnect between the passages might, in fact, be serving a purpose within the overall 
scheme of the work.  
       Having now built up a picture of this overall scheme through our examination of the 
aetiology, though, we are now in a position to judge whether this sense of disconnect can be 
seen as serving any such purpose. Happily, I think it can. As will be argued in this chapter, 
the key to understanding these passages again comes down to the structure of the work. Once 
we take account of the structural scheme elaborated in the previous chapter, it becomes 
                                                 
1
 E.g. Graver (1999), 52-3. 
2
 Stahl (1960),(1964); Waiblinger (1977); Berno (2003); Williams (2012).  
3
 Essentially Limburg’s (2007) position. 
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apparent that these moralising passages occur at very specific points in the work. In 
particular, they occur at just the points in the aetiology where the highest level of causal 
analysis has been reached – the precise point, in other words, at which the reader is notionally 
most ‘separated’ from their body. The purpose of placing them here, I argue, is to confront 
the reader with these vivid descriptions of vice at precisely the point where they are best 
placed to reflect critically on such things. What is crucial, though, is that each vice Seneca 
explores can be explained as an over-attachment to some object that has mistakenly been 
articulated as the good. Indeed, taken together, the vices explored in the moralising passages 
address the paradigmatic examples of misarticulated goods: pleasure, fame, wealth and, 
ultimately, bodily preservation itself. By confronting the reader with these vices in the abrupt 
way that he does, I argue, Seneca hopes to jar us into critical reflection on these supposed 
‘goods’. The hope: to help us to see the error of our habitual attachments, thus contributing to 
the process of re-orienting us towards the cosmos as a whole. 
       We shall begin, in section 2, by considering the essential features of the moralising 
passages. Subsequently, in section 3, we shall turn to consider in detail the therapeutic role of 
these passages within the overall scheme of the work. 
 
2. Characterising the moralising passages 
2.1 Differentiating the moralising passages 
The first thing that must be said about these passages, however, is that they do not form a 
homogenous group.
4
 Indeed, several passages that we might prima facie want to consider as 
belonging to this group – insofar as they are prefaces, digressions, or epilogues, for instance – 
cannot be described as ‘moralising’ at all, but rather belong more or less straightforwardly to 
the aetiology. The most obvious examples are the prefaces to books 5 and 2 – the former on 
the definition of wind, the latter on the nature of air. Again, while the epilogue to book 3 and 
the preface to book 7 certainly have a moral dimension, Gross is right, I think, to argue that 
their primary focus is on the phenomenon at hand: the causes of the flood, and of comets, 
respectively.
5
 Clearly, then, even if these passages are, in one way or another, distinct from 
the main body of the investigation, they nevertheless do not pose the same sorts of difficulties 
that the other, more overtly ‘moralising’, passages do.  
                                                 
4
 This point is also emphasised by Codoñer (1989), 1805 – although I tend to disagree with the way she 
differentiates them. In particular, I do not think that the attempts to quell fear in books 2 and 6 should be seen as 
playing a different (i.e. lower order) role compared to, e.g., the preface to book 1. 
5
 Gross (1989), 142ff.; 281. See also Strohm (1977), 317-18. Indeed, in the case of the flood, at least, this 
suggestion is supported by my argument in the previous chapter that the causes of the flood are investigated by 
precisely the same methodology as Seneca employs with all other phenomena: the methodology of abstraction.  
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       Something similar, I would like to suggest, might also be said of the preface to book 6 – 
or, at the least, there are good reasons not to straightforwardly group this preface with the 
other moralising passages. One reason is that, unlike any of the other moralising prefaces, the 
preface to book 6 is the only one that discusses the phenomenon that is subsequently taken up 
in the rest of the book. This alone makes the preface seem much more closely integrated with 
the aetiology of the book than the other moralising passages. Moreover, although there is an 
overt moralising side in this preface – tackling the fear caused by earthquakes – the character 
and indeed the causes of earthquakes are nevertheless already under discussion in the preface. 
Having described the devastating effects of the recent earthquake in Campania (6.1.1-3), 
Seneca proceeds to discuss the effects of earthquakes in general (6.1.6-7) the ubiquity of 
earthquakes (6.1.11-15), before making an important distinction between divine agency and 
natural causation: “neither the sky nor the earth is shaken by the anger of divinities: these 
things have their own causes, and do not run wild to order, but, like our bodies, they are upset 
by certain defects, and when they seem to be causing harm, they are suffering it” (6.3.1). 
Subsequently, before bringing the preface to a close, Seneca gives a summary of the 
characteristics of earthquakes: 
 
So let us investigate what it is that moves the earth deep below the surface, what disturbs such a heavy 
mass, and what is more powerful than it, so that it shatters that great weight with its force; why the 
earth sometimes shakes, sometimes crumbles and subsides, at other times splits apart and gapes open, 
sometimes preserving for a long time the opening caused by its collapse, at other times swiftly closing 
it up again; why it sometimes diverts into itself rivers known for their great size, sometimes sends out 
new ones, at times opens up veins of hot water, at times makes them grow cold; and why it 
occasionally emits fire through some previously unknown fissure in a mountain or rock, at times 
extinguishes other fires that have been well-known and renowned for centuries. It produces thousands 
of marvels: it alters the shape of the terrain, it brings down mountains, lifts up plains, makes valleys 
swell up, and raises new islands in the deep. (6.4.1) 
 
Again, this sort of introductory summary is totally alien to all the other moralising passages 
(though, in fact, not dissimilar to what we find at the end of the non-moralising preface to 
book 7 (7.2.1-3)). What all of this means is that, again, this preface does not pose anything 
like the same interpretive problems as most of the other moralising passages. As a result, 
while not denying that there is a prominent moralising component to this passage, I 
nevertheless suggest that it should be set apart from the ‘moralising passages’, properly 
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speaking. Instead, I group it with the more ‘scientific’ prefaces to books 2, 5, 7, and the 
epilogue to book 3 (which also has a moralising ‘component’ while also discussing causes).6 
       Perhaps surprisingly, I also think the prefaces to books 3 and 1 should be considered 
separately. Even before there was a degree of agreement regarding the Non praeterit ordering 
of the books, in which book 3 comes first, there was already a consensus that the preface to 
this book, alongside that of book 1, had a programmatic force.
7
 This very fact, though, makes 
their relationship with the rest of the work much less problematic than the other moralising 
passages. Although it has frequently been said that the themes of these prefaces do not tie in 
closely with the physical topics of their respective books,
8
 once we accept that these prefaces 
are programmatic – that is, that they serve as thematic frames for the work as a whole – it 
does not seem overly problematic, to me, that they do not have a very intricate relationship 
with their individual books. As I hope to have shown in the previous chapters, and shall 
illustrate further in this one, these prefaces do indeed serve as useful guides to the work as a 
whole – namely, by stating the central aims of physical study, and by alluding to the Platonist 
context of the work’s argument. Therefore, even if they do not relate in specific and concrete 
ways to their individual books,
9
 they nevertheless play the same crucial guiding role in the 
exegesis of their own books as they do for the rest of the work.  
       The passages that are really in need of explanation (and this remains the majority of 
those with which we started) are those listed in the in the table below: 
 
Book 3 Book 4a Book 4b Book 5 
17.1-18.7  
The ‘Mullet-Eaters’ 
Pref. 1-22  
Lucilius’ flatterers   
13.1-end  
The ‘Snow-Drinkers’ 
15.1-4 
‘Philip’s Men’ 
 
18.1-end 
The misuse of winds 
Book 6 Book 7 Book 1 Book 2 
32.1-end 
The fearsomeness of 
earthquakes 
32.1-2-end 
The dedication to 
luxury over philosophy 
16.1-end 
Hostius Quadra’s 
sexual debauchery 
59.1-end 
The fearsomeness of 
lightning 
 
                                                 
6
 It is worth noting that book 6 is also exceptional in having both a moralising preface and epilogue that discuss 
precisely the same topic: fear of death. This, though, proves less decisive since book 5 also discusses the same 
theme twice: avarice – albeit not in a preface and epilogue, but rather the digression and epilogue.  
7
 This “communis opinio” is noted by Codoñer (1989), 1813. 
8
 On the incongruity of book 1 with the subsequent aetiology, see Zeller (1909), 727 n. 2; Gross (1989), 14. On 
that of the preface to book 3, see Gigon (1991), 333; Rosenmeyer (2000), 109. 
9
 Although, as I suggested in the previous chapter, book 1 does set up the important theme of the seen/unseen 
aspects of nature that is then prominent throughout the book. 
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These passages (the true ‘moralising passages’) share a number of important characteristics – 
precisely the characteristics, in fact, that make them difficult to reconcile with the rest of the 
text. It is primarily these passages, therefore, that are in greatest need of explanation. As I 
shall argue, though, it is the very characteristics that make these passages so difficult to 
integrate that also inform their therapeutic function. 
 
2.2 Thematic and rhetorical discontinuity  
First, as has already been indicated, these passages generally have a fairly weak thematic 
connection to the surrounding physical aetiology.
10
 The strongest examples of this are the 
‘Mullet-Eaters’ digression in book 3,11 and the preface to book 4a on flattery. The former is 
introduced off the back of a reference to underground fish, while the latter really has no 
obvious connection to the subsequent discussion of the Nile whatsoever.
12
  
                                                 
10
 As already noted, though, some scholars would deny this. Stahl (1960), (1964), Waiblinger (1977) and Berno 
(2003) all argue for linkage between the aetiology and the moralising passages. Stahl argues that the aetiological 
sections of the work serve, via such links, to introduce themes that are then explored in abstracto in the 
moralising passages – which Stahl regards as the centrepieces of the work (Stahl’s view is argued against 
strongly by Strohm (1977)). Waiblinger (1977) also sees the moralising passages as central, and argues that the 
aetiology serves to ‘set the mood’ for each of the books (which Waiblinger argues are arranged in pairs, with 
each member of the pair reflecting, respectively, a broadly positive or negative aspect of nature). The mood set 
by the aetiology is then manifested in the moralising passages. Berno (2003) also sees the aetiology as playing a 
broadly ‘introductory’ role for the moralising passages, but also argues that there is overt ‘mirroring’ between 
the attitudes of the notional natural philosopher (as characterised through the aetiology) and the protagonists of 
the moralising passages. However, as I argued in Chapter 1, merely reducing the physics to this kind of 
introductory tool seems altogether unsatisfactory. Nor, in my opinion, do these supposed linkages really do 
much to explain the collocation of ethical and physical themes: just because there is a connection between the 
physics and an ethical theme does not immediately justify a digression upon that theme. Furthermore, as I have 
said before, the fact that generations of scholars have failed to detect these supposed links (as well as the fact 
that there are disagreement over what these links actually are among scholars) should perhaps arouse scepticism 
as to whether Seneca intended for us to detect them. In general, I have more sympathy for Williams’ (2012, esp. 
ch. 2) suggestion that the protagonists of the moralising passages exemplify a kind of ‘narrow mindset’, which 
contrasts starkly with the expansive perspective that Seneca is trying to foster through the aetiology. In what 
follows, I shall try again to give a firmer philosophical grounding to this idea. Again, though, I do not agree with 
Williams’ detection of “tight thematic and verbal linkage between Seneca’s moralising passages and their 
surrounding contexts” (54). Indeed, if what Seneca is trying to illustrate in the moralising passages is, in a sense, 
the polar opposite of what the physics is supposed to bring about (and here Williams and I agree), then it would 
be somewhat strange if Seneca did try to bring the two parts of the text into too close an association. Indeed, I 
shall argue that it is precisely the stark and jarring opposition between the two sections of the work that is 
supposed to produce their therapeutic effect.  
11
 Waiblinger (1977, 43ff.) sees this digression as an artful turning-point in the book, since before this point we 
find a broadly positive depiction of nature, while afterwards a broadly negative one (although this scheme has 
been contested by a number of scholars). The subsequent account of the flood is then to be seen as divine 
punishment for the vicious behaviour in the digression. Berno highlights the parallels between the philosopher’s 
inquiry into nature and the diners’ avid attention to the colours of the dying fish. Berno also links the digression 
to the surrounding aetiology by suggesting that the diners perversely reflect the underground fish that have been 
referred to just before the digression. Williams (2012, 75ff., esp. 79) follows Berno closely here, though also 
Waiblinger, since Williams likewise sees the flood account at the end of the book as a kind of punishment for 
the digression’s moral transgressions. Against the notion of punishment here, see Gauly (2004), 98. 
12
 Limburg (2007, 185) finds one (4
th
/5
th
 century) literary parallel for the association of flattery and the Nile, 
though herself openly admits that this is rather tenuous, and ultimately rejects it as a plausible connection. 
Codoñer (1989, 1812) goes as far as to speculate that this preface may be an adapted epistle, originally intended 
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       Book 4b’s epilogue on the ‘Snow-Drinkers’; Book 1’s epilogue on Hostius Quadra; book 
5’s digression about Philip’s Men; and book 7’s epilogue on the neglect of philosophy in 
favour of luxury all share at least some connection with the aetiological investigation: 4b’s 
tirade against snow-cooled drinks links to the aetiology of snow;
13
 Quadra’s use of mirrors 
links to the optical phenomena that dominate the book;
 14
 the journey of Philip’s Men 
underground is introduced after a reference to winds being emitted from underground 
caves;
15
 book 7’s discussion of the neglect of philosophy in favour of a luxury has some 
relevance to the idea that the causes of comets will require the devoted philosophical 
inquiry.
16
 However, these links, I contend, are so manifestly weak that they actually serve to 
emphasise to the disjuncture between the aetiology and the moral sections.
17
  
                                                                                                                                                        
for the Letters. Other scholars have also pointed to the epistolary character of this preface. For an excellent 
summary of this scholarship, see Limburg, op. cit., 185-195. Berno (2003, 136-7) sees the hyperbole of the 
flatterers as mirrored in subsequent hyperbolic description of the Nile – though this artistic linkage is, in my 
opinion, quite strained. Berno is nearer the mark, I think, with her additional suggestion that the subsequent 
investigation of the Nile enacts a kind of philosophical withdrawal from the sorts of dangers that flatterers pose 
(although it must be noted that what is proposed is not merely the sort of withdrawal frequently proposed in the 
Letters, but an “escape from oneself”). Williams (2012, 95-110; 132ff.) suggests something similar. In this 
respect I partially agree – although I set this within the broader scheme outlined in the previous chapter.  
13
 Waiblinger (1977) thinks the epilogue reflects the light-hearted, almost comic tone of the aetiology. Berno 
sees the Ice-Drinkers as mimicking the philosopher’s mindset in their dogged search for after-dinner palliatives; 
the parallels are enhanced further by various lexical links between the epilogue and aetiology. Williams (2012, 
141ff.) largely follows Berno here.  
14
 Waiblinger (1977, 68ff.) sees the Quadra episode as a counterpoint to the metaphorical ascent towards 
heavenly light carried out in the aetiology. The interpretive problems with this metaphorical ascent are noted in 
Chapter 1 (where I contrast it with the conflicting interpretations of Leitão (1998) and Williams (2012, 58f.) It is 
also worth pointing out that the Quadra episode fits uncomfortably within Waiblinger’s overall scheme of 
positive/negative book-pairs, since book 1 is supposed to be one of Waiblinger’s ‘positive’ books. Berno (op. 
cit, ch. 1) suggests that Quadra’s attention to detail mimics natural philosophical inquiry. Williams (op. cit, 
55ff.) sees Quadra as emblematic of the parochial mindset that he (I believe correctly) thinks characterises all of 
the agents in the moralising passages. Williams, though, also follows Leitão (op. cit.) in seeing Quadra as 
presented in similar terms to god in the preface to this book. I strongly disagree with this – if there is a 
relationship, it is merely one of antithesis: god is nothing but mind, Quadra is nothing but body. I struggle to see 
why Seneca would wish to muddy his ethical message in this way. Scott (1999), while taking a completely 
different approach to integrating the passages, does not appear to see any particular problem with the mirrors 
serving as a thematic link, suggesting merely that “Seneca makes the bridge between physics and ethics by 
discussing the development of the mirror” (60). Similarly Bartsch (2000, 83-4): “In the end, Hostius’ own 
magnified and multiplied images are nothing other than a continuation of the theory that sees in earthly 
reflections the distorted images of the divine”. 
15
 Waiblinger (1977, 74ff.) sees a sinister tone in the build-up to the digression, with Seneca using language 
evocative of the Underworld in his description of winds being emitted from underground caves – language that 
subsequently reappears in the digression. Berno (2003, ch. 5) also detects Underworld imagery, though also 
argues that the men’s search for gold underground mimics the philosopher’s search for obscure causes. Williams 
(2012, 80ff.) again follows Berno closely, though also suggests, rightly I think, that the narrowly-focussed 
perspective of Philip’s men is set in opposition to the expansive perspective fostered by the aetiology. 
16
 Both Berno (2003, ch. 8) and Williams (2012, 85ff.) draw attention to the parallels between the way the 
natural philosopher approaches the study of the heavens, and how the vicious pursue luxury. Williams (85-6), 
for instance, sees a reflection of the natural philosopher’s interest in the seasonal ‘steps’ (gradus) of stars’ 
risings and settings, with the interest of the vicious in their own delicate gait.  
17
 On the tenuousness of these links, see esp. Gauly (2004, ch. 3); Limburg (2007, passim). 
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       The epilogues to books 5, 6 and 2 ostensibly have much stronger connections to their 
books’ topics. Those to book 6 and 2 discuss (at least initially) the fear of the phenomena 
under investigation – earthquakes, and lightning. The epilogue of book 5, meanwhile, 
discusses the misuse of winds – to sail overseas in search of wealth. Nevertheless, despite 
these thematic overlaps, there are some very obvious ways in which these passages are not 
neatly integrated with the aetiology. In book 6, the transition between the aetiology and the 
epilogue is not a smooth one. While reporting some remarkable effects associated with 
earthquakes, Seneca suddenly announces: “So much for explanations, Lucilius, excellent 
man: now for what serves to reassure our minds” (6.32.1). In a very similar move, book 2’s 
epilogue is abruptly introduced when Seneca says “I know what you have long been wanting, 
what you are clamouring for: ‘I would rather,’ you say, ‘not be afraid of lightning bolts than 
understand them’” (2.59.1). Moreover, in both cases, although the discussion of fear of death 
is initially motivated by the phenomena in question, it rapidly becomes a diatribe against fear 
of death in general.
18
 Similarly, although the transition from the aetiology in book 5 is 
(marginally) less abrupt than in those books, what starts off as an apparent justification for 
the lengthy preceding account of the distribution of winds (“providence did not devise winds 
or distribute them in different locations for one reason alone” (5.18.1)) rapidly turns into a 
quite different discussion about man’s propensity to seek wealth through war (esp. 5.18.6f.).19  
       In fact, abrupt transitions are a feature of quite a few of the moralising passages. Like the 
epilogues to book 6 and 2, the epilogue to 4b is introduced with a contrived interjection from 
Lucilius: “‘Why,’ you ask, ‘do you pursue so energetically these absurd inquiries, which 
make a person more learned, not more virtuous?’” (4b.13.1). Meanwhile, the account of 
Philip’s Men, and of Hostius Quadra, are introduced by Seneca’s sudden announcement of 
his wish to tell us a “story”: (5.15.1: “Now let me tell a little story (fabula)...”; 1.16.1: “At 
this point I want to tell you a story (fabella)...” 
       Not only are these passages at odds thematically with the surrounding aetiological 
discussion, therefore, but, even when there is a modicum of thematic continuity, Seneca 
seems to go out of his way to mark or even create a sense of discontinuity through the use of 
these awkward transitional devices.
20
 
                                                 
18
 As noted by Limburg (2007), 332; 339ff.  
19
 Limburg (2007, 243ff.), with comment against Stahl’s theory that the introduction of providence has been 
prefigured in the aetiology. On this, see also Gross (1989) 235; Strohm (1977), 321.  
20
 Limburg (2007, 44ff.) notes the unusualness of abrupt transitions of this sort among contemporary literature – 
although, despite this, she seems sympathetic with Hutchinson’s (1993, 149) suggestion that such transitions 
serve to create an “appearance of firm and lucid organization” (no doubt because Limburg herself contends that 
the unusual form of the work is a product of contemporary literary practice). However, far from creating a sense 
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2.3 ‘False goods’ and the portrait of empiricism in the moralising passages 
Another central feature of these passages is that they all describe a very particular sort of 
vicious behaviour. At first, however, the behaviours exhibited in these passages might seem 
quite diverse, even arbitrary. Berno, for instance, labels them as libido (book 1, Hostius 
Quadra), luxuria (book 3, the ‘Mullet-Eaters’), luxuria (book 4b, the ‘Ice Drinkers’), avaritia 
(book 5, ‘Philip’s Men’ and ‘the misuse of winds’ in the epilogue), timor (books 6 and 2, on 
fear of death), and, again, luxuria (book 7 – though in this case more specifically deliciarum 
dissolutio and impudicitia, because of this epilogue’s reference to effeminate male 
adornments and lavish sexual practices). Trying to make sense of this apparently disparate 
ensemble, Berno considers whether these behaviours can be mapped onto any existing Stoic 
lists of passions, but finds they cannot.
21
 She notes that luxuria in particular fails to find an 
analogue. In fact, though, there are Stoic precedents for the association of these behaviours; 
and, crucially, the context in which they do associate them is in their thought about the good. 
       Let us consider the example of luxuria, since it occurs most frequently in Berno’s list and 
appears problematic. Luxury is, of course, a burning issue for Seneca, and elicits some of the 
most frequent and scathing attacks throughout his corpus.
22
 The problem with luxury, though, 
is not the fact that it is inherently bad.
23
 Rather, what is dangerous about it is its alluring 
quality, the fact that, through its pleasant presentation, it tends to fool people into thinking 
that it is genuinely good.
24
 It is this very mistake, though, that the Stoics say is at the root of 
human misery, leading mankind into all sorts of unnatural, impassioned behaviour
25
 – 
behaviour, that is, such as we find exemplified in the moralising passages themselves. If this 
is right, this raises the possibility that what unifies the apparently diverse set of vicious 
behaviours depicted in the moralising passages is their agents’ collective mistake over the 
nature of the good. 
       Let us briefly review these vicious behaviours – or rather, the objects at which these 
behaviours are directed – to see how this maps out. The Mullet-Eaters of book 3; the Snow-
                                                                                                                                                        
of clear organisation, these abrupt transitions have frequently been seen as evidence of poor organisation on 
Seneca’s part. Gauly (2004, chs. 2-3) thinks that these transitions (along with the thematic discontinuity) serve 
to highlight the layered way which, on his reading, the Natural Questions can be read. On the one hand, the 
moralising is introduced as a concession to the less philosophically interested readers (primarily, the Roman 
popular audience). To more sophisticated readers, however, the disjuncture between the physics and the 
moralising sections emphasises the need to abandon this hopelessly corrupt world and escape into Platonic 
contemplation.  
21
 Berno (2003), 24-5. Consequently Berno argues that these are specifically the vices of Roman society. 
22
 For a complete list of references to Seneca’s attacks on luxury, see Motto (1970), 128-9. 
23
 In moderation, indeed, it can be helpful: Ira 2.20.2 
24
 Galen De Hipp. et Plat. 5.5.19-20; cf. Ep. 124.2. See also Long (1968), esp. 336ff.  
25
 See, for example, SVF 3.378-9; 3.391; 3.480. 
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Drinkers of book 4b;
26
 the luxuriosi of book 7, and – most tellingly – the sexual deviant 
Hostius Quadra in book 1: all of these are surely tokens of pleasure-seeking behaviour.
27
 
Book 5 discusses avarice – that is, the over-valuation of wealth. Book 4a might seem like an 
odd example, since the apparent topic is flattery. In fact, however, the point of this passage is 
to warn Lucilius against being taken in by flatterers, which risks arousing his sense of 
ambition (not to mention the fact that it is presumably ambition that motivates the flatterers 
themselves). Indeed, Seneca explicitly warns Lucilius against ambition: not to become over-
proud of his position as procurator in Sicily (4a pref. 1; 20-2), which is the site of so many 
important historical events. The object that Seneca is really warning against here, therefore, is 
political power. This leaves books 6 and 2, which discuss the fear of death – surely an over-
attachment to life itself, though this might also reasonably be rephrased as an over-concern 
with (narrowly conceived) self-preservation, or even as an over-attachment to the body itself. 
This, in any case, is what Seneca seems to imply at 2.59.4: “Can they [causes of death] do 
any more than separate the body from the mind?”. For the sake of clarity, I tabulate this 
below: 
 
Book 3 4a 4b 5 
Vicious 
Behaviour 
Watching fish die 
at the table 
Being lured/luring 
others into 
political ambition 
Using snow to 
cool drinks 
Going to great 
lengths for wealth 
Caused by over-
valuation of... 
Pleasure Fame/Power Pleasure Wealth 
 6 7 1 2 
Vicious 
behaviour 
Fearing death Pursuing luxury 
over philosophy 
Having elaborate 
sex 
Fearing death 
Caused by over-
valuation of... 
Narrow self-
preservation/the 
body 
Pleasure Pleasure Narrow self-
preservation/the 
body 
 
This might still seem like a rather motley collection of topics. As it happens, though, this very 
list of items – wealth, fame, pleasure and (to a lesser extent) self-preservation – are ones that 
are frequently associated by the Stoics, and they are associated specifically as things that 
                                                 
26
 Alternatively, since the protagonists is this epilogue use snow to cool drinks in order to cure indigestion, this 
passage could be taken to represent not pleasure, but health – another indifferent that we might be inclined to 
mistakenly think of as a genuine good. However, Seneca puts a much stronger emphasis on the act of eating 
luxurious food than the desire to, as it were, stay healthy, so I tend to think that luxury/pleasure is the ‘good’ in 
question here. 
27
 The preponderance of passages dedicated luxury/pleasure is not doubt in part down to Seneca’s personal gripe 
with luxury, though likely also because he sees luxury/pleasure as a particularly dangerous and commonplace 
misidentification of the good. At Ep. 110.10, for instance, he says that indulging in pleasure is “the beginning of 
all troubles”. 
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people often mistakenly take to be goods. For instance, all four of these ends are mentioned 
together by Cicero at De officiis 1.66-8. While instructing his son to pursue only what is 
honestum, Cicero emphasises that this must be done even when it endangers life, and goes on 
to warn him not to become distracted by pleasure, wealth, and the desire for glory. 
Elsewhere, Marcus Aurelius mentions wealth, pleasure and fame in one breath, chiding 
himself for the very mistake we are talking about: regarding them as good.
28
 Diogenes 
Laertius also associates pleasure, wealth and fame (though he also mentions beauty, strength 
and noble birth),
29
 citing them as examples of Stoic ‘indifferents’ – presumably choosing 
these specific examples precisely because these are the things that are typically regarded as 
good rather than merely indifferent.
30
 Meanwhile, in a related context, Stobaeus lists “love of 
pleasures and riches and honours” as examples of objects towards which the passion of 
‘appetite’ (τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν) is directed.31 It would appear, then, that it is no coincidence that 
Seneca chooses to exemplify agents who pursue these particular ends; for it seems that the 
Stoics saw these as paradigmatic examples of misarticulated goods. 
       This focus on ‘goods’ is obviously already significant considering the dialectical context 
in which I locate the Natural Questions. But what seems especially indicative is that the 
range of ‘goods’ discussed in these passages are precisely the things that, according to the 
Platonist line of thought, an empiricist would be bound to consider as the good. According to 
this, the inescapable egoism that empiricism gives rise to means that an empiricist agent 
could only ever articulate the good in these terms – in terms of pleasure, wealth and the rest.  
       What is truly striking, though, is that Seneca’s descriptions of the protagonists 
emphatically draws attention to their reliance on sense-perception, and even seems to portray 
this as the cause of their extreme egoism.
32
 This means that the agents in these passages 
actually end up looking rather like caricatures of empiricist agents, as portrayed by the 
Platonists. The most arresting example of this tendency is the lurid depiction of Hostius 
Quadra in book 1. If we recall, this passage describes Quadra’s use of mirrors to observe 
himself during his elaborate orgies. Several scholars have pointed out Quadra’s extreme 
inward-focus in this passage: surrounded by mirrors, he can almost literally see nothing other 
                                                 
28
 10.30. 
29
 Incidentally, a number of these additional misidentified goods are also alluded to in passing by Seneca, 
though without being thematised in the same way: beauty: 7.31.2; strength: 1.5.14 (not in a moralising passage); 
noble birth: 4a pref. 15. 
30
 7.102; cf. 7.115. 
31
 SVF 3.394. 
32
 Berno (2003, passim) also draws attention to the vicious protagonists’ emphatic reliance on, in particular, 
vision – as does Williams (2012), esp. ch. 2. Williams, though, also connects this with the parochial mindset of 
these characters and, as I do, sees it as contrasted with the expansive thrust of the aetiology. 
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than the image of his own body.
33
 Interestingly, as Berno observes, Quadra’s crime in this 
account appears not simply to be the sexual acts themselves as much as it is his seeing 
them.
34
 Seneca (rather too graphically) berates Quadra for “filling not just his mouth but his 
eyes”, and exclaims that, “as though it were not enough to submit to unheard of, unknown 
things, invited his eyes to watch” (1.16.3-4).  
       Several of these features recur in the digression in book 3.
35
 Having described the 
Mullet-Eaters’ fascination with the changing colours of the dying mullet, Seneca comments 
that they are “not content with teeth, and stomach, and mouth, they are gluttons with their 
eyes as well.” Again, this obsession with visual pleasure is associated with selfish egoism: 
“None of these people sits by a dying friend, none can endure seeing the death of his own 
father, though he has prayed for it. Hardly any of them follows a family funeral procession to 
the pyre! The final hour of a brother or neighbour is deserted, but people race to the death of 
a mullet”. (3.18.6-7).  
     Culinary pleasure features again in the epilogue to book 4b – although in this case it is the 
pain that follows over-indulgence that motivates the protagonists, who seek ever-colder 
palliatives to sooth their indigestion. The egoistic nature of this behaviour is emphasised by 
the fact that the diners become, in a sense, closed off from the outside world. For, the 
constant oscillation between ever more extreme sensations – hot, cold, pleasure, pain – seems 
to render the diners practically insensate: “the unremitting self-indulgence, which has already 
overcooked their minds, drives what is left of them into a state of frenzy and inflames them 
with longing for something ever colder...For just as we sprinkle cold water on people who 
have fainted or are in a daze, so that they may recover their senses, so their internal organs, 
dulled by their vices, can feel nothing unless you shock them with extreme cold” (4b.13.7). 
Sensory over-stimulation results, almost paradoxically, in the Snow-Drinkers’ complete 
inability to perceive the world around them.
36
 
       In the epilogue to book 7 (the last in our group of pleasure-seekers) we again find a 
strong emphasis on these agents’ visual fixation. Seneca pours scorn on the obsession with 
physical appearance gripping Roman men: “With our sleek, glossy bodies, we have overtaken 
female beauty treatments; we men wear prostitutes’ colours that married women would not 
put on; we tiptoe along with delicate, mincing steps (we do not walk but parade); we adorn 
                                                 
33
 Berno (2003), 35ff; Leitão (1998), 146; Bartsch (2000), 82ff.; Williams (2012), 55ff., esp. 60. 
34
 Berno (2003), 35ff; see also Bartsch (2000), 83. 
35
 As noted by Berno (2003), ch. 2, followed by Williams (2012), 84-5. 
36
 A point also made by Berno (2003), 158-60. On the parochial mindset that this leads to, see Williams (2012), 
143-4. 
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our fingers with rings; a jewel is arranged on every joint”. The role of vision and the senses in 
bringing about this behaviour is made clear when, a few lines later, Seneca says the search for 
new pleasures is never-ending because “our eyes, our hands are its slaves” (7.31.2-32.1).37 
       In the preface to book 4a, Seneca contrasts the devious and self-serving advances of 
flatterers with Lucilius’ disinclination to political advancement and dutiful loyalty to his 
friends. Interestingly, the very efficacy of flattery is said to depend on its visibility. 
“Blandishments are wasted if hidden”, a certain Plancus is reported to have said, while 
Seneca himself adds that “the more open flattery is...the swifter its victory”. However, despite 
the flatterer’s apparent openness, (and, we might add, despite their appearance of promoting 
the interests of others) Seneca is keen to emphasise that they are motivated entirely by self-
interest. Demetrius, we hear, once told a powerful freedman (ironically, we can assume) that 
he had discovered “an easy path to wealth on the day he repented of his good intentions”. 
With flattery, Demetrius says: “I’ll teach how they can make money not just easily but 
enjoyably, and can rob victims who relish it” (4a pref. 7). It should also be noted that the very 
reason that Seneca warns Lucilius about flatterers is down to the potential they have to inflate 
his own sense of self-regard: “I shall draw you far away from your province to ensure that 
you...do not begin to be pleased with yourself...” (4a pref. 21; cf. 1-2). 
       In the first of two discussions of avarice in book 5, the digression on Philip’s Men again 
stresses the act of seeing. Having journeyed underground for several days, the men “saw” 
(vidisse) huge lakes and rivers, upon which they “could not help shuddering at the sight” (non 
sine horrore visos, my emphasis). Seneca subsequently criticises the men for “searching in 
the darkness for what was inadequately concealed” (5.15.1-2). Again, the result of sensory 
fixation is a kind of dissociation from the outside world; for their pursuit of hidden wealth 
leaves them literally isolated, deep underground. Seneca stresses this, contrasting their 
situation with man’s natural orientation towards the cosmos: “What great hope made them 
leave the daylight behind? Human beings stand erect, facing the stars...” (5.15.3).  
       In an inversion of this picture, the protagonists of this book’s epilogue travel across the 
whole earth, braving the oceans in search of distant lands. In one sense, such an endeavour 
might seem to be in accord with the ‘expansive’ aims of the physics, helping to foster an 
appreciation of the wider world. Indeed, Seneca himself says that one of the providential 
purposes behind the winds is precisely to facilitate exploration and communication between 
distant peoples (5.18.4). The problem, though, is the motivation: not communion, but 
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 See Williams (2012, 85) for the emphasis on bodily devotion here. 
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conquest. Rather than driving a greater affinity with the wider world, our obsession with 
wealth sets us at odds with the rest of humanity.
38
  
       Finally, then, the epilogues to books 6 and 2 both discuss the fear of death. These 
passages have a different character from those considered so far: shocking anecdotes of 
vicious individuals are replaced by simpler forms of exhortation. This is perhaps due to the 
slightly different object at stake here – no longer an external object, but one’s very life. This, 
for one thing, makes the emphasis on sense-perception that we find in the other passages 
somewhat more difficult to contrive. Regardless of this, though, Seneca makes clear that the 
underlying mistake of this vice, and its outcomes, are broadly the same as in other passages. 
Self-centred tendencies are again at the forefront, vividly evoked by Seneca’s comparison of 
one fearing his death to “someone who, when placed in the ranks of those about to die, asked 
as a favour to be the last to face the executioner” (2.59.7). Moreover, as already mentioned, at 
2.59.4 Seneca characterises fear of death as precisely an over-valuation of one’s own body 
(cf. the denigration of the body at 6.32.3). Considering the Platonist debate, this emphasis on 
over-attachment to one’s own body is especially significant; for, according to Anon., it is the 
precisely at the body where most people’s sphere of self-interest ends. Characterised in this 
way, the fear of death represents the quintessential manifestation of the egoistic tendencies 
that, according to the Platonists, an empiricist agent is bound to exhibit. 
       Why, then, should Seneca present the protagonists of the moralising passages in this 
way? Does this not risk undermining his own point – that empiricist agents need not turn out 
like this? Is Seneca agreeing with the Platonists, after all? In a sense, in fact, I think he is 
agreeing with the Platonists. He is acknowledging that the reason why most people do behave 
in ways analogous to the protagonists of the moralising passages is, indeed, because of their 
over-reliance on sense-perception. Most people, Seneca is saying, put far too much store by 
the senses as a means of identifying what is good for a human being – a mistake that cannot 
but leads us astray. This, indeed, is a point that Seneca makes in his 124
th
 Letter: 
 
If the senses were what ascertain the good, we would not reject any pleasure, since there is no 
pleasure that does not entice and please us...Yet we disapprove of gluttons and people addicted to sex, 
and we despise those who are dissuaded from every manly undertaking by fear of pain. If the senses 
were the criteria of good and bad, how would these people do wrong by obeying them? For you have 
ceded to the senses the authority to decide what to pursue and what to avoid. But obviously it is 
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 A point made by Seneca himself at Ep. 90.36. 
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reason that has charge of that. Reason settles questions about the happy life, virtue, and the 
honourable, and likewise about the good and the bad. (124.2-4, trans. Long and Graver).  
 
With this in mind, this emphasis on the senses can initially be seen as serving two related 
functions. On the one hand, it serves to further clarify the internal goals of the work. As 
Seneca says at the start of the work, the aim of studying physics is to separate our minds from 
our bodies by investigating the hidden causes of nature. In the moralising passages, then, 
Seneca essentially explains why we need to do this: if we do not, we will end up acting like 
them. On top of this, though, the emphasis on sense-perception helps to foreground the issues 
to do with empiricism that are relevant within the broader philosophical context – in effect 
serving as a further signpost, alongside the Platonic allusions, for Seneca’s engagement with 
the ongoing debate over this problem. 
       At the same time, though, these considerations alone cannot tell the full story of the 
moralising passages and their role in the work as a whole. While these thoughts might 
account for the emphasis on sense-perception, they do not account for many of the other 
unusual features shared by these passages. In particular, these considerations do not explain 
the emphatic rhetorical and thematic discontinuity between these passages and the 
aetiological sections of the work. Nor do they explain the tendency to indulge in detailed 
descriptions of very specific, and at times bizarre, instances of vice (a point we shall return to 
later). To begin to unpick these peculiarities, we first need to consider another crucial element 
of commonality between these passages.  
 
2.4. The positioning of the moralising passages in the work 
Again it is the structure of the work that holds the key. In the previous chapter we saw that 
each book is structured according to a scheme in which we move from material, mechanical 
(and often visible) causes, through ever more complex and abstract ones, culminating with 
divine reason. Accompanying and indeed as a result of this process, I have suggested, the 
soul is gradually distanced from the body, a process that reaches its climax (the point where 
the soul is, as it were, ‘most distant’ from the body) along with the discovery of divine 
reason. Considering the direction of this dynamic, what is striking is that it is precisely at the 
end of this process that we encounter the great majority of the moralising passages – directly 
alongside the highest level of causal analysis. 
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       Let us briefly review this. The episode of the Snow-Drinkers in the epilogue in book 4b
39
  
occurs concurrently with the consideration of nature’s intention behind the distribution of 
water. The epilogue to book 5 occurs, very similarly, alongside the consideration of nature’s 
intention behind distributing winds. The epilogue to book 6 occurs after the discussion of the 
primary role of spiritus/πνεῦμα as a cause of earthquakes,40 and Seneca reminds Lucilius that 
death (like earthquakes) is a part of the naturae lex. In book 7, the dedicatees of luxury are 
juxtaposed directly with Seneca’s reflection on the modesty we should have towards the 
gods, and the hidden character of the divine. Hostius Quadra’s antics are followed again by a 
reflection on nature’s intentions, this time behind creating mirrors. Finally, the epilogue to 
book 2, on fear of death, occurs shortly after the work’s most detailed description of the 
divine (within the discussion of divination),
41
 and contains a further reminder to see death 
(and, by implication, lightning) as part of the universal law. 
       The vicious episodes that we find in the epilogues, then, consistently occur just as, or 
shortly after, the most profound level of causal analysis has been reached. In fact, this is 
regularly reached within the epilogue itself, so that the vicious episode is directly juxtaposed 
with the introduction of the divine. 
       Of course, it will no doubt have been noted that several of the moralising passages do not 
actually occur in epilogues. If the hypothesis is that these moralising episodes crop up just as 
the highest level of causal analysis has been reached, the fact that some occur, say, in the 
middle of the book – as is the case with books 3 and 5 – might seem problematic. In fact, 
though, these anomalies actually serve to corroborate the hypothesis. For, although it is true 
that Seneca generally reaches the highest level of causation near the end of each book, he 
sometimes reaches this stage much earlier. And, strikingly, essentially
42
 the only two 
occasions when this happens are in these very books, just before the moralising passages 
occur.  
       In book 3, if we recall, the digression on the Mullet-Eaters occurs at the end of a clear 
series of ever-deepening causes. From the mechanical theories that ‘backflow’ or rainfall fills 
rivers, Seneca then explores the role of underground caverns. From here he introduces the 
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 The first moralising epilogue in the work (on the Non praeterit ordering) for which, in any case, we have 
evidence – book 3 has no moralising epilogue (we shall return to the significance of this momentarily), and the 
latter half of book 4a is lost. 
40
 Albeit with an intervening passage considering several paradoxical phenomena. I shall return to consider the 
significance of these, and the importance of their locations in the work, in the final section of this chapter. 
41
 Again, a passage of paradoxical phenomena intervenes here. 
42
 The only possible addition being book 2, where the highest level of causal analysis is already reached in the 
central ‘digression’ on divination. The fact is, though, that this ‘digression’ is so long that it almost reaches the 
end of the book – and, indeed, is followed shortly after by this book’s moralising epilogue. 
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role of elemental transformation, which is used to introduce the concept of nature – first, as a 
vast system of interconnected mechanical causes; then as a living system governed according 
to the model of our own bodies; finally, as a providential agent governing natural phenomena 
with complete regularity. It is at precisely this point, however, that the Mullet-Eaters 
digression occurs. 
       The situation is very similar in book 5. Following the discussion of the atomist 
explanation of wind, we again see the move underground, and the subsequent introduction of 
a human body analogy – although one which is subsequently refined from a mere biological 
(digestive) analogy, to one based instead on the air’s vitality and ability to self-move (5.5.1-
5.6). Subsequently, Seneca considers the causes of several winds individually – whose 
purpose, I argued in the previous chapter, is to illustrate the organised way in which winds 
occur across time (predawn, just after dawn, later in the day...). The full providential 
significance of this distribution, it is true, is not fully revealed until the epilogue, when 
Seneca reveals the purpose behind this ubiquitous distribution of winds (facilitating the 
constant circulation of air, and rain, for instance). However, we should note the striking 
parallel with book 3. For immediately preceding the digression in that book Seneca likewise 
considers the regularity of nature across time, in that case via the consideration of intermittent 
springs and other natural cycles.  
       Despite not occurring at the end of the book, therefore, these digressions nevertheless 
conform to the pattern: occurring just at the point when Seneca has explained the phenomena 
by referring them to the organisation and regularity that is found throughout the natural 
system.  
       Prima facie, a more difficult case is the preface to book 4a. This is because the 
moralising episode in this book occurs right at the beginning of the book. This is ostensibly 
problematic since it appears to mean that there is no opportunity to reach the usual ‘high’ 
level of causal analysis beforehand; nor, moreover, is there any relevant discussion of 
providence or the like in the preface itself – nor, for that matter, in the rest of the surviving 
book. Indeed, part of the problem, of course, is that the book is only partially extant. It is 
therefore possible that this apparent exception to the pattern could have been made sense of if 
we knew what happened in the remainder of the book. Fortunately, however, I do not think 
that we need to resort to such speculation. For, although it is true that there is no opportunity 
to reach the usual level of causal abstraction before the moralising episode in book 4a, we 
must also, I think, consider the position of this preface immediately following book 3.  
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       Indeed, we should note that despite all the controversy over the book-order in the Natural 
Questions, no one has ever questioned the fact that book 4a follows book 3. This is for the 
very good reason that Seneca both explicitly postpones the discussion of the Nile in book 3 
(3.1.2), and then also explicitly refers back to this postponement at the start of the 
investigation in book 4a (4a.1.1: quaeram enim tecum, id quod libro superior distulit, quid ita 
Nilus...abundet). It is absolutely certain, therefore, that book 4a followed immediately after 
book 3.  
       The significance of this begins to become apparent when we consider how book 3 ends. 
Like other books, book 3 certainly ends with a strong emphasis on the divine – at, therefore, 
the highest level of causal analysis. However, emphatically unlike all other books, book 3 
does not end with a moralising passage – remaining, as it were, at the highest level of causal 
analysis.
43
 This is especially significant, though, when we consider that the following book, 
book 4a, is the only book that begins with a moralising passage, properly speaking.
44
  
       This by itself might already hint at a special relationship between these books; but there 
are other more compelling reasons to suggest this.
45
 Principal among these is the very close 
relationship between the phenomena explored in these books. Book 3 discusses rivers in 
general; book 4a discusses the Nile. In addition, a number of scholars have drawn attention to 
numerous parallels between Seneca’s description of the cataclysmic flood at the end of book 
3, and the subsequent flood of the Nile. Both are, of course, kinds of flood; but there are even 
close parallels in the way Seneca describe them. These correspondences have, indeed, led a 
number of scholars to regard these books as a kind of unit: Waiblinger, for instance, uses 
these two books as the basis for his theory that all the books are grouped in pairs; Gigon, 
meanwhile, argues that book 4a is a kind of appendix to book 3.
46
  
       All things considered, this seems too much of a coincidence to ignore. I maintain, 
therefore, that these two books function as a unit, and between the end of book 3 and the start 
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 As argued in section 2.1 above: although there is certainly a moralising component to this epilogue (cf. the 
prefaces to books 6 and 7), it does not have what is probably the key feature of the other moralising passages: a 
detailed focus on a particular sort of vice.  
44
 Again, as argued in section 2.1. 
45
 In addition to the correspondences between the phenomena, it is also worth highlighting the relationship 
between the prefaces to these books. In the preface to book 3, Seneca is primarily addressing himself: 
commenting on his own old age, his own “misspent life” (in politics?) and the need for him to turn his mind “to 
contemplation of itself” (3 pref. 2). Meanwhile, the preface to book 4a is addressed at Lucilius, at his need to 
withdraw from politics, and to ‘escape’ from himself. In a sense, then, the prefaces form a kind of pendant pair, 
with the first addressed to the author himself, the second to the work’s addressee. This is suggested by 
Waiblinger (1977), 103. 
46
 Waiblinger (1977, ch. 4); Gigon (1991), 322-3. Gigon accepts the Grandinem ordering of the books, in which 
books 3 and 4a come last. Gigon, in fact, regards book 3 as an appendix as well – in this case to book 6, because 
of the reference to underground caves filled with water in that book. Book 4a, then, is a kind sub-appendix. Cf. 
Williams (2012, ch. 3) who also discusses parallels between the two books. 
132 
 
of book 4a we get the same kind of contrast between a profound level of causal analysis and 
sensational description of moral vice that we have seen to be characteristic of the other 
moralising passages. 
       In sum, while there is certainly a degree of variation in the way Seneca implements this 
strategy, I think we do nevertheless find him consistently positioning these passages 
according to a coherent plan. Namely, the moralising episodes are introduced just after or 
alongside points at which the aetiology has reached the highest level of causal analysis. This 
is supposed to correspond, I contend, to the point at which the mind is, as it were, at its most 
detached from the body. The question now, though, is what this strategy is supposed to 
achieve.  
 
3. The therapeutic role of the moralising passages 
To begin to answer this question, let us pause briefly to reflect on what we have seen so far. 
The features of these passages that we are now trying to make sense of are: (i) their abrupt 
interjection within the aetiology, which is jarring both rhetorically and thematically (ii) the 
fact that their protagonists seem to typify precisely the sort of attitudes that Seneca is trying 
to counter with the physics (iii) that they occur just at the point where the most profound 
level of causal analysis has been reached.  
       Now, it seems to me that, if only (ii) were the case, we might suspect that the purpose of 
these passage is simply to show us what, as it were, we are trying to get away from: we study 
physics, the idea would go, in order to avoid falling into the vices displayed in these 
passages.
47
 As such, the moralising passages could simply be seen as a way of helping to 
frame the goals of the physics. This, then, is roughly what I suggested at the end of section 
2.3, and I do not think it is entirely incorrect, merely incomplete. For when we also factor in 
(iii), in particular, one begins to suspect that this is not the full story. The fact that these 
passages occur at very specific points in an already tightly woven and carefully conceived 
structure suggests, to me, that they have a role to play that is much more closely integrated 
with the aims of the aetiology.  
       Some crucial clues as to what this role might be come, once again, from the prefaces to 
books 3 and 1. It is at the end of the preface to book 3, if we recall, that Seneca says in 
explicit terms what he thinks the benefits of studying physics are. So far in this study we have 
focussed primarily on the goal of separating mind and body, since this idea recurs several 
                                                 
47
 This role is suggested by Limburg (2007, 267), and is, at risk of over-simplifying, essentially what I take 
Williams’ position to be.  
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times in the work, and thus seems most prominent. In reality, though, this goal is actually just 
one item in what is presented as a three-point programme of benefits that, Seneca says, can be 
derived from the study of nature. Let us consider this passage again: 
 
Ad hoc proderit nobis rerum inspicere naturam: primum discedemus a sordidis; deinde animum 
ipsum, quo summo magnoque opus est, seducemus a corpore; deinde in occultis exercitata subtilitas 
non erit in aperta deterior. Nihil est autem apertius his salutaribus quae contra nequitiam nostram 
furoremque discuntur, quae damnamus nec ponimus.  
 
For these reasons it will be useful for us to investigate nature: first, we shall leave behind what is 
sordid; next, we shall keep our mind, which needs to be elevated and great, separated from the body; 
next, when our critical faculty has been exercised on hidden matters, it will be no worse at dealing 
with visible ones. And nothing is more visible than these remedies which are learned in order to 
counter our wickedness and madness, things we condemn but do not forsake. (3 pref. 18) 
        
What Seneca describes here seems, in fact, to be some sort of process (primo...deinde... 
deinde). The first two stages can, I think, be seen broadly to describe the role of the aetiology 
outlined in the previous chapter. First, the study of nature removes us from sordidis (by, that 
is, focussing our attention away from the perceptual things that normally dominate our 
attention). Subsequently (deinde) the activity achieves a separation of mind and body 
(through the methodology abstraction). So far, so familiar. However, it is the third stage in 
this sequence to which we should now pay attention. Here Seneca says that once our mind 
has been exercised on hidden matters – in other words, once we have achieved the separation 
of mind and body – we will then, at that point, be better at dealing with ‘apparent things’ 
(aperta – opposed to occulta). Now, it does not seem too much of a stretch to think that the 
‘apparent’ (or, as Hine translates, ‘visible’) things to which Seneca refers here are meant to 
represent precisely the sorts of things that preoccupy the protagonists of the moralising 
passages. For one thing, these aperta are clearly correlated with the aforementioned sordidis; 
but adding to the plausibility is the fact that it is precisely ‘apparent’ or ‘visible’ things that 
do preoccupy the protagonists of the moralising passages, as we have seen.
48
 If we are right 
to assume this, then what Seneca appears to be saying is that once we have investigated 
hidden matters, and thus achieved a degree of ‘separation’, we will then be in a position to 
turn back to the sorts of ‘sordid’ things that preoccupy the agents in the moralising passages – 
things which, in all probability, preoccupy us as well.   
      What is significant about this, if correct, is that it seems to fit perfectly with what we have 
found regarding the location of the moralising passages in the work. For, as we have seen, it 
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 Williams (2012, 55-6) makes a similar connection. 
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is precisely after Seneca has been exploring ‘hidden things’ – typically, divine reason itself – 
that he does turn our attention back towards ‘sordid things’, as exemplified in the moralising 
passages.  
       If this is indeed Seneca’s plan, the question now is why he should think that we would be 
better at dealing with such things having gone through the process of ‘separation’. The 
answer, I believe, is closely connected with what was said in the previous chapter concerning 
the purpose of this ‘separation’. There it was argued that isolating the soul from the body was 
useful because it minimised our mind’s focus on the body, thus creating a certain sense of 
‘critical distance’ from it. This distance, I suggested, is intended to provide an opportunity for 
us to consider the world around us in a way that is not, for once, refracted through the prism 
of the body. This helps to draw one’s attention to one’s own true rational nature, in turn 
highlighting the profound sense of affinity that exists between human beings and the cosmos. 
In this way, I suggested, Seneca hopes to create psychological conditions where we are best 
placed to begin to extend our sense of self-interest beyond the body, and towards the cosmos. 
       It seems plausible, though, that this same sense of critical distance might also provide an 
ideal opportunity to reflect on the ‘sordid’ and ‘apparent’ things that, in ordinary 
circumstances, tend to preoccupy us. For, having freed ourselves from the distractions of the 
body, having grown aware of our own quintessentially rational natures, we would surely be  
well-placed – indeed, virtually primed – to see the error of attaching so much value to things 
such as pleasure, wealth and the rest. 
       The core of this idea is, I believe, already implicit in the passage from the preface to 
book 3. However, in the equally programmatic preface to book 1, we get further 
confirmation. What we seem to get, in fact, is an illustration of this process in action. Having 
scolded Lucilius for not having yet ‘broken free’ from himself, Seneca begins his figurative 
depiction of the soul soaring into the heavens. In the course of this he says:  
 
...consummatum habet plenumque bonum sortis humanae cum calcato omni malo petit altum et in 
interiorem naturae sinum venit. Tunc iuvat inter ipsa sidera vagantem divitum pavimenta ridere et 
totam cum auro suo terram, non illo tantum dico quod egessit et signandum monetae dedit, sed et illo 
quod in occulto servat posterorum avaritiae. Non potest ante contemnere porticus et lacunaria ebore 
fulgentia et tonsiles silvas et derivata in domos flumina quam totum circuit mundum, et terrarum 
orbem superne despiciens angustum ac magna ex parte opertum mari, etiam ea qua extat late 
squalidum et aut ustum aut rigentem, sibi ipse dixit: “hoc est illud punctum quod inter tot gentes ferro 
et igne dividitur!”  
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It [the soul] has consummated and fulfilled the blessings of human destiny only when it has trampled 
over every evil and has sought the heights and entered the inner recesses of nature. Then, as it 
wanders among the stars themselves, it takes delight in laughing at the paved floors of the wealthy 
and at the whole earth with its gold—I refer not just to what it has disgorged and given to the mint for 
stamping into coinage, but also to what it keeps hidden for the greed of posterity. The mind cannot 
despise colonnades, and ceilings gleaming with ivory, and topiary forests and rivers channelled into 
houses until it has toured the entire world and until, looking down from on high at the earth – tiny, 
predominantly covered by sea, and, even when it rises above it, mainly uncultivated, and either burnt 
or frozen – it has said to itself, “This is that pinprick that is carved up among so many nations by 
sword and fire!” (1 pref. 7-8).  
 
Here, indeed, we see something like a playing-out of the three-point programme described in 
the preface to book 3. First, the soul is separated from “evil” (mala, cf. sordida) by seeking 
the “inner recesses” of nature. As it subsequently wanders amongst the stars (i.e. having 
achieved the separation of body and soul) it then (tunc) is able to turn back and re-evaluate 
(“laugh at”; “despise”) the things to which it was previously attracted. Indeed, tellingly, the 
things that the soul turns back to laugh at are precisely the sorts of tangible things that occupy 
the agents in the moralising episodes: wealth, political dominion, visually pleasing things. 
       This analysis, if correct, serves to explain the third (iii) of the key features of these 
passages: why the moralising passages are positioned where they are. The reason, we can 
now conclude, is because it is here that we most ‘detached’ from our usual body-focussed 
perspective, and thus are in the best possible position to re-evaluate our attachments to the 
things that normally dominate our attention. However, the same analysis also now allows us 
to explain (ii) in greater detail: why the protagonists of these passages seem to typify the sorts 
of attitudes and behaviours that Seneca is trying to lead us away from. For, if the purpose of 
these passages is to provoke moral reflection on a certain sort of moral error – namely, on our 
erroneous attachments to false goods – it would make sense for these passages to exemplify 
that which Seneca wishes us to reflect upon.  
       What is still not immediately clear, though, is (i); how do we explain the rhetorical and 
thematic discontinuity between these passages and the surrounding aetiology? What I would 
like to suggest is that that these features are intended to enhance the potential of these 
passages to promote ethical reflection. In particular, I suggest that the stark contrast in themes 
and sudden introduction of these passages is supposed to jar us – a jarring effect that is made 
all the stronger when combined with the process of ‘separation’ that precedes. As we have 
seen, physical study draws us away from ourselves, exposes us to what is divine in nature 
and, by the same token, what is divine in ourselves. It is, I suggest, with careful calculation 
that Seneca chooses this very moment to bring us crashing back down to earth, and to do so 
in the most powerful way possible. The combined effect of jarring rhetoric and extreme 
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thematic contrast with the adjacent aetiology is, I think, supposed to jolt us into moral 
reflection – into reflection on the discrepancy between what we ideally are, and how we 
normally behave. If correct, what this means is that the transitions between the aetiology and 
these passages are supposed to be abrupt; their subject matter is supposed to be disconnected 
with the aetiological investigation. For these features are, it turns out, a crucial part of the 
therapeutic design of these passages. 
 
4. ‘Paradoxical’ natural phenomena 
As it happens, this same framework might also serve to explain another recurrent feature of 
the text, whose discussion I have repeatedly postponed over the last two chapters. I am now 
talking about the numerous passages of what I have been referring to as ‘surprising’, 
‘remarkable’ or ‘paradoxical’ phenomena. The discussion of these passages belongs here 
because, while not part of the moralising passages themselves, they nevertheless tend with 
considerable consistency to occur adjacent to them.  
       It was Stahl who first distinguished these (what she calls miribilia) passages as a separate 
structural feature of the work – alongside the aetiology and the moralising passages – and she 
too who noticed the tendency of these passages to appear just before and/or after the 
moralising passages.
49
 A number of scholars have resisted this aspect of Stahl’s reading;50 
however, I think she is right to distinguish them – if not quite as radically as she does. Indeed, 
while I can agree with Gross that Seneca still generally tries to explain these causes of these 
phenomena (and thus we ought to consider them, strictly speaking, as a part of the aetiology), 
the pronounced emphasis on unexpected or surprising phenomena in these passages, and 
especially their consistent placement around the moralising passages suggests, to me, that 
they were intended to serve a separate or additional function of their own.
51
  
       Examples of such passages include the discussions of deformed underground fish that 
surround the digression in book 3 (3.16.4-5; 3.19.1-3); the violent and destructive winds – 
ἐκνεφίαι, whirlwinds, and πρηστῆρες – before the digression in book 5 (5.12.1-14.4); the 
remarkable effects associated with earthquakes before the epilogue to book 6 (6.27.1-31.3); 
                                                 
49
 Stahl (1960); (1964), esp. 426-7. Stahl thinks the role of these passages is to make the transition from the 
‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ aetiology, to the ‘philosophical’ and ‘subjective’ moralising passages. As the 
following makes apparent, while I agree with Stahl that these passages ought to be distinguished, I do not agree 
with her over their role in the work.  
50
 Strohm (1977), esp. 315-16; Gross (1989), 110-11. 
51
 Gross, ibid.  
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and the spectacular fires that appear in the night sky that are discussed just before the 
anecdote about Hostius Quadra.
52
  
       The writing of so-called ‘paradox literature’ was, as it happens, immensely popular 
during this period. Often aimed at mass appeal, such works tell tales of such amazing 
occurrences as two-headed children or, just as commonly, surprising natural phenomena.
53
 
However, aside from this more popular brand of ‘paradoxography’, paradoxes were also of 
special philosophical significance for the Stoics. The Stoics’ ethical theories were, of course, 
often regarded, and indeed presented, as paradoxical.
54
 Famously, the Stoics often claim that 
only the wise person is free, or rich, or some other quality that would seem to be contradicted 
by, for example, her apparent slavery, poverty, etc.
55
 One important point behind such 
paradoxes was that, if one’s reasoning faculty was in good health, then nothing at all about 
the world would seem paradoxical – be it a particular ethical theory, or a remarkable natural 
phenomenon.
56
 Such paradoxes could thus play an important role in testing, as it were, one’s 
mental health. Equally, though, such paradoxes were supposed to be provocative, thereby 
serving to cajole us into reflecting more deeply about our own beliefs.
57
 
       The ‘natural paradoxa’ that we find in the Natural Questions can, I think, be read in this 
context. However, the kind of reflection they are supposed to promote, I suggest, is not on 
our moral beliefs, per se, but rather on the beliefs we might hold about nature itself. One 
indication that this is the case comes from the passage of paradoxical phenomena that 
precedes the digression in book 3. Having made reference to the ‘paradoxical’ fact that there 
are vast underground spaces, which even contain kinds of fish, Seneca – imagining Lucilius’ 
incredulity – exclaims “Are you surprised by this? How much more incredible are the 
achievements of luxury! How often it either fakes or surpasses nature!” (3.17.2). Lucilius’ 
surprise at this phenomenon (rather than at the excesses of luxury) should, Seneca implies, 
give him pause; it highlights both the imperfect state of his own mental health, and also his 
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 Cf. the discussion of the remarkable effects of water after the preface to book 3 (3.2.1-2); the discussion of 
spectacular fires in the night sky, frequently taken as ‘portents’, after the preface to book 1 (1.1.1-4 – mirroring 
those before the epilogue to this book); and the passage from 7.26.1 where Seneca considers problems 
including: the fact that our eyesight passes through the tails of comets; the different appearances of stars; 
Aristotle’s suggestion that comets predict stormy weather; the slowness with which comets appear to move. 
53
 For a comprehensive study of such paradox literature, see Schepens and Delcroix (1996). See also Boys-
Stones (2006). 
54
 SVF 3.544; 3.547 – not to mention Cicero’s work dedicated to Stoic ‘paradoxes’ – The Paradoxes of the 
Stoics – and, polemically against such paradoxes, Plutarch’s The Stoics talk more paradoxically than the poets 
and On common notions, against the Stoics. 
55
 SVF 3.589-610 
56
 For this point, see Boys-Stones (2006). 
57
 In this sense, their purpose was perhaps not unlike the paradoxes of Heraclitus which, on some readings at 
least, were intended to serve precisely this function – a point made by Boys-Stones (2006). 
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own misconceptions about nature – the result, we might infer, of his own over-reliance on 
sense-perception.
58
 
     If this is right, the role of these paradoxa can be seen to complement the role of the 
moralising passages around which they congregate. While the function of the moralising 
passages is to provoke reflection on our ethical beliefs, these paradoxa serve to promote 
reflection on the beliefs we might hold about nature. 
        If this is indeed their function, this would explain why they occur where they do – i.e. in 
the same places as the moralising passages. For, occurring here necessarily means that these 
paradoxa are similarly juxtaposed with those points in the work when the most abstract and 
profound level of causal analysis has been reached.
59
 This means, though, that these passages 
generally coincide with the revelation of the divine in nature, and the accompanying sense of 
affinity with the cosmos that this gives rise to. As such, it seems reasonable to think that one 
would, on these occasions, be well-placed to reconsider the beliefs about nature. Such beliefs 
might include that the world is governed by malevolent divinities, or, conversely, that there 
are no gods at all – conclusions that we might well infer from unnerving ‘portents’, on the 
one hand, or destructive phenomena, on the other.
60
 Crucially, though, such beliefs would 
present a serious obstacle to our coming to regard the cosmos as something we should feel 
affinity with.
61
 Accordingly, it is essential that such beliefs are confronted; and this is what I 
think the passages of natural paradoxa might be doing. 
       This explanation, if correct, would also help to explain why, occasionally, there is delay 
between Seneca’s arrival at the highest level of causal analysis, and the subsequent initiation 
of the moralising episode. The clearest example of this occurs in book 6 when, having 
decided on the role of spiritus in causing earthquakes (along with all its Stoic, cosmo-
biological connotations), it is a further eight paragraphs before Seneca introduces the final 
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 Cf. 6.3.2 where, commenting on our surprise at the occurrence of earthquakes, Seneca asks: “Yet why do we 
find anything unusual? Because we grasp nature with our eyes, not our reason”.  
59
 An interesting test-case for this comes from book 2. This book’s central discussion of divination, which is 
indeed formally marked as a digression (see Codoñer (1989), 1808ff.) is surrounded by passages dealing with 
paradoxical phenomena. What is unusual about this, of course, is that unlike the other digressions in the work, 
this is not a moralising digression. However, what it does have in common with the digressions is that it 
nevertheless sits at a point at which the highest level of causal analysis has been reached. Indeed, it is in this 
‘digression’, if we recall, that we find one of the most overt descriptions of the Stoic god: “the ruler and 
guardian of the universe, the mind and breath of the world, the master and the craftsman of this creation, for 
whom every name will be appropriate...he it is on whom everything depends, the cause of causes” (2.45.1-2). 
This serves to confirm the idea that Seneca is purposely clustering these passages around points in the work 
where the highest level of causal analysis has been reached. To these passages in book 2 might be compared the 
long passage of remarkable phenomena that precedes the account of the flood in book 3 (3.20.1-26.8) – another 
non-moralising passage in a position normally occupied by a moralising one.   
60
 Destructive phenomena could, of course, lead to either conclusion. 
61
 More on the role of physics in dispelling such beliefs in the next chapter. 
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epilogue.
62
 These paragraphs, though, are concerned with precisely the sorts of paradoxes we 
have been considering (many of which occurred during the recent Campanian earthquake – 
no doubt explaining the unusual length of this section). If this section plays the role proposed 
above, then the location of this passage here makes perfect sense – clustering around the 
points in the work at which reflection on such matters is likely to be most productive. 
 
5. Conclusion 
If the foregoing has any merit, it turns out that the very features that have frequently been 
considered perplexing and objectionable about the moralising passages stand, in fact, at the 
heart of their therapeutic purpose. What is more, the therapeutic role of these passages can be 
seen to complement the broader aims of the work as a whole, as outlined in the previous 
chapter. There it was argued that, in light of debate the with Platonism, the physics in the 
Natural Questions should be seen as an attempt to demonstrate how, through a carefully 
structured programme of physical study, an agent could be helped to transcend their usual 
restricted, body-centric perspective on the world. By distancing the mind from the body, and 
by drawing our attention to what we and the cosmos have in common, Seneca hopes to get 
the reader into a state in which they might genuinely feel a sense of οἰκείωσις towards the 
cosmos.  
       However, as we have seen, the very reason why such a process is necessary is that 
Seneca realises, as the Platonists suggest, that most people are altogether far too attached to 
their own bodies and the things that serve (or seem to serve) the needs of the body – pleasure, 
wealth, and the rest. It is precisely our over-attachment to such things which leads us astray, 
causing the natural progression of οἰκείωσις to, in effect, stall. Accordingly, part of the 
challenge facing the Stoics is not merely to show how one could come to achieve a sufficient 
degree of οἰκείωσις towards the cosmos, but also how one can break one’s sense of 
attachment to these commonly misidentified ‘goods’. 
       It is, I suggest, to this second problem that the moralising passages are addressed. As we 
have seen, the passages depict agents oriented towards the sorts of objects that most people 
do regard as the good. As well as helpfully signposting the relevant issues at stake in the 
work, these passages are meant to prompt reflection on the true value of such objects. By 
introducing them abruptly, by filling them with extreme and graphic examples of vice, and, in 
particular, by locating them at points in the work where the reader is at their most distanced 
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 The same might be said for book 2, following the central ‘digression’ on divination – see n. 59 above. In this 
book, though, the gap between the highest level of causal analysis and the epilogue is much smaller. 
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from their bodies, Seneca hopes to maximise the potential of these passages to provoke 
genuine reflection on where we ground our understanding of the good. 
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– Chapter 5 – 
Studying Physics in the Hellenistic Stoa 
 
1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapters we have focussed primarily on interpreting the Natural Questions 
within its contemporary context. This approach has proved fruitful; by paying attention to 
contemporary currents of philosophical debate, we have been able to explain many of the 
features of the work that have often been seen as unusual and perplexing. At the same time, 
this approach has left one important question about the Natural Questions unanswered: how 
Seneca’s approach to physics compares with what we find in the Hellenistic Stoa. 
       Of course, we already know that Seneca certainly presents physics in an unusual manner. 
As the discussion in Chapter 1 showed, Seneca’s particular combination ethics and physics 
does seem to be unique in the tradition of Stoic physical writing. However, this does not 
necessarily imply any significant theoretical innovation with regard to the role of physics, and 
its relationship with ethics – any more, to draw a parallel, than Lucretius’ unique presentation 
of Epicurean philosophy necessarily represents doctrinal innovation on his part. The 
emphasis in this chapter, then, will not be on Seneca’s presentation of physics, or on the 
significance of his inclusion of ethical passages within the Natural Questions. Indeed, 
explanations for these features of the work have been offered in the two preceding chapters. 
Rather, my aim now is to consider to what extent Seneca’s views on the value of physical 
study represent conservatism or innovation with regard to Hellenistic Stoicism. 
       To assess this question, however, we need first to understand what the role of physics 
was supposed to be according to the Hellenistic Stoa. The problem here, however, is that this 
question is highly contentious, some going so far as to deny that there was ever a consistent 
view.
1
 As I shall argue, however, this debate has tended to focus unduly on just one aspect of 
the issue. In particular, I argue that a central question that has been widely overlooked is what 
we, as agents, are supposed to get out of engaging in the study of nature. The answer, it turns 
out, is that there are a number of ways in which the study of physics can help us. And, 
significantly, it turns out there are striking parallels between Hellenistic views on this, and 
what we have seen in the Natural Questions. 
 
                                                 
1
 Inwood (2009), 206: “the idea that there is a single, general Stoic view on the question of the role played by 
physics should probably be shelved”. Annas (2007) also expresses doubt about a single Stoic view on the 
matter. Ludlam (2003) casts doubt on the idea of Stoic ‘orthodoxy’ as a whole. Cf. also Reydams-Schils (2011), 
who suggests that the Stoics as a whole were less bound to a notion of school authority than other schools.  
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2. Stoic physics and stoic ethics: the modern debate  
It has almost always been supposed that Stoic physics, somehow or other, plays an important 
role in Stoic ethics. This much is indicated by Stoic claims for the outstanding ‘unity’ of their 
system,
2
 and the organic relationship between the three parts of philosophy.
3
 Indeed, it has 
frequently been said that Stoic physics actually plays a ‘foundational’ role in Stoic ethics – 
that is, the Stoics’ ethical theory is in some sense grounded in the views that they have about 
the physical cosmos.
4
 This is not surprising: a fair amount of evidence seems to support this 
supposition. Chrysippus, for instance, is recorded as saying: “It is not possible to discover 
any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the 
universal nature, for thence everything of the kind must have its beginning if we are going to 
have anything to say about good and evil”; and Plutarch, who is our source here, goes on to 
offer two further direct quotations from Chrysippus expressing a similar idea (Sto. rep. 
1035CD, trans Cherniss). Likewise, Cato, in Cicero’s De finibus, argues that “he who is to 
live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of 
the entire world” (Fin 3.73). Indeed, a considerable amount of prima facie reliable evidence 
can be adduced to support the idea that Stoic ethics is grounded in Stoic physics.  
       What is more, though, the reasoning behind the claim seems relatively clear. The 
cosmos, so the argument goes, represents the highest expression of a rationality in which we 
ourselves share, and thus the best kind of life for a human being – where ‘human nature’ 
finds its highest expression – is a life in which we try as best we can to conform ourselves to 
the course of nature as a whole. This, then, is the argument we seem to get in an important 
account, purportedly going back to Chrysippus, found in Diogenes Laertius (7.85-6). A life 
lived in this way is ‘good’, therefore, both because it fully conforms with our own natures as 
human beings (it is, in other words, good relative to us); but it is also good in an objective 
sense, precisely because a life lived in this way contributes to the wellbeing of everything that 
exists: the entire cosmos.
5
 This, it will be noted, is the conceptualisation of Stoic ethics that I 
have been working with in previous chapters. 
                                                 
2
 De fin. 3.74-5, with a new, sceptical (with a small ‘s’) reading of this claim in Inwood (2012). 
3
 D. L. 7.39-41, who describes philosophy with the famous similes of the egg, the garden and the living being. 
Cf. S. E. M. 7.19; Seneca Ep. 88.25-8. For discussion of these images, and an important discussion of the 
relationship between the ‘parts’ of philosophy, see Ierodikonou (1993), esp. 71ff.  
4
 Classically, Long (1968), 341: “Stoic ethics is ultimately parasitical on physics” and, less strongly, (1989 (= 
1996a)), 195: “The Stoics’ eudaimonism is principally grounded in their beliefs about the relation in which 
human beings stand to a determinate and providentially governed world”. Another major proponent of this view 
is Striker (1991), esp. 1-13. 
5
 On the importance of the objectivity of Stoic ethical claims, see Chapter 2.  
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       Nevertheless, some scholars have resisted this interpretation, most forceful among whom 
has been Julia Annas.
6
 Annas argues that an ethics grounded in cosmic nature would not in 
fact be ethics, properly speaking. It would “define virtue as conformity to some standard 
which is defined in ways that are external to the basis of virtue”. Annas contends that, since 
Aristotle, the starting point of ancient ethical theory had been to determine the peculiar good 
of the agent, which, so determined, would “enable the agent to make sense of her life and 
correctly order her priorities.” The appeal to cosmic nature, Annas maintains, achieves the 
opposite of this: “it pulls the agent away from the kind of attachment to her own concerns 
which is needed for useful reflection on her final end to be possible”. Even if one were to 
gain an understanding of cosmic nature, she argues, “this would still not be relevant to any of 
the concerns I need ethical theory for”, given Annas’ understanding of ancient ethics.7 
Against those who respond by saying that cosmic nature provides the rational pattern to 
which human agents try to conform their own rationality, Annas argues that such a pattern 
would be irrelevant until we had reflected on rationality from the human point of view – that 
is, from “within” ethics. Insofar as ‘nature’ plays a role in Stoic ethics, it is human nature 
about which the Stoics were concerned; it is this that grounds and shapes ethical theory. 
Physics, Annas therefore argues, does not contribute any content to Stoic ethics. It is instead 
significant only as the second-order study of ethics, through which we come to see the 
broader significance of our ethical doctrines.
8
 
       Annas’ interpretation has met with resistance from several scholars, on a number of 
fronts.
9
 For one thing, scholars have been unmoved by her attempt to downplay the body of 
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 Variously in Annas (1993), 159-179; (1995); (2007). Others, though in a minority, have expressed sympathy 
with Annas’ view, namely Engberg-Pederson (1986); (1990), esp. Ch. 2; Gill (2004). 
7
Annas (1993), 160-1. 
8
 Annas, op. cit., 164. It should be noted, however, that Annas maintains that in later Stoic writing, unlike its 
earlier counterpart, we do find evidence of the standard scholarly interpretation of Stoic ethics. Writers such as 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius do frequently appeal to cosmic nature in the course of their ethical arguments; 
but in doing so, Annas maintains, they break from the traditional Stoic approach. Moreover, Annas judges the 
outcome of such a strategy as invariably negative. The result is what she calls the “alienation” or “only a part” 
strategies, in which the concerns of the individual are unhelpfully minimised in reference to the wellbeing of the 
cosmos as a whole. Curiously, she does not mention Seneca in this context. However, considering what we have 
seen in previous chapters, the Natural Questions in particular seems to contradict the idea that one can only 
achieve negative outcomes through the ‘cosmic’ approach. Indeed, rather than making the agent feel as though 
they are a mere part, Seneca is clear that seeing one’s place within the cosmic context actually elevates one’s 
sense of status within the cosmos, helps one to realise one’s true divine nature and one’s close relationship with 
the cosmos as a whole. What is more, as we shall see below, these ideas are also clearly visible in evidence for 
earlier Stoicism.  
9
 Particularly Cooper (1995), (1996); Inwood (1995); Boeri (2009); Klein (2010), esp. ch. 2; Bénatouïl (2014). 
There is a degree of balance in Betegh (2003), though he too ultimately comes down against Annas’ 
interpretation. 
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evidence that seems strongly to favour the traditional interpretation.
10
 Others have questioned 
her reading of the ethical tradition since Aristotle, pointing out that Aristotle himself looks 
‘outside’ the ethical, to the natural world, to formulate and justify his own ethical position.11 
However, even if Annas were right about these things, it is also doubtful, philosophically, 
whether her conclusions about the ‘external’ nature of Stoic ethics would follow from the fact 
that Stoic ethics is grounded in cosmic nature. For it has been pointed out that the Stoics did 
not conceive of the need to follow cosmic nature as conformity to some impersonal external 
standard. Rather, as already mentioned above, the Stoics argued that conforming oneself to 
the rational standard of the cosmos was the precise way in which we achieve the highest 
expression of our own rational natures. We do not, as Annas seems to interpret the position, 
try to conform ourselves with nature as a whole simply because this is what the cosmos 
demands of us;
12
 we do so because it is in our own best interest to do so.
13
 Indeed, as has 
been argued in previous chapters, the aim of Stoic ethics appears to be to get to the stage at 
which we view the welfare of the cosmos as coinciding perfectly with our own self-interest. 
Far from drawing us away from our proper ethical concerns, then, it is precisely by referring 
to the cosmos as a whole that we get it right about what is truly good for us. While Annas is 
no doubt right that we must also know ourselves in order to recognise the significance of the 
cosmic standard of rationality, it also seems clear that coming to see one’s place within the 
cosmic context is a necessary part of what it means to truly understand oneself (an idea we 
have already seen in Seneca, though one which we shall also find in the Hellenistic 
evidence).  
       In my opinion, then, there does not seem to be any particular reason – philosophically, or 
in terms of evidence – to doubt that the Stoics believed that their ethical system was grounded 
in certain beliefs they held about the cosmos. However, this conclusion does not, I suggest, 
get us very much closer to understanding the role of physics – that is, the actual business of 
studying nature – in relation to Stoic ethics. For it seems to me that the actual study of nature 
is something to be distinguished from the question that normally occupies scholars – which is 
                                                 
10
 For analysis of Annas’ use of sources see especially Inwood (1995a). 
11
 Cooper (1996). 
12
 This, however, is implied by Long (1989, 186ff), with his reference to a ‘theocratic postulate’.  
13
 On which Vogt (2008b), ch. 4, esp. 215-16. However, seemingly contra Cooper (1996), who argues that the 
sage would see the obligations of virtue as something “imposed” on her by cosmic nature. In this argument, 
though, Cooper seems to contradict himself, since shortly before he emphasises that the sage must not merely 
accept local adversity, but actively desire it. While one might accept something justly imposed on us, it is 
difficult to see why we should actively desire it, in the Stoic model, unless it were not contributing to our own 
wellbeing as well. If anything, Cooper here opens himself up to the sorts of concerns raised by Annas.    
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essentially the importance of the ‘cosmic context’ for Stoic ethics.14 On my reading, the 
cosmic context is significant because it provides the ultimate grounds for determining 
whether something can be considered good, and thus serves as the ultimate justification
15
 for 
the sage’s actions. If asked why it is a good thing (indeed good, rather than merely 
indifferent
16
) to pursue a course of action that will involve considerable personal hardship, 
the sage can point to the fact that it serves to promote the rational order of the cosmic system, 
(which in turn promotes her own nature because the sage, as a participant in cosmic reason, 
has a stake in the rational ordering of the cosmos).  
       But if this reading is right, what precisely does the sage need to know in terms of 
physical theory? Does she really need to know about principles, elements and πνεῦμα? What 
about the size of the sun, the substance of the moon, and the patterns of the tides? On the 
contrary, all that the sage would seem to need to know in order to approach hardship in the 
way described above is that the cosmos is, in fact, providentially ordered – which is to say, 
‘good’. Of course, the more detailed conclusions of physical investigation might help the 
sage to come to this conclusion.
17
 But surely the whole gamut of Stoic physical theory is not 
necessary for her to do so. In fact, the idea that the cosmos was, on the whole, ‘good’ is 
relatively uncontroversial in ancient philosophy. The Sceptics obviously withheld judgement 
on the matter, and Epicurus actively denied it; but in fact Epicurus was so exceptional in this 
regard that he had actually to argue for the contrary position – arguments that other schools 
viewed with derision. Of course, the Stoics for their part did offer arguments purporting to 
prove the providential ordering of the cosmos, as preserved most fully in book 2 of Cicero’s 
De natura deorum. But in the same book, Balbus begins his argument with the claim that the 
providential order of the cosmos is all but self-evident – hardly requiring argument, in fact –  
                                                 
14
 This distinction between the role of the cosmic nature and the actual act of contemplating was already drawn 
by Festugière (1949),75-76.  
15
 Klein draws attention to a distinction between the role of the cosmic context in terms of ‘justification’ and 
‘motivation’ (2010) ch. 2, esp. 33 n. 94). I do not intend to draw any such distinction. As it happens, I believe 
that the cosmic context serves as both ultimate justification and, in some circumstances at least, a positive 
source of motivation to act. This much is made clear by the famous fragment of Chrysippus (Epictetus, Diss. 
2.6.9 – more on which in the note below) in which he suggests that if he knew the cosmos required him to be ill, 
he would seek illness.  
16
 Indeed, since Socrates at least, and certainly in Stoicism, all actions are conceived as being directed towards 
some good. If the sage merely saw actions that would lead to adversity as indifferent to her happiness, there 
would be no reason for her to take them. This, in fact, presents a further problem for Annas’ interpretation of 
Stoic ethics. While her ‘internalist’ account can account for why adverse circumstances do not affect the sage’s 
happiness, it can provide no reason for why the sage would regard such actions as towards the good. And yet 
this positive attitude towards even adverse circumstances is clearly described by a famous fragment of 
Chrysippus, where he claims that if he knew he was fated to be ill he would choose illness (Epictetus Diss. 
2.6.9) – implicitly requiring him to see this action as serving the good.  
17
 More on this below. 
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and in any case demonstrable on the basis of some quite simple observations of the world.
18
 
The fact the Stoics had arguments to prove that the cosmos was providentially ordered does 
not necessarily mean that one needs to know them in order to believe this. So again, we must 
ask what it is precisely that we are supposed to gain by going out and studying nature. But the 
question becomes all the more pressing when we realise that there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that one might become virtuous without ever studying physics. 
 
3. Why study physics...at all?
 
 
In fact, from a historical perspective, it is somewhat surprising that the Stoics advocated the 
study of physics in the first place.
19
 To begin with, like several of the Hellenistic schools, the 
Stoics located themselves in a tradition tracing its ancestry to Socrates. The Stoics, indeed, 
frequently marked out Socrates as the ideal philosopher, and presented themselves as his true 
philosophical heirs. Considering this, though, it is puzzling to note that Socrates was 
commonly believed to have renounced the study of physics, in favour of an exclusive focus 
on ethics: 
 
Socrates was the first (this is a point accepted by all) to summon philosophy away from the obscure 
subjects nature itself has veiled—the questions all his philosophical predecessors had been concerned 
with—and to direct it towards ordinary life. He set it onto investigating virtue and vice and good and 
bad in general, considering celestial subjects to be far beyond our knowledge or, even if they were 
perfectly knowable, still completely irrelevant to the good life. (Cicero, Acad. 1.15, trans. Brittain) 
 
There is a certain amount of variation in these reports; other evidence does not record the 
stronger claim that physics would be useless even if it were knowable, focussing instead on 
the mere difficulty of ascertaining knowledge of nature. Nevertheless, we find similar reports 
across a remarkable period, ranging from the time of the Socratics right through into the 
Roman period, and beyond.
20
 Of course, it is not clear to what extent this view represented 
that of the historical Socrates;
 
but the fact that a fairly widespread and stable tradition rose up 
                                                 
18
 E.g. at ND 2.4, Balbus argues that the existence of the gods “seems not even to require arguing. For when we 
gaze upward to the sky and contemplate the heavenly bodies, what can be so obvious and so manifest as that 
there must exist some power possessing transcendent intelligence by whom these things are ruled?”. For 
discussion of this point, see Schofield (1980). 
19
 The discussion in this section owes a lot to Inwood (2009, esp. 201-7) who also draws attention to these 
apparent contradictions in the evidence. From these, though, Inwood concludes that there was never a consistent 
view on physics in the Stoa. In this we disagree. I believe that these apparent inconsistencies can be reconciled 
once we see that physics was not something that everyone needs to do, but an activity that is engaged in for a 
specific therapeutic function. As such, the different emphasis that different Stoics place on physics (where this 
is not down to specific personal interests) may simply be the result of differing therapeutic goals.   
20
 E.g. Xenophon, Mem. 1.1.11-12; Eusebius, Praep. ev. 15.62.7. 
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around Socrates as someone who rejected physics does at least raise the possibility that there 
is a tension here to be addressed. 
       Then again, one might suppose that this traditional picture of Socrates is not all that 
significant – other representations of Socrates were available (albeit from Plato), and it is not 
as though the Stoics lived or died on their loyalty to him. However, as it turns out, Socrates is 
just the tip of the iceberg.  
       It is, for instance, well-known that Zeno’s philosophy was influenced by Cynicism, 
presumably mediated through his teacher Crates. Indeed, the influence seems to have been so 
pronounced that later Stoics (vainly) attempted to eradicate the more Cynicising aspects from 
his work.
21
 But this connection with the Cynics is important for our question for a number of 
reasons. First, not only did the Cynics also trace their philosophical ancestry to Socrates, but, 
like him, they rejected physics in favour of ethics alone. Despite this divergence, though, 
there are a number of close doctrinal similarities between the Cynics and the Stoics – 
doctrines, moreover, that in the Stoics’ case are generally seen to be closely bound up with 
their physics. Most striking of these is the shared claim that the human τέλος is ‘to live in 
accordance with nature’. While, as we have seen, there is some debate in Stoicism about the 
application of ‘nature’, it is (paradoxically) quite clear in the Cynics’ case that this 
requirement had a cosmic dimension to it. This is suggested by their adherence to a form of 
cosmopolitanism – another theory, of course, which the Stoics themselves came to adopt.22 
Strikingly, then, the Cynics felt able to place their ethics in a cosmic context without the need 
to do any studying of the cosmos at all. 
        But the puzzle does not stop here. Even within the Stoa there were those who thought 
the study of physics unnecessary – I am now speaking about Aristo of Chios. Aristo is, in 
fact, sometimes interpreted as being a Cynic rather than a Stoic;
23
 but he certainly did not 
think of himself as one. Furthermore, although the later tradition painted him as a renegade, 
his contemporary influence seems to have been considerable: we know, for instance, that he 
had a following of so-called ‘Aristonians’. Whatever the ultimate doctrinal differences 
between Aristo and the strand of Stoicism that became dominant, his rejection of physics 
nevertheless suggests that in the early Stoa, at least, the place of physics was not completely 
                                                 
21
 D. L. 7.34. 
22
 Moles (1996) argues convincingly against the idea that Cynic cosmopolitanism was merely a negative theory, 
tantamount to a rejection of the polis and its conventions. Among other points, Moles points out that the 
doctrine is formulated positively: it is not that the Cynic is without a polis, but that he is at home everywhere in 
the cosmos. Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that the doctrine implied allegiance to the whole of 
mankind and, indeed, the earth itself (Dio Chrysostom 4.13; Epictetus, Diss. 3.24.64). 
23
 E.g. Porter (1996). 
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unquestionable. The reason why physics became an integral part of Stoic philosophy, 
therefore, becomes all the more intriguing. 
        Of course, Aristo’s conception of the τέλος differed from that of other Stoics (although 
it should be noted that several fragments suggest that he too saw ethics as operating within a 
cosmic context, and that it was merely the fact that physics was unknowable that led to its 
rejection).
24
 One might also point out that there were significant doctrinal differences 
between Stoics and Cynics. In the Cynic case in particular, though, one also has to deal with 
the surprising claim that the Stoics regarded Cynicism as a “shortcut to virtue”.25 What is 
especially significant about this claim, moreover, is that the context it turns up in is precisely 
that in which we hear that the Cynics did away with physics
26
 – the implication surely being 
that Cynicism is a ‘shortcut’ precisely because it did away with this part of philosophy.27 The 
fact that the ‘virtue’ at stake here is of a kind that the Stoics themselves would recognise is 
supported by other evidence, which suggests that the Stoic wise person might even act like a 
Cynic herself. Cicero’s Balbus, for instance, reports that “Some Stoics say that the Cynics’ 
philosophy and way of life is suitable for the wise person, should circumstances arise 
conducive to its practice”.28 Therefore it would seem that at least “some” Stoics believed that, 
in the right circumstances, one could become a Stoic sage by taking this Cynic ‘shortcut’ – in 
which the study of physics is omitted completely. 
       If it was thought possible to become a sage without studying physics at all, why then do 
the Stoics pay any attention to this field of inquiry? White explores two philosophical 
motivations that might theoretically have led the Stoics to believe that a Stoic sage would 
require a detailed knowledge of physical theory – one epistemological, the other 
psychological.
29
 White’s epistemological suggestion is that the Stoics might have maintained 
that the sage’s belief in the goodness of the cosmos must not rest on mere belief, but rather 
full knowledge. This might involve knowing not merely that the cosmos exhibits a perfect 
pattern, but also what sort of pattern. Such a position would presumably necessitate a very 
large, or even comprehensive knowledge of the physical world. However, aside from the 
                                                 
24
 Importance of universal nature: SVF 1.361; 359. Physics merely unknowable: D. L. 7.160. 
25
 D. L. 6.104; 7.121. 
26
 D. L. 6.104. 
27
 Along, of course, with logic. 
28
Fin. 3.68 – albeit also noting that some Stoics reject the idea. However, the context makes clear that their issue 
with Cynicism is the flagrant violation of social conventions and niceties for which the Cynics were famous. 
However, reservations about this extreme convention-flouting side of Cynicism does not count against the basic 
acknowledgement of the similarity in their ethical ideal. See also Epictetus (Diss. 3.22) for a comparably 
positive evaluation of the Cynic way of life; D. L. 7.101: The wise man “will also play the Cynic”. 
29
 White (1985), esp. 71ff. 
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intuitive implausibility of the sage having to know literally everything about the cosmos,
30
 
White himself admits that there is virtually no evidence to support such an assumption. 
Indeed, Kerferd’s much-cited analysis of the evidence on this question seems to rule out such 
a position.
31
 
       White’s ‘psychological’ motivation relates to his wider interpretation of Stoic ethics. He 
argues that in order to achieve the Stoic virtuous disposition, the agent must believe that the 
cosmos is perfectly good. Having this belief about the cosmos, he argues, allows the agent to 
see “local unsatisfactoriness” as part of a broader pattern that is good overall. This in turn 
allows the agent to “downgrade” the “badness” of local circumstances so that they do not 
“mind” them anymore.32 As to why a detailed knowledge of physics might be necessary for 
this move, White suggests that the Stoics might not have thought it sufficient for the sage 
simply to know that local disadvantage fitted into the perfect cosmic pattern somehow or 
other, but also precisely how it did so. However, White admits that he finds no evidence to 
support this position either. Moreover, he freely admits that neither of these conditions seem 
necessary for the Stoics to maintain the position that they do. As he points out: “believing 
that the universe exemplifies the perfect pattern does not require that one have detailed 
knowledge of how it is put together”.33  
       And yet, there may be another way in which the sage might, after all, turn out to have a 
considerable knowledge about the cosmos. This stems from the idea, found widely in the 
evidence, that the study of physics is an activity that is peculiarly suitable to human beings. 
Indeed, a variety of evidence, including the Natural Questions, alludes to the idea that human 
beings are simply designed to engage in this activity, and in doing so one does something that 
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 Although, some scholars nevertheless maintain this, e.g. Christensen (1962), 63; more recently Boeri (2009), 
191 (who thinks that the sage would even be able to predict future events, so clear is her knowledge of the 
causal nexus).  
31
 Kerferd (1977). There is one piece of evidence that Kerferd finds which could conceivably be taken to suggest 
omniscience (SVF 3.131: the wise person is “ignorant of nothing”). However, as Kerferd plausibly suggests 
(128-9) this is likely to mean not that she knows everything, but simply that within her knowledge there is no 
room for error (see also Vogt (2008), 118-20). Kerferd’s interpretation, moreover, finds support from the 
evidence which suggests that when a wise person was unsure of what she perceives, she would withhold assent 
(SVF 3.548). Presumably, faced with some obscure natural phenomena, the wise person would simply withhold 
assent regarding its causes. Consequently, this fragment is actually consistent with the idea that the sage might 
know very little about the cosmos at large. 
32
 As it happens I disagree with White on this count. As Annas (2007, 69f.) rightly argues, the reason why the 
sage does not ‘mind’ local adversity is because she views it as indifferent. The sage does not refer to cosmic 
nature to make local circumstances bearable but, as I have argued, because she sees local circumstances as 
contributing to the order of the cosmos, which is in her own self-interest to promote. 
33
 White (1985), 70-1. Indeed, White in fact suggests that this might explain why later Stoics (apparently) paid 
less attention to physics. However, as we saw in the Introduction, this impression of later Stoicism is a 
misconception.  
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is fundamentally in accord with one’s nature as a human being.34 If the sage, though, is seen 
as the optimally ‘natural’ human being, then surely we could assume that she would, as a 
matter of fact, strive to engage in the study of the cosmos – and in the course of this acquire a 
considerable understanding of physical theory?  
       The trouble is, however, that while the sage would no doubt strive to study the cosmos, 
this does not necessarily mean that she would actually end up doing so very frequently – and 
possibly never at all. For one thing, there is evidence to suggest that the study of physics is, in 
fact, a ‘leisure’ activity35 – indeed, one could hardly imagine that the sage would break away 
from other pressing (social, political) duties to go and study nature.
36
 Whether or not this 
means that physics is merely something we do to productively fill our leisure time, or rather 
something which we actively strive to find leisure time for, is unimportant here; it remains 
the case that the sage would need to have some leisure time in order to be able to do the 
studying. And yet the Stoics are clear that leisure is something which is not ‘up to us’: it is 
dependent on the circumstances.
37
 Thus there is no guarantee that the sage will ever end up 
actually being able to study the cosmos.
38
 Indeed, even if one were to dispute the idea the 
Stoics believed that theoretical activity of this kind was to be reserved for leisure, as some 
indeed have,
39
 it remains perfectly reasonable to assume that there are circumstances in which 
physical study will simply never be possible – if, for instance, one happens to be imprisoned, 
or blind, for one’s whole life. 
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 Inwood (2009) calls this an ‘intrinsic’ (as opposed to an ‘instrumental’) reason to study nature. 
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 E.g. Cicero De fin. 4.12. 
36
 Forschner (1998), however, claims that the emphasis on the need for leisure is an innovation of Cicero, as a 
result of his ‘Roman’ concern with the pre-eminence of the practical life (although, against such a reading of 
Cicero, see Reydams-Schils (2016)). Forschner claims that the early Stoics placed a far greater importance on 
theoretical activity than is often supposed. While I can to some extent agree with Forschner that the Stoics did 
think that ‘θεωρία’ had inherent value (insofar as it is a quintessentially ‘natural’ activity for a human being), I 
strongly disagree with him that the ethical benefits of studying physics were of secondary importance to this 
inherent value. Indeed, considering the therapeutic frame of Stoic philosophy, discussed below, it would seem 
that the ethical benefits to be gained from physical study were at least as important as the inherent desirability of 
the activity. Furthermore, the passage from Tusc. 5 on which Forschner bases his reading (a passage which I 
also discuss below) seems, in fact, to confirm that ethical benefit is at the core of the study of physics. For 
further comment against Forschner’s reading, see Bénatouïl and Bonazzi (2012), 2. 
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 Epictetus Diss. 4.4.1-4. 
38
 These considerations seem to count against Forschner (1998), who suggests that θεωρία would have been a 
central part of what it means to be virtuous. It is true that the Stoics advocated the ‘mixed’ kind of life – 
involving both theoretical activity and action (what they called the ‘rational life’ – D. L. 7.130). But there is 
little to suggest that this means engaging in θεωρία was a requirement for virtue. Rather, θεωρία must surely be 
something we strive to engage in, just as we (or rather the sage) strives to engage in politics. In both cases, 
however, it is clear that circumstances may prevent it (see e.g. Seneca’s argument for political withdrawal in 
Ot., and frequently in the Letters). For further reflection on the importance of θεωρία in Stoicism, see Bénatouïl 
(2009); (2013). 
39
 See n. 36, above. 
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       But this actually turns out to be a compelling reason for the Stoics not to make the study 
of physics, and thus a detailed knowledge of physical theory, a requirement for becoming a 
sage. For they, unlike some of their rivals, were keen to emphasise the egalitarian nature of 
their ethical ideal. As Seneca puts it: “Virtue shuts the door on no one. It is open to everyone 
and lets us all in, invites us in: the freeborn, ex-slaves, slaves, kings, and exiles” (Ben. 
3.18.2). This position, however, could not be maintained if the Stoics held that an extensive 
amount of physical theory was necessary to become a sage. While one might strive to engage 
in physical study – as a quintessentially human thing to do – the truth is that there are many 
circumstances in which one might be prevented from doing so. 
 
       We seem to be in a curious situation, then, that despite regarding physics as an integral 
part of philosophy, despite developing a sophisticated body of physical theory, and despite 
writing extensively on physical topics themselves,
40
 there is no evidence to suggest that the 
Stoics saw any philosophical imperative to study physics. Does this mean that the Stoics are, 
after all, basically in accord with their Socratic heritage, believing that ethics should be our 
primary concern, while physics should be reserved for, at most, a productive way to fill our 
leisure time?  
       Fortunately, I do not think we need to accept this paradoxical conclusion. The solution to 
the problem emerges, I think, when we cease to view Stoic physics, and indeed Stoic 
philosophy as a whole, as a body of knowledge that one needs to know in order to become 
virtuous. For this is not, as it happens, how the Stoics themselves thought about philosophy. 
Rather, the Stoics believed that the purpose of philosophy was to restore us to a state of 
accord with nature, from which we have departed because of the corrupted state of our 
rationality. What we gain from philosophy is not knowledge as such, but therapy. And once 
we realise this, the amount of attention one ought to pay to physical study turns out to be 
dependent on one’s specific therapeutic needs.  
       The notion of ancient philosophy as broadly ‘therapeutic’ is not new, particularly with 
respect to Hellenistic philosophy.
41
 But the Stoics have a very specific theoretical reason for 
regarding it as such. The best account of why this is comes from Seneca’s 90th Letter, and the 
account he gives there of the development of human society. Here Seneca explains how the 
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 See Chapter 1. 
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 See e.g. Blumenberg (1985), 243-325, Voelke (1993); and of course, on the therapeutic thrust of ancient 
philosophy more widely, the work of Hadot, (1995); (2002). Sellers (2007) on the other hand, seems to suggest 
that it is primarily post-Hellenistic philosophy that approached philosophy within a therapeutic framework, 
where we find a new emphasis on so-called ‘spiritual exercises’. More on this below.  
152 
 
earliest men, unacquainted with sources of corruption, lived in perfect accord with nature. 
Seneca, it is true, does not think that these men were sages (or at least, not all of them: their 
leaders may have been (90.5)); but their simple lack of corruption meant that they were not in 
need of further instruction in how to live: they simply ‘followed nature’. As time went on, 
however, mankind fell away from this innocent state – brought on, Seneca believes, by the 
development of technology, and the corrupting influence of luxury that this brought with it. 
Crucially, Seneca tells us that it was only now that philosophy arose – precisely, it seems, 
because it was only now that it became necessary, as a way to counter the forces of rational 
corruption.
42
 Philosophy, then, is fundamentally corrective: it aims to counteract the 
corruption that blights the reasoning faculties of humanity. 
       This therapeutic conception of philosophy helps, I think, to resolve many of the apparent 
inconsistencies among the Stoics’ views on physics. For a start, what the therapeutic model 
reveals is that we are actually posing the wrong question entirely when we ask whether the 
sage would have to know a great deal of physical theory in order to be a sage. For 
philosophy, in an important sense, is not directed at the sage – any more than medicine is 
directed at the healthy person. The question that we should instead be asking is how the study 
of philosophy in general, and physics in particular, can help those of us who need help to get 
to – or rather, get back to – the optimally natural state. 
       What becomes apparent, though, is that the help that each of us needs in this respect can 
vary considerably. Seneca, again, is instructive here:   
 
“But what, then,” people say, “have not certain persons won their way to excellence without  
complicated training? Have they not made great progress by obeying bare precepts alone?” Very true; 
but their temperaments were propitious, and they snatched salvation as it were ‘by the way’. For just 
as the immortal gods did not learn virtue – having been born with virtue complete, and containing in 
their nature the essence of goodness – even so certain men are fitted with unusual qualities and reach 
without a long apprenticeship that which is ordinarily a matter of teaching, welcoming honourable 
things as soon as they hear them. Hence come the choice minds which seize quickly upon virtue, or 
else produce it from within themselves. But your dull, sluggish fellow, who is hampered by his evil 
habits, must have this soul-rust incessantly rubbed off. Now, as the former sort, who are inclined 
towards the good, can be raised to the heights more quickly, so the weaker spirits will be assisted and 
freed from their evil opinions if we entrust to them the accepted principles of philosophy. 
(Seneca Ep. 95.36-7, trans. Gummere) 
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 For the importance of this narrative in Stoicism, both as a strategy of theodicy and as a methodological 
principle, see Boys-Stones (2001), Ch. 1. 
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For the majority of us – dull, sluggish, with evil habits – a fairly extensive course of 
philosophical training might be necessary, if only to make up for our lack of natural ability.
43
 
Such training, we can presume, would likely (though not necessarily) involve all three 
branches of the philosophical curriculum. On the other hand, however, those born with 
naturally propitious temperaments and abilities – those who have somehow avoided the 
rational corruption that afflicts the rest of us – might require very little philosophical training 
indeed. Such a person, it seems, would be able to achieve the perfect state without even 
having to know a great deal of ethical theory – achieving virtue, Seneca says, with the barest 
of ethical precepts.  
       Could such an exceptional individual have been found, according to the Stoics, in the 
person of Socrates? Indeed, while there is no positive evidence to suggest that the Stoics 
made this argument, this seems an entirely plausible way in which they could at once have 
considered physics an integral part of philosophy, and yet have regarded Socrates – the 
notorious disavower of physics – as the ideal philosopher, even a sage. Someone of Socrates’ 
supreme natural ability, the Stoics could have maintained, would simply not need an 
extensive amount of training in physics to achieve the heights of human excellence. This 
need not mean that Socrates had no views about the cosmos at all – he evidently did believe 
in the gods and their providence, for instance. But this, they might have maintained, was all 
that he needed. 
       The same consideration might also explain why Cynicism might (sometimes at least) 
provide a ‘shortcut’ to virtue. Earlier we associated this claim with the idea that the Stoic 
sage might live as a Cynic. One important qualification to this claim, as reported by Cicero, 
was that the sage would live in this way only “should circumstances arise conducive to its 
practice” (my emphasis). The context makes clear that the sorts of ‘circumstances’ Cicero 
has in mind here are socio-political ones, since it is precisely while Cato is describing the 
Stoic views on social structures that the claim is made. So the implication of this claim is 
surely that it is only in ideal socio-political circumstances that it would be possible to live 
like a sage. While this is again speculative, it does not seem implausible that a similar 
qualification might apply to the claim that Cynicism represents a ‘shortcut’ to virtue. In an 
ideal society, such a shortcut might well be possible; for in such a society there would not be 
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 Again, though, it is important to point out that, unlike the Platonists, the Stoics do not rule out such a person 
being able to achieve virtue. It does seem to be the case, however, that they would be far less likely to do so, 
unless they received considerable philosophical training. We can assume, then, that even though the Stoics 
thought that anyone could achieve virtue – even someone held in slavery for their whole lives – such a person 
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the corruption that, elsewhere, might necessitate a course in physics (and logic). Indeed, just 
as Seneca says that an ideal person (someone who has avoided extensive corruption) in an 
ordinary society might be able to become virtuous without extensive philosophical training, 
so an agent in an ideal society (where corruption is less prevalent or completely absent) might 
be able to take the Cynic ‘shortcut’.        
 
4. Physics as therapy 
If in ideal circumstances a therapeutic course of physical study might not be deemed 
necessary, the same cannot of course be said for those of us unfortunate enough not to have 
exceptional natural abilities, or to have been brought up in an ideal society. In our case, no 
doubt, we will need all the help we can get. But this brings us back to the question of how, 
precisely, studying physics is supposed to help us. This, I suggest, again becomes apparent 
when we think of physics in terms of a corrective activity: something we need to counteract 
the corruption that our reason has undergone in the course of our development. As we shall 
see, though, types of corruption are numerous – meaning that so, too, are the means of 
correction.  
       One way in which physics might prove useful is by directly countering corrupt beliefs we 
may have accumulated, beliefs that might in turn stand in the way of us leading a life in 
accordance with nature as a whole. The most obvious example of such a belief would be that 
the cosmos is not, as a matter of fact, ‘good’ – and thus, obviously, not worth us striving to 
live in accordance with. What is significant, however, is that this belief might arise for a 
diverse range of reasons. It might come about, for example, because one happens to believe 
that the cosmos is made up of randomly swerving atoms, and thus is the product of chance.
44
 
It might come about because one is an atheist – or believes that the gods are simply not 
interested in us. Conversely, it might come about because one has developed superstitious 
beliefs about the gods, and thus believes that, far from being providential, they are actually 
capricious and vengeful, and frequently impose suffering on human beings. However, 
because of the variety of beliefs that might cause one to think that nature is not something 
worth following, it would have been necessary for the Stoics to develop a fairly 
comprehensive body of physical theory in order to show how each of these beliefs is, after 
all, mistaken. Against the idea of randomly swerving atoms, the Stoics would have to show 
that the cosmos is, in fact, a material continuum in which no randomness can exist. They 
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would have to show both that the gods exist, and what they are like: superlatively rational, 
beneficent beings.
45
 Against those who took dangerous natural phenomena as evidence for 
the malicious intentions of the gods, it would be necessary that these events have natural, 
mechanical causes, while also serving some broader role within the overall order of the 
cosmos.
46
 Overall, any aspect of the Stoics’ physical theory could be seen as motivated by the 
fact that people often hold harmful beliefs to the contrary, beliefs which end up getting in the 
way of their ethical development.
47
 Again, though – and this is crucial – not everyone will 
hold all (or indeed any – Socrates?) of these harmful beliefs; and, as such, the level of 
physical study in which one will need to engage might vary significantly.
48
 
       In this respect, there are considerable parallels between Stoic views on the therapeutic 
benefits of physical study, and those advocated by the Epicureans. It was precisely (and 
indeed only) for the purpose of dispelling ethically harmful beliefs about the cosmos that 
Epicurus recommended the study of physics.
49
 However, it also seems that the Stoics saw 
physical study as useful beyond this basically ‘negative’ function (negative in that it serves to 
remove harmful beliefs). In addition to this, the Stoics seem to have accorded physical study 
a further, more constructive role. Indeed, Cicero makes this explicit in De finibus 4: 
 
Much the same can be said about natural science [sc. that the Peripatetic system is more 
comprehensive than the Stoics’]. Both the Peripatetics and the Stoics engage in it, and for more than 
the two reasons which Epicurus recommended, namely to drive out fear of the gods and religious 
superstition. A study of the heavens brings in addition a certain sense of moderation when one 
observes the great order and control that obtains among the gods as well. To look upon the gods’ 
works and their acts creates in us also a loftiness of spirit. And we gain a sense of justice when we 
understand the will, the design and the purpose of the supreme guide and lord to whose nature 
philosophers tell us that true reason and the highest law are perfectly matched.  
(Cicero De finibus 4.11, trans. Woolf) 
 
Cicero suggests that in addition to dispelling harmful beliefs about the cosmos, the study of 
physics can also invest us with a sense of moderation, a loftiness of spirit, and a sense of 
justice. What is interesting about these additional benefits, I suggest, is that they do not seem 
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 Such as we find in Cicero ND 2. 
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 Of course, one might also argue that the Stoics were required to develop the range of physical theory that they 
did for polemical reasons – i.e. in order to counter arguments from other schools. But this can actually be seen 
as motivated by the very same consideration: their philosophical rival are serving to spread harmful beliefs 
about the cosmos, and as such the Stoics need to respond with theory to counteract them.   
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 Indeed, Ierodiakonou (1993), in her analysis of the ‘parts’ of Stoic philosophy, argues that the varying orders 
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to the needs of its audience, rather than representing a fixed way of achieving moral progress. 
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to be rooted in knowing the content of physical theory, per se. The ‘Epicurean’ function of 
physical study, by way of contrast, seems very much to rely on the fact of the agent getting to 
know certain facts about the cosmos (precisely in order to dispel harmful beliefs one already 
has). Instead, these additional benefits seem to stem from the very activity of studying nature. 
Merely ‘observing’ or ‘looking upon’ (videant) the order of the cosmos, Cicero seems to 
suggest, brings about these senses of moderation, loftiness of spirit, and justice.  
       Of course, Cicero says that this is the view of both Stoics and Peripatetics; but we should 
bear in mind the dialectical context of this report, since Cicero’s strategy is to show that the 
Stoics basically plagiarised the Peripatetics. A certain amount of equivocation over the 
theories of each school is thus to be expected. But, in any case, we find these ideas also 
showing up in a variety of other contexts, where it seems clearer that Cicero had specifically 
Stoic views in mind. One important example is a passage from Tusculan Disputations 5, 
which is commonly taken to be heavily influenced by Stoicism.
50
 In this passage, moreover, 
Cicero goes into far more detail about how the study of nature can bring about these 
additional benefits: 
 
Haec tractanti animo et noctes et dies cogitanti exsistit illa a deo Delphis praecepta cognitio, ut ipsa 
se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio completur... 
Haec ille intuens atque suspiciens vel potius omnes partes orasque circumspiciens quanta rursus 
animi tranquillitate humana et citeriora considerat! Hinc illa cognitio virtutis exsistit, efflorescunt 
genera partesque virtutum, invenitur quid sit quod natura spectet extremum in bonis, quid in malis 
ultimum, quo referenda sint officia, quae degendae aetatis ratio deligenda.  
 
To the soul who investigates these things, reflecting on them night and day, there arises a recognition 
of that which is prescribed by the god at Delphi: that the mind must know itself, and feel its union 
with the divine mind. As a result of this it is filled with insatiable joy...As he gazes at this and looks 
upward – or rather around – at all parts and extremities of the universe, with what tranquillity of soul 
he turns back to reflect upon human matters, and upon the things that are closest to him! From this 
there arises a recognition of virtue, the genera and species into which the virtues bloom. It is 
discovered what nature regards as the utmost among goods and the worst among evils, that to which 
duties must be referred, that which must be chosen as the measure by which life is lived.  
(Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.70-2, my trans.) 
 
Again we see an emphasis not so much on learning facts about the cosmos (although no 
doubt one would also learn about the cosmos in this way) as on the mere act of engaging in 
this activity. This is again reflected by Cicero’s emphatic use of the language of seeing – 
intuens, suspicions, circumspiciens. How, though, does this benefit us? As in the passage 
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from De finibus 4, Cicero says that this activity results in a knowledge of the virtues – this 
time not only moderation and justice, but the virtues as a whole. Here, however, Cicero is 
much more informative about this. What, significantly, the agent appears to gain from 
contemplating the cosmos is self-knowledge. In particular, the knowledge of themselves as an 
integrated part of the cosmos – a part, moreover, that has a profound connection with the 
divine. It appears that the observation of the supreme expression of rationality that we find in 
the cosmos calls our attention to our own rational natures; and in this juxtaposition we feel – 
sentiat – a profound sense of “union” (coniunctam) with the world. This, of course, is an idea 
we have seen in the Natural Questions (which we shall come back to presently). Just like 
Seneca, then, Cicero seems to be saying that studying physics helps us to realise – or rather to 
feel – that our own end as human beings is bound up with the state of the cosmos more 
widely. 
       In a recent study, Reydams-Schils has also noted this link between physical study and the 
promotion of what she refers to as the “social aspect of virtue”.51 Again working through the 
prism of Cicero, Reydams-Schils considers the frequently-cited problem of the apparent 
absence of cosmic nature in Cicero’s ‘first’ account of οἰκείωσις at De finibus 3.21ff. 
Drawing more widely on Cicero’s work, however, she notes a consistent pattern that when 
the ‘social’ side of virtue becomes relevant, the cosmic context, and the importance of 
physical study, makes a reappearance. This much, indeed, is also true in De finibus 3; it is 
precisely after the ‘second’ account of οἰκείωσις (so-called ‘social οἰκείωσις’) that we find 
the Stoic spokesman Cato reaffirming the significance of physics, saying that (in a close echo 
of Chrysippus)
52
 “the starting point for anyone who is to live in accordance with nature is the 
universe as a whole and its governance...one cannot make correct judgements about good and 
evil unless one understands the whole system of nature” (3.73). Cato, moreover, goes on to 
repeat precisely what was said in the Tusculan Disputations – that the study of physics plays 
a crucial role in our coming to understand ourselves within this cosmic context: 
 
Those ancient precepts of the wise that bid us to “respect the right moment”, “follow god”, “know 
oneself ” and “do nothing to excess” cannot be grasped in their full force without a knowledge of 
physics. This one science alone can reveal the power of nature to foster justice and preserve friendship 
and other bonds of affection (De fin. 3.73, trans. Woolf). 
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Again Cicero quotes the Delphic maxim, and again it is clear that this process of coming to 
know oneself involves, or rather requires, knowing oneself as an agent who operates in the 
cosmic context. The study of physics helps this process, Cato says here, by helping to foster 
justice and the bonds of affection with other rational agents. If Reydams-Schils is right, and 
the ‘second’ account of οἰκείωσις in De finibus is supposed to ‘fill in’ what is missing from 
the first account at 3.21ff. (namely, the ‘social’ side of virtue), physical study can be seen as 
playing a useful role in helping agents to bridge the psychological ‘gap’ that is often seen as 
existing between the self-regarding impulses with which all agents begin life, and the 
socially-oriented impulse that becomes increasingly important as one develops into a fully 
rational being.   
 
* 
 
       In a moment we shall turn to consider some of the striking parallels between the 
foregoing and what we have seen previously in the Natural Questions, and the implications 
of this for Seneca’s originality. First, though, it will be useful to briefly summarise our 
findings.  
       To begin with, we have seen that there is a distinction between the role that cosmic 
nature plays in Stoic ethics, and that played by the activity of actually studying nature. The 
study of physics, we have seen, ought to be pursued for two broad reasons: first, because it is 
something that is simply natural for human beings to do, and thus, as is the case with all 
‘natural’ or ‘appropriate’ human activities, will be pursued if circumstances are conducive 
(sufficient leisure time, for instance). Second, though, we have also seen that physics could 
be pursued for its therapeutic benefits; but we have also seen that there is more than one way 
in which the study of physics can prove therapeutically beneficial. This depends, I have 
suggested, on what sort of defect the agent in question has developed. On the one hand, 
agents who have developed harmful beliefs about the cosmos (in particular, the belief that the 
cosmos is not a rationally and providentially organised place to live) will benefit from 
learning the content of Stoic physical theory – namely, those aspects that serve directly to 
counteract such beliefs: that it is atomic, or that natural phenomena are the work of 
malevolent gods, for instance. On the other hand, we have also seen that the study of physics 
can serve a therapeutic role that was not, per se, dependent on the content of physical theory. 
While I do not wish to claim that ‘content’ plays no part in this (indeed, it would no doubt 
lead to content; and it would be dangerous to engage in this activity if one was prone to 
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drawing harmful conclusions about the cosmos) it nevertheless seems from Cicero that there 
was something inherent in the very activity of studying nature which serves to promote a 
sense of ‘connectedness’ with the cosmos. 
       These two therapeutic functions can perhaps be related to a more general distinction that 
is sometimes made, especially in scholarship on post-Hellenistic Stoicism, between so-called 
‘spiritual exercise’, and what has been called ‘rational discourse’.53 This is sometimes cashed 
out as a distinction between, on the one hand, actually ‘learning’ philosophical theory and, on 
the other, performing exercises that help to, as it were, ‘digest’ this theory. However, while it 
is true that the evidence does sometimes seem to describe different sorts of philosophical 
activity that might be captured by this distinction,
54
 I hesitate to use the terms because, for 
one thing, they are not used by the Stoics themselves; but more importantly because such 
terms seem to create, in my opinion, too stark and artificial a divide between different sorts of 
philosophical activity. Sellers, for instance, suggests that the activity of the philosophical 
trainee would be divided quite rigidly along these lines: first doing some nuts-and-bolts 
learning of theory, and then striving to internalise this through various spiritual exercises. 
However, this account (aside from generally lacking in evidence) seems to conceptualise 
philosophical activity as the learning and internalising of every single aspect of Stoic theory – 
logical, ethical and physical. But this, I suggest, misrepresents the overarching frame of Stoic 
philosophy as, fundamentally, a therapeutic activity. Rather, as we have seen, there is no 
strict formulaic way in which an agent needs to engage in philosophy. Instead, the agent will 
engage in whatever activity is necessary for them to counteract their personal faults – be 
these erroneous beliefs about the cosmos, a failure to develop one’s ‘social’ tendencies to a 
sufficient degree, or whatever else. 
 
4. Physics and ethics in the Natural Questions (revisited)  
In the preceding I have largely excluded the Natural Questions from the discussion in an 
attempt to paint as neutral a picture of the earlier Stoa’s position on physical study as 
possible. However, as will already be apparent, there are considerable overlaps between the 
two. Overall, this seems to indicate that Seneca is generally working well within existing 
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Stoic parameters. This is not to say, however, that he is not also innovating significantly in 
some respects, and we shall come on to look at these in a moment. First, though, let us begin 
by considering the features of the Natural Questions where Seneca does seem to be 
conforming closely to traditional ideas about the value of physics. 
       First, it seems reasonable to say that the Natural Questions as a whole has a therapeutic 
aim in mind. For instance, from the very start of the work, and then repeatedly throughout, 
Seneca makes clear that we ought to study nature because it will benefit us.
55
 Broadly, then, 
the work can be seen to fit the notion of ‘physics as therapy’ (rather than, that is, an 
engagement in physical study for its own sake). 
       It also seems clear (particularly if one accepts what I have argued are the goals of the 
physics in the Natural Questions) that the work has much more in common with the second, 
non-‘Epicurean’ approach to physics as a therapeutic activity – though this is not to say that 
the work neglects this approach entirely, any more than it neglects the idea of physics as an 
intrinsically desirable activity for a human being to pursue. Indeed, just as we should resist 
any stark division between ‘spiritual exercise’ and ‘rational discourse’, so too would it be a 
mistake to think that a work of Stoic physics must work within just one of these frameworks. 
Indeed, it is quite clear that at several points in the Natural Questions Seneca does take the 
more ‘Epicurean’ approach. At the beginning of book 6, for example, when Seneca is 
considering the outstanding fearsomeness of earthquakes, he pauses to point out: 
 
It will also help to realise in advance that the gods are not responsible for any of this, and neither the 
sky nor the earth is shaken by the anger of divinities: these things have their own causes, and do not 
run wild to order, but, like our bodies, they are upset by certain defects, and when they seem to be 
causing harm, they are suffering it. When we are ignorant of the truth, everything is more 
terrifying...We never marvel at these things without fear. Since the cause of the fear is ignorance, is it 
not worth acquiring knowledge in order to remove your fear? (6.3.1-4)  
 
Here, then, Seneca recommends the study of physics for the quintessential ‘Epicurean’ 
motive: showing that frightening natural phenomena have natural causes, rather than being 
the work of malevolent divinities
56
 (although, it is worth noting that Seneca says that we must 
realise this fact about the cosmos in advance (praesumere), which perhaps already implies 
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that this sort of benefit is not the main motivation of the work. Indeed, it could even imply 
that realising this sort of fact about the cosmos is a precondition for being able to benefit 
from a work like the Natural Questions). Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter, the 
sections of the work that I referred to as ‘natural paradoxa’ might themselves be designed, if 
not specifically to counteract harmful beliefs about the cosmos, at least to promote reflection 
on one’s beliefs about nature. Seemingly, therefore, Seneca is happy to combine the various 
approaches to physical study available to him from the Stoic tradition. 
       In general, though, this ‘Epicurean’ approach does not seem to be Seneca’s primary 
motivation in the work. For one thing, Seneca spends relatively little time positively arguing 
for the fundamentals of Stoic physics, and certainly does not do so in any systematic way. 
One of the few major examples is the preface to book 2, which makes a case for the cosmos 
as a material continuum; but it is perhaps telling that such an exposition only takes place in 
the very last book. Indeed, most of the time, Stoic assumptions about the cosmos – the Stoic 
elemental theory, the active role of pneuma/spiritus, and even the function of divine reason – 
are, in effect, taken for granted. Again, this need not mean that the ‘content’ of the theories 
Seneca explores are completely irrelevant: it would clearly be counterproductive if the reader 
came to a harmful view of the cosmos by reading the Natural Questions. It simply appears 
that Seneca is not primarily concerned to show that the cosmos is of such or such a character 
– as would be his aim if he did principally have the ‘Epicurean’ goal in mind.  
       That the Natural Questions has much more in common with the second, non-Epicurean 
approach is, of course, already clear if one accepts the role that I have assigned to the physics 
in the Natural Questions in previous chapters. In point of detail, however, there are also some 
striking correspondences between what Seneca says about the study of physics and its 
benefits, and what we saw earlier from Cicero – particularly in the passage from Tusculan 
Disputations 5. It is worth quoting the relevant passages side by side: 
 
Haec tractanti animo et noctes et dies cogitanti exsistit illa a deo Delphis praecepta cognitio, ut ipsa 
se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio completur... 
Haec ille intuens atque suspiciens vel potius omnes partes orasque circumspiciens quanta rursus 
animi tranquillitate humana et citeriora considerat! 
 
Cum illa tetigit, alitur, crescit velut vinculis liberatus in originem redit, et hoc habet argumentum 
divinitatis suae quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis sed ut suis interest. Nam secure spectat 
occasus siderum atque ortus et tam diversas concordantium vias; observat ubi quaeque stella primum 
terris lumen ostendat, ubi columen eius [summumque cursus] sit, quousque descendat. Curiosus 
spectator excutit singula et quaerit. Quidni quaerat? Scit illa ad se pertinere. 
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To the soul who investigates these things, reflecting on them night and day, there arises a recognition 
of that which is prescribed by the god at Delphi: that the mind must know itself, and perceive its 
union with the divine mind. As a result of this it is filled with insatiable joy...As he gazes at this and 
looks upward – or rather around – at all parts and extremities of the universe, with what tranquillity of 
soul he turns back to reflect upon human matters, and upon the things that are closest to him!  
(Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.70-2, my trans.)    
 
When it has reached those regions, it finds nourishment, it grows, and, as though freed from its 
chains, it returns to its origin. It has this proof of its own divinity, that it takes delight in the divine and 
enjoys it not as someone else’s possession but as its own. For confidently it watches the settings and 
risings of the stars, and their differing but harmonious paths; it observes where each star first reveals 
its light to earth, where its zenith [the highest part of its course] is, to what point it descends. As a 
fascinated spectator, it examines and inquires into each detail. And why should it not inquire? It 
knows this all relates to itself. (1 pref. 12-13)    
 
As was pointed out earlier, Cicero suggests that the study of nature brings about a kind of 
self-knowledge – in particular, the knowledge of oneself as an integrated part of the cosmos 
with a close connection to the divine. What Seneca suggests seems strikingly similar. While 
Cicero talks about a sense of union with the divine mind, Seneca suggests that the activity 
leads to the realisation of one’s divine nature. In both cases, moreover, this realisation leads 
in turn to a heightened sense of ‘connectedness’ with the cosmos. Seneca, for his part, speaks 
of coming to see the cosmos as one’s own possession, as relating to oneself. Cicero, 
meanwhile, speaks first of the agent’s transition from looking upwards to looking around 
(going from a sense being ‘beneath’ to ‘among’ the cosmos, as it were), and then goes on to 
describe the agent’s reflection on what is “closest to him” (citeriora) – the implication 
presumably being that such reflection leads to the conclusion that the cosmos itself is 
‘closer’, in an ethical sense, than previously realised. 
       These theoretical correspondences imply two things. To begin with, they seem to 
confirm that Seneca was, indeed, drawing on existing Stoic ideas about the value of physical 
study. In addition, though, the correspondences here also add considerable support to what I 
have argued is the overall purpose of the aetiology in the Natural Questions: to promote a 
sense of affinity with the cosmos. For in the earlier evidence we find a clear theoretical 
precedent for this idea. 
       At the same time, Seneca’s unoriginality in this respect might also raise concerns about 
other features of my overall interpretation. One of my central contentions, of course, is that 
the Natural Questions should be read as a response to philosophical pressures exerted by 
contemporary Platonism; in particular, that Seneca’s attempt to foster affinity with the 
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cosmos is a response to the Platonists’ contention that empiricism prevents agents from 
developing more than a very narrow conception of self-interest.  
       If, however, the Stoics already had a solution to the problem, why, on the one hand, do 
the Platonists think this will be an effective line of attack? Or why, on the other, does Seneca 
believe that foregrounding this particular aspect of Stoic theory will prove an effective 
response, if it was something that the Stoics already had in place? 
       Part of the answer, I think, stems from the fact that the Stoics themselves had identified 
the issues surrounding man’s ‘social’ tendencies as a weak point in their theory.57 This much 
is indicated by the very fact that we find Stoics, both early and late, describing strategies to 
address the issue. Indeed, we have seen several of these strategies. Aside from the ‘approach 
through physics’, we have also seen the attempt of the Stoic Hierocles to promote sociability 
through his exercise involving circles. In addition, the very process of οἰκείωσις that we find 
elaborated in Stoic texts has sometimes been interpreted as an attempt to address the issue. 
Striker, for instance, argues that the description of the process of οἰκείωσις is actually just an 
attempt to construct a “psychologically plausible” account of how any agent could come to 
regard ‘agreement with nature’ as the only good (while the argument for this being the end, 
Striker maintains, takes a different form).
58
 But even if one does not subscribe to this 
interpretation, there are other features of the οἰκείωσις account that could be taken to indicate 
Stoic disquiet in this area. In particular, the mere fact that οἰκείωσις is harnessed to perform 
the double function of explaining initial motivation and then social tendencies – two 
functions that are notoriously difficult to reconcile
59
 – in itself could be taken to betray the 
Stoics’ awareness of a gap between these two sorts of motivation, one that needed to be 
addressed.
60
  
       If this is right, then the Platonists would have had a strong motive to pick away at this 
area of Stoic theory regardless – or rather, precisely because of – the various strategies they 
had developed to address the problem. For, they will have noted, the Stoics themselves were 
evidently concerned about the issue, and the sheer variety of strategies they developed to 
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 Inwood (1984, esp. 179ff.) calls attention to this issue as a perennial problem for the Stoics – one that he 
believes they never managed adequately to address.  
58
 Striker (1989).  
59
 For an excellent summary of the approaches scholars have taken, see Klein (2016). 
60
 Contra Reydams-Schils (2002); (2005a, ch. 2), who suggests that the Stoic social impulse exists even in 
childhood. For me, the existence of these strategies to mitigate the problem counts against this.  
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address it merely betrays a long-running disagreement and a lack of clarity about how best to 
solve it.
61
  
       This, however, does not immediately answer the question of why Seneca thought 
foregrounding one of these existing strategies – the approach through physics – would prove 
an effective response. If the Platonists could point to Stoic disagreement as evidence of the 
failure of these strategies, merely rehashing any of these approaches would be unlikely to 
make significant headway. This, though, is precisely where Seneca’s innovations in the 
Natural Questions become central. For the fact is that Seneca does not merely rehash existing 
Stoic ideas. Certainly, as we have seen, he makes use of existing strategies; but he also, and 
crucially, adapts these ideas for the specific opponents with whom he is dealing. In 
particular, he combines the Stoic ‘approach through physics’ with the Platonist methodology 
of abstraction. It is exactly this, however, that gives his approach teeth against the Platonists; 
for in doing so he rephrases the argument in terms that the Platonists themselves ought to 
accept. It is they who suggest that a carefully structured engagement with nature can bring 
about a separation of mind and body, and thus they who provide a potential route out of the 
problem. By recasting the ‘approach through physics’ in this way, Seneca adapts an existing 
Stoic argument to respond effectively to the contemporary philosophical context.
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Indeed we know that the Platonists were keen to exploit these sorts of disagreements. As we saw in chapter 2, 
the disagreements among rival schools was one of the key justifications for reverting to the authority of Plato. 
What is more, it seems that Platonists regarded the Stoic school as being particularly fractious, even within its 
own ranks, and they did indeed take this to indicate the weakness of their theoretical framework. We see this 
clearly in the following from Numenius: “[Unlike the Epicureans, t]here have been factions among the Stoics 
which started with their founders and continue today. They take pleasure in malicious refutation. Some of them 
maintain their original positions, others have shifted. Their founders were like oligarchs, whose divisions 
furnished their successors with plenty of reasons for criticising them” (from his book On the Dissension of the 
Academics from Plato, ap. Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 14.5.1-6.14, trans. Boys-Stones, my 
emphases). 
165 
 
– Summary & Conclusion – 
 
1. Summary 
In Chapter 1 I considered the unusual form of the Natural Questions. Having rejected the 
approach of scholars who essentially deny there is any discontinuity between the aetiology 
and the moralising passages (on the basis that these interpretations sometimes rest on rather 
subjective evidence) I moved to consider a number of factors that might have motivated 
Seneca to write the work in this ‘compartmentalised’ way. I began by looking at writing 
conventions that might have influenced him – first, those of the Stoic tradition of physical 
writing, and subsequently the conventions of contemporary literary output. We saw that, 
while there is precedent for the combination of ethics and physics in the Stoic tradition, 
Seneca does seem unusual for combining these particular sorts of ethical themes with 
physical discourse. As for literary convention, although there are some partial parallels to 
Seneca’s approach in the wider literary tradition, these do not, I contended, really explain 
what Seneca might be trying to achieve with this text – especially considering the 
philosophical frame of the work. Consequently, I then looked at a number of philosophical 
approaches to the text. I argued that approaches that try to explain the form of the work on 
the basis of the close relationship between Stoic ethics and physics are limited because, again, 
this does not explain why Seneca focuses on these rather surprising ethical themes. Finally, 
then, I considered the view that the form of the work is influenced by Seneca’s engagement 
with Platonism. While I rejected the idea that he has a conciliatory attitude towards 
Platonism, I suggested that the influence of Platonism may yet prove decisive, considering 
the high concentration of Platonic allusions at key points in the Natural Questions.  
       In Chapter 2, then, I set about considering the nature of the debate with Platonism around 
the time Seneca was writing. In particular, I focussed on a key issue in ethical epistemology: 
how to form a well-grounded concept of ‘the good’. The Stoics, I argued, may have been able 
to stave off Platonist concerns about not being able to derive a robust concept of ‘goodness’ 
through empirical means alone by, for instance, identifying the good with the total wellbeing 
of the cosmos. But this solution brought problems of its own – problems that seem to have 
been picked up by the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus. Anon., I suggested, argues 
that the Stoic attempt through οἰκείωσις to get the entire community of rational beings within 
the agent’s ethical frame of reference fails, since empiricist agents are necessarily restricted 
to a partial view of the world – that of the body. No empiricist agent, then, could ever achieve 
the impartiality required by the Stoic position. I then argued that Seneca seems to be aware of 
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this debate. His 120
th
 Letter not only discusses the problems associated with acquiring the 
concept of the good but, moreover, even draws attention to our over-attachment to our bodies 
as a serious sticking-point for the theory. More significantly, various statements within the 
Natural Questions itself seem to speak directly to the problem: the repeated claims that 
studying nature can separate mind from body or bring about an ‘escape from oneself’, and 
that it can even foster a sense of affinity with the cosmos – goals, moreover, that are phrased 
in strikingly Platonic terms. 
       Chapter 3 considered whether and how these goals are being achieved in the Natural 
Questions. Looking at the aetiological portions of the work, I argued that each book appears 
to be structured in a relatively uniform way. Seneca moves from naive material, mechanical, 
and often visible causes, through ever-more profound accounts of causation that are 
increasingly inaccessible to the senses. This process consistently culminates with some 
reflection on the role of the divine – the most profound and imperceptible cause of all. This 
‘methodology of abstraction’, I argued, closely parallels one that the Platonists employ, 
designed, indeed, to lead the mind away from the distractions of the senses and the body, in 
preparation for cognition of the Forms. While Seneca manifestly does not regard the 
apprehension of the Forms as the end-point of this process, he can nevertheless exploit this 
methodology to bring about a certain distancing of the mind from the body. The intention 
behind this approach, I suggested, is that it will at once draw our attention to our own 
fundamentally rational natures, and, by exposing us to the supreme rationality found in nature 
at precisely this point, will serve to promote a sense of affinity with the cosmos. Seneca, then, 
uses a methodology recommended by the Platonists themselves to overcome the problem 
they level at Stoicism.  
       In Chapter 4 I returned to consider the moralising passages. I began by distinguishing 
those which ought properly speaking to be considered ‘moralising passages’, doing so on the 
basis of a number of shared characteristics. Aside from having, at best, a very tenuous 
connection with their surrounding aetiology, and often being introduced abruptly with 
awkward transitional devices, all of them contain vivid depictions of moral vice. What unites 
this ostensibly disparate collection of vices, I argued, is the fact that each of them can be read 
as instances in which agents have misarticulated the good, having come to regard things such 
as pleasure, wealth, political power or mere bodily survival as genuine goods. Having noted 
the significance of Seneca’s emphasis on these agents’ over-reliance on sense-perception 
(which seems to reflect the Platonist critique of empiricism), I then argued that these passages 
can, in fact, be seen to complement the role of the aetiology by orienting us away from these 
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erroneous goods. This function is again informed by the structure of the work – in particular, 
the careful placement of these passages at points when the highest level of causal analysis has 
been reached. The idea, I argued, is that by abruptly confronting us with these vivid and 
repulsive instances of vice at points in the aetiology at which we are most ‘separated’ from 
our bodies – most aware, that is, of our true rational natures and our relationship with the 
divine – Seneca hopes to jar us into critical reflection on the value of such objects. Thus, 
while the aetiology serves to foster a stronger relationship with the cosmos, the moralising 
passages serve to sever our existing attachments to false goods. 
       Having looked at the Natural Questions in its contemporary philosophical context, 
Chapter 5 turned to consider the work in relation to earlier Stoic thought about the value of 
physical study. I began by considering the contentious issue of the relationship between 
physics and ethics in Stoicism. I sided against the likes of Julia Annas in thinking that physics 
(or rather, ‘cosmic nature’) plays a grounding role for Stoic ethics. At the same time, I argued 
that this debate has largely neglected the question of what we, as agents, are supposed to get 
out of studying physics. I then considered the paradox of the fact that, despite the Stoics’ 
apparent interest in physics, a variety of evidence seems to suggest that one could become a 
sage without ever studying nature. The paradox dissolves, I argued, when we consider the 
fundamentally therapeutic frame of Stoic philosophy. Considered in this light, it became 
apparent that the extent to which one might engage in the study of physics depends on one’s 
particular therapeutic needs. As it turned out, though, the study of nature can provide more 
than one therapeutic benefit. On the one hand, it can focus on the content of physical theory, 
serving to counteract one’s harmful beliefs about the cosmos that might stand in the way of 
one’s ethical progress. On the other, and much more in line with what we find in Seneca, it 
also seems that engaging in the study of nature can serve to enhance one’s ‘social’ 
tendencies. Considering this, it seems highly likely that in the Natural Questions Seneca was 
drawing on existing Stoic ideas about the value of physical study. However, by combining 
these ideas with the Platonist ‘methodology of abstraction’, Seneca adapts them to respond 
effectively to a pressing contemporary philosophical problem. 
 
2. Seneca’s innovative conservatism 
In the Introduction I spoke quite strongly against what I think are some of the prevailing 
misconceptions about post-Hellenistic Stoicism. In particular, the idea of Stoicism in this 
period being concerned solely with ‘practical ethics’; that they were unthinking ‘eclectics’; 
and that Stoic innovation in this period was restricted to the form of works, rather than 
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theory. There is a certain irony in the fact, therefore, that I have argued (a) that Natural 
Questions has an ethical goal in mind (b) that Seneca appropriates a Platonist methodology, 
and (c) that Seneca draws heavily on existing Stoic theory, though innovates in the way he 
structures the work! What distinguishes my account, however, is that in each case I think 
Seneca is motivated by sophisticated and theoretically grounded philosophical considerations 
– something of which he is often deprived on more traditional readings. Let us take these in 
sequence. 
       Two relevant points spring to mind concerning the ethical thrust I have attributed to the 
Natural Questions vis-à-vis the narrative of ‘practical ethics’. First, there is a tendency 
among some (though not all) who subscribe to this narrative to conceive of it as a new focus 
on ethics at the expense of the theoretical considerations underlying ethics. Taking the 
theoretical underpinnings of Stoic ethics as a given, it is maintained, Stoics of this period 
write works that merely aim to help their readers (and themselves) to make progress towards 
these ideals in their everyday lives – through spiritual exercises, critical self-reflection, and 
the like. This might conceivably be the case with someone such as Marcus Aurelius – though 
he is, of course, an extremely unusual example; and some would dispute this even in his case. 
As I hope to have shown, though, the same certainly cannot be said of Seneca and the 
Natural Questions. To begin with, the ethical end that Seneca hopes to achieve is solidly 
grounded in Stoic theory – principally, the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις, and Stoic thought about 
the benefits that can be derived from physical study. What is more, though – if I am right 
about the anti-Platonist dimension to the work – the Natural Questions is engaging in a 
technical theoretical debate with the Platonists over the ability of Stoicism to justify its 
account of the highest good. While Seneca undoubtedly hoped that there would be practical 
ethical payoff from reading his work, this takes nothing away from the sophisticated level of 
theoretical engagement that lies behind his approach to bringing this about. 
       The second thing to say about the ethical drive of the work is that, as we saw in Chapter 
5, Seneca is by no means novel in thinking that the study of physics can and should serve an 
ethical purpose. Indeed, as we saw, the very ethical goal that Seneca attributes to the study of 
physics coheres closely with earlier Stoic thought on the matter. This, in fact, should go 
further towards highlighting the mistake of distinguishing too sharply between early and late 
Stoicism: Stoics of both periods, this shows, had both theoretical and practical concerns in 
mind. 
       What, then, of Seneca’s appropriation of elements of Platonist theory – does this make 
him an eclectic, after all? The short answer is, of course, no. If we take eclecticism to mean 
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an unthinking adoption of rival theories that do not cohere philosophically with the 
recipient’s system, then Seneca cannot be described as an eclectic. Rather, as I hope to have 
shown, Seneca’s appropriation of the Platonist-inspired ‘methodology of abstraction’ is 
motivated by very specific philosophical considerations. It serves to solve a problem that 
already existed within Stoicism: how to get from a narrow (and in some sense natural) form 
of self-interest, focussed on the body, to one that pays significantly less attention to the body. 
Even this, however, underplays the level of philosophical acuity that Seneca displays here. 
For, as we have also seen, it is the very fact that Seneca uses the Platonists’ own theory 
against them that gives the Natural Questions teeth as a polemical work. 
       However, even if we can reject this naive sort of eclecticism, does not the Natural 
Questions, on my reading, nevertheless display a certain openness Platonism? Indeed, 
although it has been my contention throughout that Seneca’s engagement with Platonism in 
this work should be seen in an adversarial light, some might well wonder whether my reading 
actually has more in common with the conciliatory reading of Seneca vis-à-vis Platonism 
than I have thus far acknowledged. After all, Seneca’s response to the Platonist attack is not 
to mount an all-out offensive of his own. On the contrary, Seneca responds by incorporating 
one of the Platonists’ own theories within his system. To some this might look less like 
hostility, and more like what has been called a “pooling of philosophical resources” between 
the schools.
1
 Rather than rejecting Platonism outright, it could be argued, Seneca instead 
looks openly to Platonism in search of answers; and, on inspection, he finds the ground 
fertile. 
       However, I believe this reading should on the whole be resisted, based on the following 
considerations. First, we must reflect on the nature of the Platonist project in this period. As 
we have seen, the central and defining claim of Platonism is that we must accept the 
existence of transcendent first principles: the Forms. Unless we do so, Platonists claim, we 
might as well give up on philosophical dogmatism; and it is precisely the desire to show this 
that motivates much of the anti-Stoic, anti-empiricist polemic we have seen from the 
Platonists in previous chapters. 
       What is crucial to note, then, is that on this central matter Seneca makes absolutely no 
concessions to the Platonists. Indeed, far from working with the Platonists in their project, 
Seneca’s appropriation of the methodology of abstraction is harnessed to defend the Stoic 
account of the good – an account that is entirely at odds with the central Platonist claim, and 
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 Sedley (2003), 22. 
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one which the Platonists explicitly attack. Seneca, moreover, shows that the methodology can 
be harnessed usefully without adopting any of the metaphysical apparatus that the Platonists 
attach to it. If this is a pooling of philosophical resources, then these resources are 
nevertheless being used for diametrically opposing ends. Rather than working as allies on a 
common philosophical mission, Seneca’s move seems more akin to an army stealing 
armaments from the enemy camp to fortify its own defences.   
       Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Seneca’s engagement with the Platonists in the 
Natural Questions completely lacks the ferocity that we find in the out-and-out polemics 
coming from the rival side. Even if, as I pointed out in the Introduction, the Stoics’ alleged 
dialectical silence in this period has been somewhat overblown (Seneca’s 65th Letter being 
the most overt, though not the only, example), there is no getting away from the fact that the 
Stoics do not appear to try to match their rivals like for like in these hostilities.  
       Does this, then, represent an attitude of resignation, or acquiescence, on the part of the 
Stoics? Again, I think the answer is no. The key to understanding the Stoics’ attitude in this 
period, as opposed to that of the Platonists’, comes from considering the relative positions of 
the schools coming into the post-Hellenistic period. As has been noted before, the Stoics 
came out of the preceding period as the dominant philosophical force. By comparison, 
Platonism was the new kid on the block. The task facing each side, therefore, was completely 
different in nature. For their part, it was essential that the Platonists made a name for 
themselves, carved out a philosophical identity on a philosophical playing field that was 
already dominated by big players. This, it has been suggested, is precisely why we find many 
Platonists displaying such a penchant for polemicising in this period.
2
 On the Stoic side, 
however, such tactics were simply not necessary.
3
 Already occupying the dominant position, 
the task facing the Stoics was more a defensive operation: the shutting down of specific 
threats when and where they arose. To mount an all-out offensive against this upstart 
movement may have seemed, at least at the outset, an overreaction.  
       It is under the rubric of defence that we can, I think, understand the dialectical character 
of Seneca engagement with Platonism in the Natural Questions. Seneca’s strategy, unlike 
what we frequently find in Platonist polemic, is not to undermine the Platonism system 
entirely. Such a project is outside the remit of what Seneca needs to do. All that he needs to 
do is to show that the existing Stoic theoretical framework is up to the job; and this is 
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 Bonazzi (2016), 166-7. 
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 Indeed, they may not even have been desirable: Boys-Stones (2009) suggests that for the Stoics to engage in 
such polemics could have been seen as a tacit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the Platonist position. 
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basically what he does. As we have seen, despite importing the Platonist methodology of 
abstraction, the function that Seneca ascribes to physical study, the role it can play in 
promoting affinity towards the cosmos, is fundamentally in line with Hellenistic Stoic theory. 
The fact that Seneca builds on this by importing the Platonists’ own methodology seems, to 
me, to be only an ingenious sting in the tail; for it shows that the Stoic account can not only 
be made to work, but can be made to work along methodological lines that the Platonists 
themselves should accept. 
       The defensive nature of Seneca’s engagement with Platonism, however, brings us to our 
third point. For, if Seneca’s strategy is indeed basically defensive – to hold ground that was 
gained during the Hellenistic period – this would seem to commit him more to theoretical 
conservatism than it would to significant theoretical innovation. Indeed, as we have seen, 
Seneca does ultimately adhere quite closely to Hellenistic Stoic thought on the role of 
physical study. So does this justify the idea that the innovations of later Stoics like Seneca are 
mainly in terms of the form of exposition, rather than underlying theory? Here the answer is a 
more qualified no. It would be wrong, for instance, to think of Seneca’s structuring of the 
work as just a formal innovation. The structure is at once theoretically grounded, and, more 
importantly, motivated by the changing theoretical challenges facing Stoicism in this period. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Seneca does not engage in any serious theoretical 
revisions of Hellenistic Stoicism. For all his self-professed independence from his school, 
Seneca’s views in the Natural Questions – at least when it comes to the relationship between 
ethics and physics – seem fairly ‘orthodox’. While he is keen to point out where he does 
disagree – the celestial rather than atmospheric nature of comets being one prominent 
example – such disagreements are hardly mould-breaking in the grander scheme of Stoicism. 
       However, it could be that theoretical conservatism turns out to be a virtue of the work – 
at least when read as a response to the Platonists. For if the Platonists wanted to show that 
there was something terribly wrong at the heart of Stoicism, significant theoretical innovation 
on the part of the Stoics could have been taken as an embarrassing concession. In such a 
situation, an appealing strategy might have been to resist thoroughgoing theoretical 
innovation as far as possible. While I would hesitate to offer this as an argument for Seneca’s 
theoretical conservatism more generally (which is, in any case, debatable), in the context of 
the present debate, at least, a conservative approach might have seemed particularly 
attractive. Two considerations inform this. The first is down to the matter at stake in this 
debate: the Stoic theory of the good. This theory, of course, stands at the core of the Stoics’ 
ethical project; but this means that it is here, least of all, that the Stoics would have wanted to 
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be seen undertaking significant theoretical revision. The second consideration stems from 
what was argued at the end of Chapter 5: that the problem of ‘egoism’ seems to have been a 
perennial problem for the Stoics, even before the Platonists came onto the scene. This, I 
argued, is suggested by the various approaches that the Stoics developed to address the 
problem – the two-stage theory of οἰκείωσις, the approach through physics, and the exercise 
proposed by Hierocles. In such a situation, with various approaches already available, adding 
yet another might simply have done further damage to the Stoics’ credibility over this issue. 
While, of course, highly speculative, such a narrative would add a further level of 
sophistication to Seneca’s response. Rather than undertaking any fundamental theoretical 
revisions, Seneca shows that the Platonist critique can be shrugged off with the merest of 
tweaks to Stoic theory – or rather, just to the implementation of that theory.  
       Of course, such a strategy was unlikely to prove sustainable in the long run. Indeed, the 
ultimate demise of Stoicism across this period bears testament to the fact that the Stoics were 
not, in the end, able to adapt quickly enough to stem the tide of Platonism. As I hope to have 
shown, however, this was not for want of trying. Seneca, for one, seems whole-heartedly 
engaged in the defence of his system. One hopes that further research will confirm that he 
was not alone in this effort. 
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